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This thesis studies the evolving Sino-Indian relationship from 1988 till the beginning of 
2006. It seeks to determine India-China relations in the context of India’s Look East 
policy. It examines the trajectories of the three basic forms of interaction, conflict, 
competition and cooperation, which govern this bilateral relationship. The thesis analyses 
the consequences of this interaction for India’s foreign policy options specifically in the 
Southeast Asian region, which has come to assume much importance from the 
perspective of India’s geopolitical interests and economic growth. Southeast Asia being a 
traditional Chinese sphere of influence, it is but natural that any Indian policy options in 
the region will have a significant China content. This study shows how the simultaneous 
interaction of the three quests for wealth, status and security is pivotal across all aspects 
of this relationship. 
Not much research has taken place on the changing dynamics of Sino-Indian relations 
from the 1980s onwards. Literature is available on Sino-Indian border dispute and on 
India’s Look East policy separately. There have been occasional indications in some 
studies about how relationship with China has been a factor influencing Indian foreign 
policy choices. However, no study has focused in detail this bilateral relationship in the 
context of a third region, Southeast Asia.  
Immense developments in India’s relations with China and the ASEAN states have taken 
place over the last decade and a half. India’s Look East policy has been revived and given 
a specific focus. Initially it implied trade and investment linkages with the ASEAN 
 v
region. However in its second phase, the strategic aspect of the policy has been gaining 
ground with the focus now being on wider economic and security issues. 
From the analysis of these interactions it is evident that India-China relationship has 
influenced overall Indian security perceptions, economic interests and strategic aims. The 
thesis demonstrates how Southeast Asia has become a crucial arena for the interplay of 
the multidimensional forces governing India-China relations today. How the two 
simultaneously rising Asian giants manage their relations, would have an important 
bearing for not just the ASEAN region but would actually go a long way towards 
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The Sino-Indian relationship is a unique relationship characterized by the elements of 
complex security. The two nations not only have to manage their age old rivalry but also 
seek cooperation. Over the last couple of years, both China and India have emerged as 
major economies and potential global powers and are together the topic of much 
academic focus and media coverage. The underlying elements of mistrust, tensions and 
disputes still remain deep rooted. However the regional shifts in balance of power and 
changing dynamics in the international milieu have resulted in the two states striving to 
engage with each other, while simultaneously reviving the process of confidence building 
and also competing for greater global power and influence. This introductory chapter 
would cover the aim of the thesis, the main argument, the theoretical framework and 
organization of the thesis, the scope, the relevance of Southeast Asia in the context of this 
thesis and the background and evolution of India’s China policy which forms the 
foundation of this study. 
 
Aim of the thesis 
This thesis aims to address the changing dynamics of India-China relations in the context 
of India’s Look East policy (which was initiated not only with regard to Indian policy 
options in the Southeast of Asia, but also incorporated East Asia). This study basically 
looks at the dynamics of Sino-Indian interactions from 1988 onwards (when initiatives 
were taken by either country to normalize bilateral relations for the first time) and its 
implications for India’s policy options in Southeast Asia. In addition to the traditional 
instruments of direct rivalry, increasingly both countries are emphasizing on indirect 
approach to competition. The complexity and the multidimensionality of the evolving 
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relationship which has expanded to include the issues of economics, status and security is 
bound to spill over to the Asian continent at large. 
 
There is a vast literature on Indian foreign policy and India’s relations with China. Most 
of the research has been on the aspects of conflict arising out of the 1962 India-China war 
and the Sino-Indian border dispute which is yet to be resolved. An increasing number of 
studies have also covered the border negotiations. However, there is a relative gap in the 
literature available with respect to the evolving India-China bilateral relations which 
marked a significant improvement since 1988. 
 
Scholarly works have also been forthcoming on India’s Look East policy and its relations 
with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet, not 
much comprehensive literary work is available which studies the significant changing 
dynamics of the India-China relations and its resultant influence over all round Indian 
security perceptions, economic interests and political aims. How Indian interactions with 
China have influenced India to seek out alternative options in the vibrant Southeast Asian 
region has been occasionally touched upon but not really covered in great details. This 
thesis would study how bilateral Sino-Indian relations have evolved over the years 
thereby compelling both the countries to operate across wider geostrategic spaces; 
Southeast Asia would be the reference in this context. 
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Borrowing from K.J. Holsti’s classification of inter-state relations1, which regards 
conflict, competition and cooperation as forms of interaction, the thesis would study these 
three forms of interaction which is generally present across all aspects of Sino-Indian 
bilateral relationship. Though competition as a form of interaction has elements of 
conflict in it, for the purpose of this research it is essential to differentiate between the 
two. Increasingly conflict is getting blunted and competition for status, security and 
wealth, is what is shaping the direction of the evolving Sino-Indian relations. 
 
It needs to be mentioned here that certain economic and political dimensions and issues 
like the nuclear aspect, the energy security and the role of the US, overlap in various 
chapters simply because these issues have an inherent interplay of more than one aspect. 
 
This study aims to add greater understanding to the existing literature focusing on India-
China interactions. As the two Asian giants gear up to become more important in 
international strategic terms because of their overlapping spheres of influence in regions 
like Southeast Asia, the thesis aims to take forward the current international focus on the 
region, which is again a topic of immense recent interest. 
 
An interesting thing about the re-emergence of India and China is perhaps the fact that 
both are regaining their ancient positions as largest economies in the global arena. In this 
context, understandably their international political thinking is undergoing fundamental 
changes and is contributing jointly to the increase of the Asian preeminence in the 
                                                 
1 K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992),   
pp.348-398. 
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international system. Based upon a wide review of literature and interview with scholars 
and experts, this study represents an effort to present the strategic nuances in India-China 
relations as they cooperate and compete for influence in Southeast Asia, thereby aiming 
for greater status and power in the Asian balance of power. How the two Asian giants 
manage their relations would not only have an important bearing for the Southeast Asian 
states but also for the Asian continent at large as it would go a long way in maintaining 
regional peace and stability.                
 
Main Argument 
Before offering the main argument in this thesis, it would be worthwhile to mention the 
background on which the argument is based. Of utmost importance in Indian foreign 
relations is the fact, that there has been a fundamental transition in Indian foreign policy 
making after the end of the Cold War, which in turn has influenced Indian policy options 
vis-à-vis China and the Southeast Asia. It has been a transition from the erstwhile 
idealism in the form of theories like Afro-Asian solidarity or nonalignment to a new 
found pragmatism in Indian foreign policy thinking, reflected in the pursuit of national 
interests based on realpolitik. 
 
The main argument in this thesis is that it has primarily been the interaction of India and 
China on a bilateral basis that has influenced India’s policy options in other regions, such 
as Southeast Asia. This study aims to show how India’s Look East policy in Southeast 
Asia is derivative of the interplay of conflict, competition and new found cooperation, 
which characterizes the Sino-Indian relationship. It shows how a significant Indian 
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concern emerging for a rising China, not just in terms of conflict but also in terms of 
competition, has become an important determinant in shaping Indian foreign policy, 
especially India’s Look East policy. 
 
The pursuit of Indian foreign policy in Southeast Asia had never had any linear 
progression in the past. Though Indian policy makers do time and again emphasise that 
Indian policy options in Southeast Asia are in no way derived from its relations with 
China, nevertheless, this study aims to show that once again it is out of the perceived 
security and economic concerns vis-à-vis China, that much of Indian strategic 
calculations are taking place and as a consequence there does exist an element of tension 
between an autonomous policy towards Southeast Asia (the Look East policy as officially 
announced) and as a fallout of India’s relations with China.  
 
It is the age-old balance of power game between India and China that has acquired a fresh 
meaning in the present era. Both countries have a common preference for employing the 
balance of power framework in inter-state relations, thereby inevitably leading each to 
provide vital support to those countries which could serve as potential counterweights to 
others. In this backdrop, the contest for greater strategic influence in the economically 
dynamic region of Southeast Asia comes to the forefront. It is a unique contest between 
the two Asian giants, accompanied by serious efforts to increase their all round bilateral 




Theoretical framework and organization of the thesis  
Based on the evidence of this research what comes out is that Indian foreign policy has 
elements both from the Realist and the Liberal Institutionalist framework. As it would be 
rather simplistic to study Indian foreign policy on the basis of any one particular 
framework, for the purpose of research of the subtle nuances governing Sino-Indian 
interactions, this study employs a mix of both the Realist and the Liberal Institutionalist 
perspective. The Chapters studying the interactions of Conflict and Competition would be 
analysed through a Realist framework as most literature tend to study the conflict-
competition aspects in Sino-Indian relations in zero-sum terms, given the geo-strategic 
realities and the determination of the two Asian giants to gain hold in each other’s sphere 
of influence. The Chapter analyzing Cooperation is looked at from a new perspective, 
employing the framework of Cooperative Security, which derives from the Liberal 
Institutionalist tradition. This is a new line of thinking where security is defined in much 
broader terms and would be analysed in details in the third chapter. This is a particularly 
useful approach when studying the new cooperative elements shaping India-China 
relations.  Janne E Nolan is one of the main scholars associated with this theoretical 
concept of Cooperative Security.2  
 
Overall, for the purpose of this study, we would use the framework of the three 
intersecting circles of security, wealth and status, as employed by eminent scholar Ashley 
Tellis in his study, China and India in Asia.3 In this thesis, the interaction between the 
                                                 
2 Janne E Nolan, ed., Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 1994). 
3 Ashley Tellis, ‘China and India in Asia” in The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement, eds. 
Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.134-177. 
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struggle for security, quest for wealth and recognition of status would be the key index in 
the study of Sino-Indian interactions. 
 
This introductory chapter is followed by three Chapters and a Conclusion. 
 
Chapter One examines conflict as a form of interaction in Sino-Indian bilateral relations. 
It briefly examines India’s Look East policy, the India-China territorial dispute, and the 
strategic and maritime dimensions of the conflict.  
 
Chapter Two covers Competition as a form of interaction in this relationship. It examines 
four basic aspects of competition between India and China, from economics, geopolitics 
to energy security and the nuclear question. The chapter also highlights the position of 
Southeast Asia in the competition between the two states. 
 
Chapter Three analyses Cooperation as a form of interaction in Sino-Indian relations. 
After introduction to the chapter, Cooperative Security as an approach is defined. Then 
Cooperation is categorized under the two sub-sections - Cooperation as a process and 
Cooperation as a means. Under the latter, the discussion is in detail and the issues range 
from trade, cooperation against US unipolarity to cooperation in the fields of Information 
technology (IT), energy security and against terrorism. Before concluding, this chapter 
too highlights the position of Southeast Asia in the context of Sino-Indian cooperation.  
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The findings from all the chapters are summarized in the Conclusion together with a 
projection for the future. 
 
Scope of the thesis 
The thesis aims to primarily focus on the development of Sino-Indian relations from 1988 
onwards, which was marked by the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China. 
Questions may be raised as to why 1988 is so crucial from the standpoint of this study? It 
must be noted that prior to this period, from the 1962 Sino-Indian border war till 1988, 
even with the establishment of diplomatic ties, Sino-Indian relations were practically 
frozen amidst bitterness and mutual suspicion. This sense of hostility was further 
reinforced by the Cold war and the dynamics of US-Soviet-China strategic triangle, 
which aggravated the mistrust between India and China. From 1985 onwards dramatic 
changes of policy by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev compelled not just Sino-Soviet 
détente but also Sino-Indian rapprochement.4   
 
Sino-Indian relations began to thaw significantly for the first time after Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi’s visit diplomacy to China in 1988. A literature review on Sino-Indian 
relations depicts that most analysts view the 1988 visit as significant and relevant for any 
study of India-China relations in the present context. Rajiv Gandhi is credited for having 
broken the mould of India’s rigid China policy. Not just in India but also in China, 
officials and non-officials believe that his visit greatly contributed to the establishment of 
                                                 
4 Cited in Sujit Dutta, “Sino-Indian Relations: Some Issues”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.11, No.11 (February 
1998), pp.1239-1264. 
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a strategic frame for Sino-Indian relations.5 During Rajiv Gandhi’s talks with Deng 
Xiaoping, the latter called upon India to undertake close cooperation with China, aimed at 
creating a new international economic order.6 In this context, former Chinese 
Ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng, asserted that on the disputed boundary question, it 
was Deng Xiaoping who continued to implement the policy of mutual understanding and 
accommodation, which in turn has played a vital role in guiding the consultations 
between the two countries. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China is regarded as 
having resumed the exchange of visits by leaders between the two countries, which 
eventually became a turning point in Sino-Indian relations.7
             
It brought about a new beginning of relations, nevertheless critics point out that the visit 
had hurt vital Indian interests for it not only failed to resolve the border issue, but had 
actually sidelined it to India’s detriment. Besides, by reiterating that Tibet was an internal 
matter of China, Rajiv Gandhi had actually undermined India’s bargaining leverage vis-à-
vis China by neglecting to secure a similar recognition from China with regard to 
Sikkim’s merger with India. 8
 
Security analysts like Brahma Chellaney regard that nothing new was attained by India’s 
diplomacy during this visit.9 What was hailed as a breakthrough in border negotiations, 
                                                 
5 C.V.Ranganathan, “India-China Relations- Retrospect and Prospects” in Indian Foreign Policy-Agenda 
for the 21st century, Vol.2 (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1998), pp. 240-255. 
6 Asian Recorder, No. 20431(February 12-18, 1989). 
7 Cheng Ruisheng, “Deng Xiaoping and Sino-Indian Relations”, Foreign Affairs Journal,  No.73 
(September 2004), pp.25-29. 
8 J.K.Baral, J.K. Mahapatra and S.P. Mishra, “Rajiv Gandhi’s China Diplomacy:Dynamics and Problems”, 
International Studies, Vol.26, No.3 (July-September 1989), pp. 257-270. 
9 Brahma Chellany, “Beware of the Dragon’s Design”, Hindustan Times, 8 June 2003. Text found in 
http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/6/21_4.html. 
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were simply the reclassification of the border negotiations that were on going from 1981, 
as a Joint Working Group. He is skeptical about the success of Rajiv Gandhi’s trip, as 
according to him, the official Indian elation only suited the Chinese strategy to contain 
India by covertly transferring the first missile systems to Pakistan and also starting there 
the construction of the plutonium producing Khushab reactor, while India was being 
lulled by the peace overtures. It was a strategy to alter Indian perceptions of China, 
without actually conceding any ground to India.10
 
Though there has not been significant appreciation of this landmark visit from all quarters 
of Indian strategic thinkers, nevertheless Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China did initiate the 
normalization in bilateral relations. For the first time, the boundary dispute was addressed 
in a realistic manner through peaceful negotiations and adoption of a resolution to 
maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. He had taken the path 
breaking bold initiative to drop India’s long standing demands for settlement of the 
boundary problem as a precondition to general improvement in bilateral relations, thereby 
convincing Chinese leaders of Indian seriousness to improve the overall relations.  
 
This visit is regarded as a watershed in Sino-Indian relations because of its following 
achievements- 
a) it was a symbolic signal at the highest level to indicate that the relationship was 
coming out of its past bitterness to adopt a forward looking approach for all round 
development. Addressing the State Banquet hosted by Chinese Premier Li Peng and 
Madam Li Peng, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi emphasized that “…differences over 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
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the border led to unfortunate events that strained our relationship. It is now time to 
look beyond the past. It is now time to look forward to the future. It is now time to 
restore the relationship between our countries to a level commensurate with the 
contributions our civilization has made to the world, to a level commensurate with the 
centuries of friendship between our countries, to a level commensurate with the 
contribution which today we must together make to the building of a new world 
order…There is much we can do together.” 11 
b) Besides, under changed systemic milieu, there was a re-emphasis on the fundamentals 
of the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence, which would aid in guiding bilateral 
relations. 
c) Agreements took place on civil aviation and cooperation on science and technology 
and working groups12 at different levels were set up for the first time to address the 
boundary issue, also to further promote bilateral relations, by promoting trade, 
economic and investment relations. 
d) Through talks with top leaders like Deng Xiaoping and addressing a leading Chinese 
institute for engineering and technology, there was a significant establishment of a 
perception even in Chinese thinking, that the visit of the Indian Prime Minister paved 
the way for the normalization of bilateral relations and starting a new era of positive 
developments. 
                                                 
11 Rajiv Gandhi: Selected Speeches and Writings (1988), Vol.4, (New Delhi: Publications Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1989), pp. 398-414. 
12 The Joint Working Group(JWG) on the Border Issue is led by the Indian Foreign Minister and the 
Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. Its establishment was considered to be a watershed as for the 
first time it resulted in confidence building measures aimed at reduction of tension and troops along the 
border. Building on the experience of this Group, couple of agreements on Maintenance of Peace and 
Tranquility and Confidence Building Measures have been signed subsequently.  
 12
It was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who for the first time spoke about an alternative 
process in Sino-Indian relations, based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. He 
went on to specify that “the alternative process of thinking cannot limit itself to security 
and the international political order. It must embrace economics, the environment, space 
and our common heritage.” 13
 
This visit could thus be regarded as a landmark and the starting point of this thesis, where 
the aim would be to study the nuances of Sino-Indian relations in the context of India’s 
Look East policy which was adopted in the early years of the 1990s. It would study how 
conflict has been blunted over the years in spite of prevalent mutual concerns; how 
competition has and could always be present in various dimensions under various 
contexts in the bilateral relation and also study how new found cooperation has evolved 
to move the relationship forward. 
 
Eminent scholar Surjit Mansingh has rightly pointed out that this normalization of Sino-
Indian relations did not necessarily imply that divergences in strategic perspectives have 
suddenly converged or that conflicts of interests between the two countries on a range of 
issues have ceased to appear over a period of time. 14  Instead, amidst conflict at one end 
and extreme cooperation at another there is enough space to cultivate normal relations in 
response to their respective perspectives of national interests and international ambitions. 
  
                                                 
13 “Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to China: Address at Qinghua University”,  China Report, Vol.25, 
No.2 (April-June 1989), pp. 187-200. 
14 Surjit Mansingh, “India-China relations in the Post-Cold War era”,  Asian Survey, Vol.34, No.3 (March 
1994) pp.285-300. 
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Following the adoption of this Look East policy the China focus underwent a complete 
change in Indian foreign policy making circles. Indian foreign policy makers  started to 
address and study this relationship on the basis of the three forms of interactions, i.e. 
conflict, competition and cooperation which determine the new trajectories of this 
relationship.  
 
Importance of Southeast Asia in the context of this thesis 
 
Why study this bilateral relation in the context of Southeast Asia?   
With the end of the Cold War, a major reorientation in Indian foreign policy approach 
took place. It was a shift from a highly idealist tradition to a pragmatic, national interest 
driven approach, aimed at enhancing India’s economic clout and political influence.  
Amidst Indian dismay and a sense of Chinese delight, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
implied the removal of China’s main adversary and India’s sole foreign ally. However, it 
was the Soviet disintegration that turned strategic calculations in Indian favour. It enabled 
India to seek greater diversification in its foreign relations.  
 
The radical changes that took place in the power structure and the international security 
environment disoriented to some extent most of the strategic establishments around the 
globe.15 It was amidst this background that the Asian economies came into the forefront, 
as over the years the ASEAN states succeeded in transforming themselves from being 
engulfed in economic and political problems to one characterized by regional peace and 
prosperity. It was a result of the policies of export orientation in industries and also the 
                                                 
15 K.Subrahmanyam, ed. “India and the Changes in the International Security Environment” in Indian 
Foreign Policy- Agenda for the 21st century (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1997), p.58. 
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immense influx of export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan and the 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIE).16 As global financial competition intensified, the 
East Asian tigers together with China became major players in the global economic 
scene. It needs to be mentioned at this juncture, that in spite of Chinese strategic interest 
in Southeast Asia, normalisation of relations only took place after the Sino-American 
alliance against the Soviet Union. Moreover the end of the Cold War made new 
alignments possible. The members of the ASEAN17 could not afford to overlook China’s 
economic growth and military modernization. This resulted in each country stepping up 
their respective bilateral relations with the giant neighbour.18 The fact that China 
exercised considerable political influence in Southeast Asia and was attempting to gain 
greater access in South Asia raised India’s strategic concerns.  
 
In a clear deviation from the writings of other scholars on Indian foreign policy, which 
primarily emphasized the ‘idealistic’ nature of the Indian foreign policy thinking, Ashley 
J. Tellis writing in Strategic Asia 2001-02 asserts that ever since the post-independence 
era, Indian security tradition has been consistent with the realist tradition of politics or 
realpolitik. India’s grand strategic objective has been characterized by a relatively 
assertive regional security policy, guided by the image of Fortress Indica (aimed at 
                                                 
16 Teofilo C. Daquila , “ASEAN: Economic Growth Prospects and Challenges” in India-ASEAN Economic 
Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization, eds. Nagesh Kumar, Rahul Sen and Mukul Asher 
(Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p.41. 
17 As all countries of Southeast Asia are members of the ASEAN, henceforth Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
will be used interchangeably. Since a detailed focus on what the ASEAN is all about has been covered in a 
wide range of literature, it would be avoided in the course of this thesis because of word constraint. 
18 “China-Asean partnership going strong”, in The Straits Times (15 February 2006), p.28.Excerpts from 
the speech of Chan Heng Chee, Singapore’s Ambassador to the US at the Asia Society Texas Annual 
Ambassadors’ Forum and Corporate Conference on February 3, 2006. 
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insulating the subcontinental politics from all external interferences).19  Ashley Tellis 
uses realism to express his points as he introduces the concept of three concentric circles: 
the inner ring (the subcontinental setting), the outer ring (Middle East, Central Asia, 
China and the ASEAN states) and the global setting (US, Russia, Europe and Japan). In 
another work, China and India in Asia, Tellis also brings about the inherent essence of 
India-China interactions in Asia with the use of the framework employing the three 
intersecting circles of security, wealth and status, which is also applied in this research. 
 
Books on Indian foreign policy in Southeast Asia always refer to the strategic importance 
of the region primarily because of the potential market and sources of technology but 
Ashley Tellis holds that the region could become a shatterbelt - an area of contention, 
lying in the intersection of interests of two important powers. 
 
In an attempt to renew engagements with the surrounding regions based on a new 
framework that emphasized economic relations, India embarked on a path to revive its 
ties with the economically vibrant South East Asia (a region characterized by sheer 
transformation through economic miracles), under the new rubric of the Look East policy 
vis-à-vis these Southeast Asian states.20  This framework with its emphasis on economic 
relations was equally important to India’s security policy because of the growing 
complexity of the evolving Sino-Indian relations. Though rooted primarily in security 
issues, Sino-Indian relations have also expanded to include economic instruments and 
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institutional arrangements related to the recognition of status. This in turn is bound to 
spill over to the Asian continent simply because of the growing multi-dimensionality of 
these relations.21 Although South Asia continued to dominate Indian politics, the Look 
East Policy was an attempt at redefining India’s interests and role in Asia, as Southeast 
Asia had become immensely significant from the perspective of India’s economic and 
geopolitical interests. It provided India an opportunity to minimize emerging threats, 
while simultaneously working to develop cordial relations and strategic ties with the 
region.22  
 
Besides, it should be noted that India is also trying to extend its maritime influence into 
the South China Sea area. Though scholars differ on the theory of strategic containment 
of India by China, nevertheless, fact remains that India does perceive a kind of Chinese 
encirclement, as evident from China’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal and its 
interests in enhancing its reach into the Indian Ocean region and also possibly the 
Arabian Sea, via the Gwadar port, which China is helping Pakistan to develop. In this 
regard, Indian strategies in Southeast Asia are conceived out of a hope that Southeast 
Asia would afford India an opportunity to break out of this encirclement. India’s 
increasing interest in the region is evident from its active courting of the ASEAN states, 
especially Singapore.  
 
Eminent scholar GVC Naidu writes in an article in the Strategic Analyses journal, that it 
was the Indian Navy that initiated the need for greater economic interactions which 
                                                 
21 Ashley Tellis, “China and India in Asia”, pp.134-177.  
22 Ashley Tellis, “South Asia”, pp.258. 
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eventually got culminated in the Look East policy. According to him, the policy was 
primarily three fold; to institutionalise linkages with ASEAN and its affiliates, to 
strengthen bilateral relationships with member states of ASEAN and to carve a suitable 
place for itself so that Southeast Asia will not come under the influence of any one major 
power, especially China.23 However this is hardly overtly expressed and India always 
wants to project the image that its policy is in no way derivative of China’s growing 
influence in the region. After the withdrawal of American bases from the Philippines in 
1992 and the emergence of the South China Sea dispute, the China factor started to weigh 
in significantly even in the ASEAN quarters and India attempted to capitalise on 
Southeast Asian worries, by advancing its own strategic and political interests in the 
region.  
 
Renaud Egreteau shows in his book Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy, the 
u-turn in India’s policy vis-à-vis Myanmar. It has been a major swing, from an erstwhile 
policy of voluntary hostility towards the Myanmarese generals to a policy of engagement 
towards the Myanmarese government, based on the diplomatic model of ‘constructive 
engagement policy’ conducted by the ASEAN countries.24 This shift in Indian stance can 
be attributed to the balance of power politics which is pivotal in Sino-Indian rivalry in 
Myanmar. Increasing Chinese military activities in Myanmar and efforts to establish a 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean region with the help of Myanmar comes in direct 
conflict with Indian interests. As India and China, both aspire for the great power status, 
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so undercurrents of competition and conflicts of interests are inevitable even amidst 
efforts at cooperation and confidence building. 
 
 
Background and the Evolution of India’s China policy  
Before analyzing in details in subsequent chapters the three forms of interactions in Sino-
Indian relations, it would perhaps be worthwhile to give a brief introduction to the 
evolution of Indian foreign policy. This would help in tracking the direction of India’s 
China policy under the broad contours of Indian foreign relations. 
 
A study of the literature available on Indian foreign policy brings out the basic 
framework of Indian foreign policy thinking and the intertwining of those constituent 
factors that have helped to determine India’s China policy. What comes out clearly from 
interview with scholars and a literature review of books and articles on Indian foreign 
policy vis-à-vis China is that in the Indian strategic community there does exist several 
perspectives on China. There are different models like the mainstream Indian perceptual 
position on China; the “China is hostile” perceptual position and the “China is not 
hostile” perceptual position.25 All these constructs have in them a number of Indian 
perceptions clubbed together. Amongst the Indian strategic thinkers there are a few 
perspectives that form part of the mainstream thinking. One aspect of this perception is 
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that China does not constitute a clear cut direct military threat in the immediate term but 
the future remains uncertain because of the potential of a more assertive ‘rising’ China.  
 
Another line of thinking is that the two countries do have certain important convergent 
world views like similar attitudes against US unipolarity and in favour of multipolarity, 
areas where they would cooperate; however there are differences in the strategic interest 
calculations of the two.  
 
Another core Indian perception that brings out the elements of conflict and competition 
separately, is the line of thought that China has strategic motives behind its cooperative 
posture vis-à-vis India. The other perspective which brings out the competitive dimension 
of this relationship is the mainstream Indian view that China is apparently resistant to 
greater international acceptance of India as a rising economic and political power.  
 
However, in spite of all these core perceptions which form a part of the mainstream 
Indian perceptual position, one view which has remained constant over the years is the 
inherent suspicion arising out of the intractability of the border dispute and the Sino-
Pakistan nexus, two bones of inherent contention in this Sino-Indian relationship. 
 
Based on the gradual evolution of India’s China policy, one could understand the 
interplay of the three forms of interactions, namely, conflict, competition and cooperation 
that has been shaping the relations between the two Asian giants. 
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Eminent scholar Mohammad Ayoob writes in his book titled India and Southeast Asia, 
about the chief tenets of Indian policy making, which was supposedly primarily based on 
a kind of world view shaped both by the national independence movements, as well as 
the nationalist leaders’ perception of India’s past and aspirations for the future. He 
summarises the constituent factors that have shaped Indian foreign policy thinking ever 
since Indian independence as- 
a) The coincidence of Indian independence and the emergence of a bipolar world in 
the global arena. 
b) The breakdown of India’s strategic unity following the partition of British Indian 
empire. 
c) The emergence of China as a major Asian actor following its coming to power in 
1949, also the annexation of Tibet in 1950, thereby ensuring continuous Chinese 
presence and power in direct contact with Indian borders. 
d) The need for enhanced economic interactions with the rest of the world to 
promote India’s developmental goals.26 
 
It was the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who primarily highlighted the 
chief principles guiding Indian foreign policy as- ‘the end of colonialism, and racialism, 
independence of African and Asian countries, independence from power blocs, support 
for the United Nations (UN), striving for world peace and cooperation, security through 
                                                 
26 Mohammad Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia; Indian Perceptions and Policies (London: Routledge, 
1990), p.2. 
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Commonwealth membership, friendly relations with all countries and closer ties with 
China and Asian neighbours.’27   
 
The initial phase of Indian foreign policy was basically influenced by the framework of 
Nehruvian idealism and this in turn was shaped by the three aspects, namely Gandhian 
thought, socialist ideology of early 20th century Europe and the self perceived, selective 
notion of India, being the inheritor of great moral and rational tradition in dealing with 
inter-state and inter-societal relations. This idealistic characteristic of Indian foreign 
policy which also got reflected in India’s China policy, comes out very clearly in the 
works of a number of scholars, as for example in the works of J.N.Dixit, India’s Foreign 
Policy and its Neighbours or in the book titled Conduct of Indian Foreign Policy by 
Krishan D Mathur and P.M. Kamath, where idealism does emerge as the basic essence of 
Indian foreign policy. 
 
Harish Kapur, in his work titled India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-92: Shadows and 
Substance employs multiple approaches in his framework to bring about the two core 
elements directing Indian foreign policy making, namely, the growing importance of the 
domestic factors and the reactive nature of Indian foreign policy.28 However in the 
present international environment, what elicits further qualification is with regard to the 
author’s rather skeptical opinion that with an altered international scenario and a battered 
image India has no further global role to perform. As in the course of this thesis, we 
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clearly make a case for India coming up to a rising China, as an Asian giant worth 
reckoning, a power of considerable growing economic and political clout in the Asian 
context. 
 
In an article in the International Studies journal, Professor S.D.Muni highlights that one 
of the chief tenets of India’s foreign policy had been to build a politically stable, 
harmonious and economically cooperative and strategically secure neighbourhood. A 
policy whose roots can be traced to the broad consensus on India’s stakes in the world 
that was evolved through the efforts made under the Nehruvian framework of policy.29 
According to Jawaharlal Nehru, the basis of conduct of a country’s foreign relations was 
securing its primary interests. 
 
Reflecting a similar line of thought like Professor Muni, Professor  John Garver in his 
book titled Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century analyses the 
root conflictual elements in Sino-Indian relations as being primarily based on geopolitics. 
He asserts that the undertone of conflict still remains pivotal amidst all attempts at 
cooperation. According to him, Indian threat perceptions vis-à-vis China have always 
been with regard to South Asia, as security of its neighbours has always been integral to 
it. What really comes out from this book as well as other literature on Sino-Indian 
relations is that China basically suffers from a dilemma of how to minimize the 
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contradiction between the push for improved Sino-Indian relations and continual 
unlimited expansion of Chinese interests and ties with other countries of the region.30  
 
Before analyzing the present day perspectives of Indian strategic thinkers on China, it 
would be useful to first note some of the historical aspects that have shaped Indian policy 
makers’ China policy. 
 
Sino-Indian relations of mutual concern dates back to the days just after the two equally 
nationalist regimes came to power in Beijing and in New Delhi in 1949 and 1947. Tibet 
became the impinging factor of this bilateral relationship. Though Nehru publicly 
rejected concepts like buffer zone as ‘outmoded imperialist jargon’, yet till 1951 he 
followed the British policy of regarding Tibet as an autonomous buffer state between 
India and China (a state with only Chinese suzerainty).31 The much hyped glorification of 
Sino-Indian golden days of friendship, as evidenced by the famous rhetoric of Nehru, 
“Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai”, was more of a viable policy option than real bonhomie of 
relations. After Chinese military occupation of Tibet in 1950, it became more of an 
imperative for India to adopt a friendship policy vis-à-vis China and thus came into 
motion the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, to neutralize the security threat from Chinese 
army stationed in Tibet and also to enhance Asian solidarity. 
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However, tensions started brewing soon enough which eventually manifested itself in the 
form of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, a large scale military conflict that took place 
along the eastern and western sector of the boundary thereby causing a setback in Sino-
Indian relations. A study of Indian foreign policy literature of the Nehruvian era however 
suggests contradictions amongst scholars. According to author Miloslav Krasa, Nehru 
utilized every opportunity to foster all round relations with China, thereby trying to 
portray China as spiritually akin and historically tested friendly neighbour alive in Indian 
society, who were inextricably interwoven with close friendship.32  
There are quite conflicting views in other academic quarters though. Sino-Indian 
brotherhood was said to be more of myth. Eminent historian, B.R.Nanda observed that it 
was misconstrued to assume that Nehru did not countenance any thesis regarding Chinese 
hostility towards India even during the heydays of Sino-Indian friendship. In an article he 
cites various important examples from the works of authors like B.N.Mullick, who in his 
book titled, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, disclosed that from the very 
beginning Prime Minister Nehru had reservations about China. B.R. Nanda, also quotes 
Frank Moraes, who in his work titled, Witness to an Era, had written that in 1952, Nehru 
had briefed the visiting Indian cultural delegation to China, stating “never forget the basic 
challenge in South-East Asia is between India and China. That challenge runs along the 
spine of Asia. Therefore in your talks with the Chinese keep it in mind. Never let the 
Chinese patronize you”.33  
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Neville Maxwell notes in his work India’s China War that as friendship with China had 
been the keystone of Nehru’s foreign policy agenda, hostility with China was to bring 
down the whole arch of Nehru’s policies.34 Indian political elite felt betrayed over the 
issue of Tibet. During the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, India explicitly conceded to 
Chinese claims over Tibet, as evident in the 1954 agreement on trade in Tibet where it 
unequivocally recognized Chinese sovereignty in Tibet.35 However there was no quid pro 
quo reciprocation in the form of explicit Chinese recognition of Indian claims over the 
Indo-Tibetan border in the form of the McMohan Line, which the Indian government had 
unilaterally declared as their boundary. Famous rhetorics of Nehru regarding the Mc 
Mohan Line “map or no map, we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary” 
and about the Aksai Chin area, “Aksai Chin was and had always been the historic 
frontiers” of India36 illustrates the elements of Indian hostility and tension with China. 
With the 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes began a continuing war of protests between 
both governments. 
 
In this context India had to strengthen itself against not just China but also Pakistan, 
which was being armed by the West. Even prior to the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Sino-
Pakistan strategic understanding was founded on their convergent interests vis-à-vis 
India. Western pressure on India reached its peak during this period. It is against this 
background that one of the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, nonalignment, was 
pioneered.  
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 Nonalignment was perhaps the only aspect of continuity of Indian foreign policy which 
remained the characteristic feature of Indian policy making for a long period of time. In 
spite of much criticism for not having failed to deliver substantial concrete results, still 
nonalignment was important as not merely a moral stand but also based on considerations 
of India’s national interests of the period. It was an attempt to derive the maximum 
protection for India’s security. India treated it both as a goal as well as a means to achieve 
other goals. This was one aspect of Indian foreign policy that was pursued as an 
unalterable feature by successive Indian governments. It implied maintenance of 
independence and sovereignty in foreign policy relations and avoidance of dependence on 
large scale economic and military assistance, except on the basis of capability and mutual 
interest. 37
 
Following the 1962 border clashes and the ongoing Cold War at the systemic level, both 
Indian and the Chinese governments made efforts to resume normal bilateral relations. It 
was a phase marked by transformation in Indian foreign policy thinking. This was a 
period when it gradually became apparent that Nehruvian ideals did not succeed in 
promoting India’s position in world affairs, rather it had weakened it. Nehru’s ideals of 
peace were perhaps ahead of his times. 
 
While India did try to seek a nuclear guarantee from the superpowers in case it becomes a 
victim to China’s aggression, after the latter became a nuclear power in 1964, the 
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superpowers redirected India towards the UN in case of such an eventuality. Realpolitik 
compelled India to come out of Nehruvian idealistic cocoon and thereby reassess its role 
in world affairs. While India still adhered to world peace, it stopped being judgmental on  
international issues. The policy of non-alignment gradually became that of non-
involvement as India stopped active participation in events which were not of direct 
concern and also refrained from antagonizing the West. 
 
The tenures of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and later Mrs Indira Gandhi did usher 
in an era of political realism in Indian foreign policy. Indira Gandhi’s firm leadership and 
a realistic Indo-centric worldview resulted in the building up of India’s technological and 
defense bases. As an alternative to dependence on Western support, India started a 
programme for developing a nuclear deterrent. This demonstrated the first shift from 
India’s erstwhile nuclear policy, where it gravely opposed nuclear weapons and 
championed the cause for disarmament. The first underground ‘peaceful’nuclear 
explosion that India carried out in Pokharan in 1974 symbolised the dawn of a new era. It 
was more of a response to an altered Indian geo-strategic environment marked by a 
nuclear power China, and also Pakistan which was developing its nuclear programme 
after being swept over by India in the 1971 war. After years of reliance on Nehruvian 
ideals on foreign affairs, the need for a radical re-appraisal of India’s basic interests 
became inevitable. It is in this context that a nuclear enabled India offered not just a 
symbolic deterrent but also an attempt at re-establishing its lost international prestige.38   
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Before analyzing Sino-Indian interactions in subsequent chapters, two other goals of 
Indian foreign policy making need to be highlighted in order to understand the essence as 
to why China assumes prime significance in Indian policy calculations and is the focus of 
this thesis. 
 
First, promotion of an Asian identity is perhaps one of the oft repeated notions in Indian 
foreign policy and relations. Though not much concrete results had been achieved from 
erstwhile Indian efforts at the Asian Relations Conference and the Asian-African 
(Bandung) Conference of 1955, nevertheless Indian policy makers have ever since been 
fascinated by the ideas generated in these two inter-Asian efforts. Developing an ‘Asian 
identity’ has always been at the backdrop of Indian policy making. 
 
Secondly, regionalism or regional cooperation especially in South Asia has been another 
marked dimension of Indian foreign policy thinking. However, except for the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), not much has been forthcoming 
in this regard. This cooperation was only aimed at developing and strengthening the 
economies of its members, remaining oblivious to their differences.39  
 
The defeat of Indian forces in the border clashes of 1962 resulted in estrangement of 
Sino-Indian relations as India began to embark on a path to reinvigorate its lost Asian 
identity and international status by infusing new found radical ideals in foreign policy 
thinking. This brought about a marked transformation in India’s China policy and was 
evident in the series of diplomatic exchanges from 1981 onwards, a process which was 
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initiated in 1979, following the visit to China by the then Indian foreign minister, Atal 
Behari Vajpayee at the invitation of the Chinese government. It was a period inundated 
by negotiations on border issues as well as for exchange and cooperation in culture, 
science and technology.  
 
The collapse of a bipolar world characterized by confrontations and strains starting from 
the late 1980s and eventually culminating in the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s 
had far reaching impact on the global strategic scenario. Amidst great power calculus, a 
healthy systemic milieu was created, resulting in progress in both Sino-US relations and 
also Sino-Russian relations. These two factors that used to exercise great influence on 
Sino-Indian relations, began to diminish.40 In the wake of the Cold War, both India and 
China’s aspirations to develop their respective economies and power became clearer. In 
this backdrop, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 was a milestone, for 
having set the groundwork for the ongoing process of improvement in the bilateral 
relations.  
 
However, Sino-Indian relations have been on a roller-coaster ride ever since. In spite of 
significant improvement in bilateral relations, there have been constant elements of 
inherent conflict and competition between the two.  
 
Increasingly as China is making its presence felt in South Asia and cutting into the 
traditional Indian sphere of influence (as evident in China’s entente cordiale with 
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Pakistan and also the political and strategic relations that it is developing with countries 
on the Indian periphery like Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal), India is 
looking out for options to counter it. It is out of this very concern for greater overall clout 
in India’s immediate neighbourhood of South Asia that India is trying to court and 
engage with China and simultaneously competing with it for increased geo-political 
status by extending its clout in the traditional Chinese sphere of influence, Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Indian foreign policy thinking was further compelled to undergo a reorientation with the 
end of the Cold War, which generated new patterns of competition and dominations, 
together with expansions and of economic and security arrangements dominated by the 
US.41  The apparent triumph of US liberalism and the onset of globalization and 
information technology revolution, coupled with India’s own spiraling domestic 
economic crisis made it imperative for India to not only reorient its social, economic and 
developmental policies, but also the core elements of its foreign policy thinking. 
 
Amidst these all round changes India had to rethink regionalism also beyond the 
subcontinent, in the extended neighbourhoods, i.e. in the Southeast of Asia, Central Asia, 
and Middle East. It had to seek power equations with emerging power centres of the 
world, like China, Japan, North America or the European Union. 
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The focus of this thesis would be to bring out the essence of the changing dynamics in 
Sino-Indian relationship brought about by the reorientation of Indian foreign policy 
thinking. India not only had to define its position but also had to find its place in these 
new regional, political, strategic and security arrangements, being simultaneously aware 
that it had to balance the relatively uncertain economic and political situations prevalent 
in South Asia.  
 
In order to understand this strand of behaviour prevalent in India and China, Raviprasad 
Narayan, writing in an article in the Harvard Asia Quarterly  employs the analytical tool 
of ‘balance of threat’ to study the tectonic forces of estrangement and rapprochement, 
governing Sino-Indian relations.42 However, while highlighting the aspect of security in 
Sino-Indian bilateral relations, he fails to bring out the very basic element of realism, i.e. 
the aspect of the power game. China which describes itself as a ‘peaceful rising power” is 
definitely trying to seek greater power status and after all this aspect of Sino-Indian 
competition is mostly about regional balance of power. China becomes even more 
important in the present foreign policy calculations for its ever growing economic and 
military clout in Southeast Asia, as well as utilizing it to gain access and influence in the 
Indian Ocean Region. 
 
Analyst Sujit Dutta writes in the book, In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on 
Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, that Indian strategists are aware of the 
asymmetrical power- status relationship with China. Interestingly, he also points out that 
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though ‘China’ is a preoccupation for Indian policy makers, South Asia does not really 
entail primary strategic priority for China in the likes of the US, Russia, Japan and 
Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, in the present context with India rising alongside China, 
such a view does not necessarily render the region of South Asia as inconsequential to 
Chinese calculations, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Another need to engage China was also out of imperative need to have an indirect Indian 
presence and influence in Southeast Asia. Writing on ASEAN-India relations, Kripa 
Sridharan, mentions in her book, The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy, that 
erstwhile Indian relation with the ASEAN countries lacked a clear comprehension of the 
security dynamics prevalent in the region. She goes on to elaborate how ASEAN-Indian 
interactions have mostly been derivative of the policies of major powers within their 
regions and also the local states’ relations with the major powers. As major powers’ 
triangular transactions had implications for the security dynamics operating within these 
regions, China’s role within them, made issues like Sino-Soviet split and Sino-US 
rapprochement especially significant for these two regions.43 It is in this context that 
Kripa Sridharan highlights India’s prime concern to counter Chinese influence in the 
larger Southeast Asian region without undermining its ties with China. Southeast Asia 
assumed importance for Indian policy makers also out of the perceived need to maintain 
regional security as Chinese domination in the Southeast could easily spill over and 
challenge India’s preeminence in South Asia. 
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Reflecting a similar point of view, Indian scholar C. Rajamohan holds that India got 
mired in domestic political and economic uncertainties after the Cold War, even when it 
had to revitalise its relations with major world powers. India became vulnerable to 
external pressures rather than being seen as a critical factor in the greater Asian balance 
of power.44 Professor Rajamohan believed that decisive steps were needed to transform 
perceptions of India’s power and status in the international system. One could perhaps 
view the gradual evolution of India’s Look East policy in this light. It was out of an 
imperative to create a role for itself in the Asian balance of power by strengthening its 
economic, security and political linkages with its neighbours. It was also for India’s own 
economic survival. Professor Rajamohan further highlighted the significance of the 
United States (US) in determining the contours of India-China relations. It must be noted 
that the evolution of Sino-US relationship either in the form of cooperation or 
confrontation have an important bearing on the shaping of India’s security environment. 
This makes it imperative for India to insulate its own relations with its giant neighbours 
from the vicissitudes of Sino-US ties.45
 
For advocates of the “China threat” theory like Brahma Chellaney, Pakistan occupies a 
secondary role as compared to China in India’s nuclear planning. Likewise the 
cornerstone of Indian deterrence strategy has been the development of a missile based 
nuclear capability to check China which has a growing nuclear armoury.46 However, he 
illustrates how India has been adopting a pragmatic economic and foreign policy in the 
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post Cold War period and this new India is not just expected to be a key player in the 
Indian Ocean region but would also be an important component of the emerging Asian 
geopolitical balance. If there were some points of economic and strategic convergence 
between India and China, it could significantly impact on the Asian and global 
geopolitical balance. But as the mutual suspicion remains deep rooted between the two, 
the China factor would continue to remain important in Indian foreign policy 
calculations, including in the implementation of India’s Look East policy. 
 
Other scholars like Professor Mohan Malik writing on Sino-Indian relations, believe that 
in the post Cold War era, China and India have been obliged to adjust to the dramatic 
changes in the global strategic environment. He holds that in the long term China hopes 
to offset American hegemony by its own growing strategic prowess and economic power. 
In the short term, many Chinese analysts envisage China as the leader of a nations 
striving towards multipolarity and it is against this very background that China would 
seek to benefit from cooperating with India so as to resist US unipolar domination.47
 
India seeks to gain with increased interactions with China, as economic development has 
also been a basic priority in Indian foreign policy calculations. Both Professor S.D.Muni 
and Professor Rajamohan write about the need for India to have a multi-directional 
engagement and issue based alignments not just with China but with all major powers 
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and also significant regional players like Japan, Australia, Iran, Commonwealth of 
Independent States and the ASEAN.48
 
Writing about the goals of Indian foreign policy, eminent Professor M.S.Rajan, holds that 
ever since the 1950s, India has sought to promote internal economic development and 
external economic cooperation with other countries, especially with the developing 
countries. This was done to reinforce its own political independence by self reliance and 
economic strength.49  
 
In the course of this thesis, strategic reasons behind increased Indian interactions with 
China from the 1990s are studied. This is significant from an Indian point of view, as 
China is not only expanding as an economic powerhouse but is also expanding its 
political and military capabilities as factors which would largely determine the future 
strategic and security contours of the Asia-Pacific region. An article of Jonathan D 
Pollack titled “Asian-Pacific Responses to a Rising China” in his co-edited book titled, In 
China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military 
Development, brings out the picture that all of China’s neighbours suffer from a sense of 
a policy dilemma arising out of major uncertainties linked to Chinese military 
modernization and the evolution of Chinese political and economic system in the future.50  
In the same book, analyst Sujit Dutta, perhaps brings out the latent requirements for 
                                                 
48 S.D.Muni and C Rajamohan, “Emerging Asia: India’s Options” in International Studies, Vol. 41, No.3 
(July-September 2004), pp.313-333. 
49 M.S.Rajan, “The Goals of India’s Foreign Policy”, International Studies, Vol.35, No.1 (January-March 
1998), pp.73-105. 
50 Jonathan D Pollack, “Asian-Pacific Responses to a Rising China” in In China’s Shadow: Regional 
Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, eds. Jonathan D Pollack and Richard H 
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Indian foreign policy. According to him, its not just cooperation based on engagement, 
détente or pacific resolution of disputes but also the need for a strong modernized India to 
balance Chinese power in the South and Southeast of Asia. The growth of China implies 
an element of larger Asian and global balance of forces, besides, being in direct 
proximity it also influences India’s security, diplomacy, economy and politics. 
 
One can perhaps infer that China’s reemergence as a major power has had immense 
security implications for India. Both the states are striving to reassert themselves on the 
international scene (through bilateral efforts at cooperation and competition amidst 
inherent conflict of interests) as well as attempting to revive their respective historic 
statures as great Asian powers. It is against this backdrop that lays the hope for greater 
enthusiasm in the pursuit of India’s Look East policy.  
 
The main focus in this study on Sino-Indian relations would thus be the three forms of 
interaction of conflict, competition and cooperation, each demanding detailed attention in 
separate chapters. 
 
The following chapter on Conflict in Sino-Indian relations studies India’s Look East 
policy and the political and strategic dimensions, as well as the role of the Navy in this 
relationship. It analyses how India, with its impressive economic growth rate is striving to 
become a major power and is thereby aiming to play a game of influence in China’s own 
backyard. As India and China continue to grow in international prominence, economic 
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concerns would figure heavily while at the same time bilateral competition to seek 
diplomatic influence would also be immense. 
 
It would thus be worthwhile to keep in mind in the course of this thesis, the observations 
of a former Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N.Dixit, who in one text had favoured China and 
India building up a positive working relationship, not only as a contribution to Asian 
stability but more importantly to counter discriminatory and hegemonic trends in world 
affairs. Simultaneously he expressed concerns about China’s ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
complex, where he alluded to the fact that Indian was not comfortable to the Chinese 
having a sense of ‘professed superiority vis-à-vis India’51. This typically depicts the 
perspectives shaping Indian policy options with regard to China. The aim of such a policy 
is to create a regional ‘balance of forces’ as well as a positive external security 
environment, a topic that has scarcely been covered in Indian foreign policy. 
Many observers regard the bilateral territorial issue as a potential flashpoint in Sino-
Indian interactions, others view the natural dynamics occurring between two rising 
powers as sufficient cause of concern. Though the ‘China factor’ is not the sole 
determinant of Indian ties with the region, nevertheless, it is still the most persistent 
factor in influencing Indian policy initiatives. The relationships between India and China 
and the position of Southeast Asia in this context, as brought out by the framework of 
intersection( a dual intersection of geo-strategic and functional aspects) of the three 
circles of security, wealth and status is what makes this research unique.                          
 
                                                 
51 Text found in J.N.Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi, USB 
Publishers), 1996, referred to by Steven Hoffman, “Perception and China Policy in India”, pp.33-74. 
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Over the years the basic element that has governed Sino-Indian relations has primarily 
been conflict. In international relations conflict means the clash of foreign policies 
pursued by the national governments of two states.52 K.J.Holsti clearly brings out the 
essence of “conflict” in the context of present day international relations. He defines 
conflict to be one where amongst other things parties seek to achieve certain objectives, 
such as additional or more secure territory, security, control of valuable resources, access 
to markets, prestige, alliance, etc.53 This chapter is aimed at studying the trajectories of 
the conflictual interactions of India-China relations and indicates the extent to which a 
heavy China content in India’s foreign policy thinking has influenced Indian policy 
options in Southeast Asia.  
 
 In strategic calculations of both India and China, Southeast Asia forms an overlapping 
sphere of interest. The Look East policy which is studied as an intervening variable in 
this thesis gets a special emphasis in this chapter as interactions of both India and China 
with the regional states are driven primarily by considerations of prosperity and security. 
Sino-Indian bilateral relations can be treated as independent of their respective 
interactions with any third party. However as this thesis aims to study the relevance of 
India’s Look East policy amidst the changing dynamics of Sino-Indian relations, the 
significance of Southeast Asian interactions with India would often be brought forth 
where applicable. 
 
                                                 
52 John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2001), p.3. 
53 K.J.Holsti, p.349. 
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The chapter would also briefly study the political differences which still form the primary 
basis of Sino-Indian conflict. Now an added dimension of rivalry for power and influence 
in the global arena has further fuelled the existing tensions. The detailed focus on 
strategic dimension of conflict in Sino-Indian relations in this chapter brings out the 
essence of the resurgent ‘China threat’ theory which has gradually come to bear a 
significant impact on Indian foreign policy making. It is a factor which is significantly 
altering regional balance of power against India’s favour and is a cause of continuous 
strategic conflict between the two states.  
 
Chinese moves along India’s periphery make the role of the Indian navy especially 
important and is hence also covered in this chapter, as increasingly Sino-Indian conflict is 
assuming a maritime dimension. 
 
Overall the chapter focuses on how India has adopted the Look East policy and other 
strategies not just to counter the threat perceptions from China and Chinese encirclement 
strategies vis-à-vis India but is also to nurture India’s ties with other ASEAN states who 
share a similar concern vis-à-vis a rising China. Finally the counter strategies that India 
has been adopting vis-à-vis Chinese moves which are in conflict to Indian interest in the 
region also gets a brief analysis. 
 
Dimensions of Conflict in this Relationship 
Sino-Indian relations have gone through a rollercoaster ride ever since the normalization 
of relations from 1988 onwards. Dynamic strategic and economic trends changes show 
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that India’s importance in Chinese foreign policy calculations is significantly on the rise. 
According to Chinese strategic thinkers, in the post-Pokhran phase, China is paying 
increased attention to India’s pursuit of great power diplomacy, military buildup and 
engagement with states on the Chinese periphery, which also includes India’s burgeoning 
relations with the ASEAN states.54 To understand the true essence of Chinese policies 
towards India and South Asia in general, it is important to take into account key factors 
which play a pivotal role in shaping Chinese policies towards India and South Asia in 
general, like the Chinese military security concerns, history of territorial disputes and the 
need to protect Tibet, its “soft strategic underbelly”.55  
 
Of late it has been a relationship marked by dramatic high level political, economic, 
military and cultural exchanges yet still enmeshed in mistrust, suspicion and lack of 
transparency. India is concerned about the crucial strategic relationships which China has 
forged with Indian neighbours. This enduring nature of Sino-Indian rivalry, coupled with 
the rise of China and India simultaneously seeking out for other strategic partners in the 
international arena, have resulted in attempts by powers like the US, Japan and some 
Southeast Asian states to attract India in the Asia Pacific, as a counter balancing force 
against a rising China. 
 
                                                 
54 Jing-dong Yuan, “For or Friend? The Chinese Assesment of a Rising India After Pokhran-II”, in South 
Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (New York: An East 
Gate Book, 2005), p.156. 
55 J. Mohan Malik, “India and China: Bound to Collide?”, in Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K. 
Subrahmanyam , ed. P.R. Kumaraswamy (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2004), p.127. 
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The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of systemic changes, which as a consequence 
led to altered relationships and alliances in Asia. Having improved relations with the 
major powers of the world, India still continues to be embraced in a security complex 
when relations with China are concerned. This is because of the fact that China is 
increasingly becoming a major military and economic influence in the South Asian arena. 
Management of their mutual relationship not only rests on international power 
distribution but also on their individual relations with major powers, as well as the degree 
of influence which they intend to exercise in vibrant regions.  
 
Since “China and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the Himalayas and 
South, Southwest and Southeast Asia,”56 both share a common region of strategic 
concern. Ever since China took over Tibet, it became an integral part of South Asian 
geopolitics. India, too on its part is developing its ties with countries on China’s 
periphery. Through the Look East policy India is trying to carve out a place for itself 
through strategic and economic linkages with the ASEAN states. It is also reportedly 
developing ties with Taiwan.57  
 
Throughout the Cold War period conflict notwithstanding, Sino-Indian relations have 
featured episodes of cooperation and other forms of cooperative efforts like confidence 
and security building.58 However, the improvement in bilateral relations has been rather 
                                                 
56 Sujit Dutta, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia” in Pollack and 
Yang , p.99. 
57 “India, Taiwan in Secret Military Cooperation”, Indian Express, 3 January 2002 
( http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/020102/dlfor19.asp). 
58 Examples on Sino-Indian cooperation are given in details in the third chapter. 
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slow which is evident in the “glacial process” of normalization of bilateral relations 
during the 1980s, as India- China relations continued to remain susceptible to mutual 
distrust and suspicion.59  
 
In this chapter, conflict in Sino-Indian relationship can be understood with regard to the 
territorial dispute and also the strategic influences that both the nations are trying to 
exercise simultaneously in overlapping spheres. To understand this one has to first 
understand the implied objectives of India’s Look East policy in Southeast Asia. 
  
The Look East Policy 
A new politico-economic context for India’s regional diplomacy was created after the end 
of the Cold War, which spelled out a clear need for the reassessment and reorientation of 
India’s foreign policy making. Non-alignment, which was exclusively defined in terms of 
the East-West conflict of the Cold War, became irrelevant. Besides, with the structural 
changes taking place at the international level, characterized by world wide strategic, 
economic and political changes, most countries started to redefine their positions vis-à-
vis the only remaining superpower, the United States. Eminent scholar John Garver 
observes that in the aftermath of the Cold War, influential voices in India started to argue 
that the old moralistic and idealistic policy options had actually prevented India from 
manouevring its own national interests.60 The spiraling domestic economic crisis led to 
the beginning of the liberalization process within India. All these fundamental changes in 
                                                 
59 Ashley Tellis, “The Changing Political Military Environment: South Asia”, in The US and Asia:Towards 
a New US Strategy and Force Posture, by Zalmay Khalilzaad et al. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 
60 John W Garver, “The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”,  NBR 
Analysis, Vol 13, No.5 (October  2002). Text found in 
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the external milieu together with the dramatic success of China and the Southeast Asian 
economies resulted in an Indian desire to connect to the East Asian economies. After 
years of political neglect for Southeast Asia, the new pragmatism in Indian foreign policy 
thinking made it conscious of the need to join the Southeast Asian bandwagon. It was a 
region characterized by economic miracles and that which afforded India a chance to 
once again enter the arena for Asian power politics. As India is desirous of seeing itself as 
an integral part of Asian geopolitics, it became imperative to reconstitute the core 
premises of Indian foreign policy thinking.  
 
Moreover, the growing complexity of the evolving Sino-Indian relations though primarily 
rooted over security issues, had also expanded to include economic and institutional 
instruments related to the recognition of status. A new national consciousness about 
status conception had also evolved in China. As a result simultaneous emphasis was 
being placed both on Chinese material power and international status.61  
 
As far as India was concerned, in spite of its intentions and active lobbying for 
membership of the ASEAN, it was yet to find a place in the newly emerging security and 
economic structures of the region, as for example the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC). Unlike India which remained on the periphery, China was closely involved in 
the regional concerns of peace, security, stability and development. The Southeast Asian 
countries on their part had entered into a framework of cooperation and constructive 
engagement with China, with the objective of preempting regional imbalance if a rising 
                                                 
61 Yong Deng, “Better Than Power: ‘International Status’ in Chinese Foreign Policy” in China Rising- 
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China was allowed to play free.62 In this context improved Sino-Indian relations and 
domestic reforms in India was felt as need based changes which could stimulate its 
interactions with the economically vibrant Southeast Asia.  
 
The Look East policy which was more of an offshoot of the reorientation of Indian 
foreign policy during the 1990s under the premiership of Narasimha Rao, thus marked a 
major transition in Indian foreign policy from idealism to pragmatism. After years of 
neglect, Southeast Asia once again came to the forefront of Indian foreign policy thinking 
with the shifting of industrial and trading activities from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
theatre. India not only realised that South Asia lagged way behind other East and 
Southeast Asian economies which thrived on the advances made by their pragmatic 
economic policies embarked on since the late 1970s, India also felt the need to introduce 
greater clarity in articulating its peaceful intentions in the region.63 The Look East policy 
has often been cited by analysts as a deliberately crafted damage control exercise. 
 
Cautious of the emerging security challenges, India realized that in order to achieve its 
strategic objectives, as well as to restore its great power status, it had to remain 
diplomatically engaged in the region. Southeast Asia had become immensely significant 
from the perspective of India’s economic growth and geopolitical interests. The Look 
East policy provided India an opportunity to minimize potential threats, while 
simultaneously working to develop cordial relations and enhanced economic, political 
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and strategic ties with the Southeast Asian region.64 The challenge for India was to 
initiate a regional policy based on similar philosophy and goals. The basic feature of this 
policy was to try and link India’s liberalizing economy with the Southeast Asian markets. 
 
It is against this backdrop that one can understand the inherent implied objectives of the 
Look East policy in Southeast Asia which has a heavy China content. 
The three basic implied objectives behind India’s Look East policy were- 
a) To prevent China from using Southeast Asia, through its linkages with countries 
like Myanmar and increased activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean 
region, to challenge Indian position in India’s own backyard of South Asia. 
b) To limit China’s influence in the region so that India does not become irrelevant 
to the regional states. 
c) To have a sufficient economic and political presence and influence in the region 
to advance India’s own multifaceted interests in direct competition with China.65 
It must be noted at this point that the Look East policy has two distinct phases. While the 
first phase envisaged greater association with the vibrant economies of the ASEAN 
region, in the second phase a significant thrust was given to specifically boost trade and 
economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries. Having already stated the basic 
objectives of this policy, it would perhaps be worthwhile to once again mention that 
India’s expansion of economic linkages with the ASEAN states and simultaneous 
reciprocation and interests on their part was equally derivative of Southeast Asian 
concern about a rising China’s military expansion scheme in Asia. While India is trying 
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to improve bilateral relations with China, it is equally aware of its role as a counter-
balance to China in the Southeast Asian region. Keeping these objectives in the backdrop, 
the various dimensions of conflict in Sino-Indian relations can be analysed. However it 
would be crucial to first analyse the key characteristics of China’s India policy. 
 
China’s India Policy 
J. Mohan Malik observes that a major objective of China’s Asia Policy had been to 
‘restrain Japan and contain India’ aimed at preventing the rise of any competitor which 
could challenge China’s status as the Middle Kingdom of the Asia Pacific.66 China’s 
India policy can be categorized into the following: 
 
First, to keep Indian intentions contained within Indian backyards. China’s India policy 
had primarily been the establishment of military ties with Indian neighbours. Sino-Pak 
‘special relationship’ is part of China’s grand design aimed at preventing the rise of any 
peer competitor in Asian geopolitics (India, in this case) which might otherwise emerge 
as a rival that influences Asian security environment. In spite of Indian hue and cry time 
and again over this unsolicited Chinese nexus in the Indian sub-continent, China did 
manage to justify its acts as normal inter-state relations. 
 
Second, prevalent boundary disputes with India still form the core of Chinese policies in 
South Asia. 
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Third, India, traditionally sees itself as in charge of regional security affairs and has 
likewise systematically frowned upon its neighbours’ strategic ties with extra-regional 
forces, like the US or China, which is seen as constraining the Indian sphere of influence. 
The grand strategic objective of independent India has always been guided by the image 
of Fortress Indica, the Indian version of the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at insulating South 
Asia from all external influences.67 India tries to justify its stand as most internal security 
issues have external security implications where foreign presence would be totally 
uncalled for. China justifies its stand and holds that ‘whether China and Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, or Pakistan wish any particular relations is exclusively for them to decide. 
For India to attempt to dictate or limit those relations is unacceptable.’68
 
Fourth, China’s continuous economic means in rivaling India through its financial 
assistance to South Asian states simply helps to reinforce its military security objectives 
in the region.69  
 
Moreover, from the Chinese perspective this relationship is problematic also because of 
the presence and political activities of the exiled Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama and hundred 
thousand Tibetans in India.70
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Territorial Dispute 
     Before analyzing the strategic aspects of conflict in the Sino-Indian bilateral relations, it 
is necessary to first layout the territorial differences between the two. In the analysis of 
Sino-Indian relations the political conflict between the two has been of much greater 
significance than the military conflict. All future relations between the two countries 
would lie in the solution of the primary bone of contention, i.e. the border dispute 
prevalent amongst the two countries for decades and which had resulted in the only bitter 
war in 1962. It has been one aspect of Sino-Indian bilateral relationship that had been in a 
state of limbo for a long period of time. Relations improved only after initiatives were 
taken by both countries following the 1988 visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi. 
 
Primarily, there are two disputed areas. In the east, China has been reluctant to recognise 
the British drawn Mc Mohan Line as the border and claims the Indian state of Arunachal 
Pradesh that lies south of it.71 China continues to occupy nearly 38,000 sq km of Indian 
territory in the Aksai China Area and claims yet another 90,000 sq km in the Eastern 
Sector. Moreover a number of disputed pockets still remain in spite of several rounds of 
border negotiations as for example the 5180 sq km of territory that was illegally ceded to 
China by Pakistan in 1963.72  Another area of contention had been a piece of Pakistan 
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ruled Kashmir, which the Pakistanis had ceded to China. Previous Chinese hints of 
exchanging disputed territories did not go down well with the Indian counterparts, as no 
Indian leader had dared go back against a solemn parliamentary vow to wrest back every 
square inch of land that India believed its own.73  The maps on the following pages show 
the disputed areas of Sino-Indian border conflict along the Eastern and the Western 
sectors respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Details of Indian and Chinese claims on the disputed borders in the Western and the Eastern sectors can 
also be found in Neville Maxwell, India’s China war (London: Cape, 1970). 
 




 Source: Neville Maxwell, India’s China war (London, Cape) 1970 
 
Over the last couple of decades, despite several rounds of talks, no concrete agreements 
have been reached to resolve the border claims. In 1993 and 1996, agreements were 
signed to maintain peace and tranquility along the disputed border, but such agreements 
have been often violated, more so since 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests 
resulting in the downfall in Sino-Indian relations. In spite of several rounds of talks on 
the vexed boundary issue and repeated official assurances, the two sides failed to 
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exchange sample maps of the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as 
planned.74 Despite the elevation of the talks to the political level with the visit of Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in 2003, still the prospects for a negotiated 
settlement of the border dispute do appear to be remote. While a booming trade and 
fifteen rounds of border talks do pave the way for a realistic compromise, yet according 
to Indian strategic thinkers, India’s China policy continues to live on hope. If conflictual 
relations are to be improved it is important to address concerns at their roots. Despite 
much hue and cry over the success of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China, strategic 
analysts like Brahma Chellaney holds, that India did not raise its primary concerns with 
the hosts; namely, Chinese reluctance to define the disputed border with India, Beijing's 
opening of a new military flank against India via Myanmar and the transfer of Chinese 
technologies to Pakistan for the manufacture and delivery of weapons of mass destruction 
[WMD].75
 
Rivalry between India and China for power and influence in Asia, have further fuelled the 
already existent tensions caused by the territorial disputes. This brings in the overriding 
interplay of the struggle for security, quest for wealth and recognition of status into 
action. China cannot afford to brush aside the interests of its client as well as an ally state 
like Pakistan, while seeking to resolve territorial claims with India. It would then result in 
the deployment of Indian military forces on India’s western borders with Pakistan, 
thereby altering the balance significantly in India’s favour vis-à-vis Pakistan. This in turn 
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could result in China losing the powerful leverage that it has in containing India by 
mounting a two-front strategic pressure.  
The intersection of the aspects of security and status clearly becomes evident when other 
strategic factors that continue to contribute to this uneasy relationship are analysed. 
 
Strategic Dimensions 
The China threat aspect has been resurgent in Indian strategic calculations and threat 
perceptions, right from the 1962 Sino-Indian war, through the Chinese nuclear tests in 
1964 till the very recent Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Even after the thaw in bilateral 
relations in 1988 as marked by the series of hi-profile visits which ensued, annual defence 
reports of the Indian government began to note with concern the Chinese ambitious 
programme of military modernization, coupled with its strategic linkages with India’s 
neighbours. There was a gradual buildup of this Indian concern which eventually 
culminated in the infamous assertion by the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, 
who categorised China as India’s ‘potential threat number one’.76
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, three indicators marked the rise of China as a potential threat for 
India. 
a) China’s remarkable rate of economic growth which it has successfully been able 
to sustain for over two decades. 
b) China’s increased defence expenditure and resultant military buildup with imports 
of advanced weapon system. Together with the restructuring of the People’s 
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Liberation Army (PLA) and enhanced power projection capabilities it imposed a 
serious challenge to the regional balance of power.77 
c) and another indicator was the perceived Chinese assertive handling of 
international affairs. Its rise has resulted in greater ambitions in the Asia Pacific 
and also Southeast Asia, where it is trying to establish its maritime power 
projections. It is a matter of concern for India, as Chinese naval ambitions in the 
Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, have been viewed as indirectly aimed at 
containing India, within the Indian backyard of South Asia. 
 
Strategic conflict with China continues because of the concerns emerging from the direct 
and indirect military threats posed by China. What is this strategic conflict all about? 
The tensions which dominated India-China relations have declined over the years but this 
relationship is still characterised by mutual distrust and latent suspicions. 
 
The Sino-Pakistan nexus 
Chinese policies have long operated on the basis of the approach of maintaining balance 
of power in inter-state relations, thereby providing for strategic assistance to countries 
that could serve as deterrents to China’s perceived peer competitors. 
 
India regards Chinese activities as the only impediment to its achieving great power 
status in Asia while simultaneously ensuring its security. Ashley Tellis, notes that even 
though Indian policy makers recognize that sub-continental balance of power is 
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essentially in favour of India, still time and again Pakistan does try to mitigate it through 
its unfavourable activities. Pakistan can only afford to exploit its bargaining potentials 
vis-à-vis India based on the regular supply of nuclear and missile technology transfers 
which it receives from China.78 The annual defence reports of the Indian government 
indicated how China continued its extensive defence collaboration with Pakistan. Though 
this is an indirect threat perception nevertheless it is well documented in Western media 
and has been publicly acknowledged by the CIA. In 1993, in a testimony before the US 
Congress, the CIA Director of that period, James Woolsey noted, “Beijing has 
consistently regarded a nuclear armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally and vital 
counterweight to India’s growing military capabilities… Beijing , prior to joining the 
NPT in 1992, probably provided some nuclear weapons-related assistance to 
Islamabad.”79
 
To this extent, Sino-Pakistani nexus serves as a critical barrier in the normalization of 
Sino-Indian relations. 
 
The conflict with Beijing is also because India holds that China, is constantly trying to 
undercut India’s predominance in South Asia with its initiatives and increased military 
and strategic activities in the terrains of India’s smaller neighbours. This compels India to 
have its resources focused in maintaining its predominance within South Asia. Thus, it 
prevents India from expanding its sphere of influence to other strategically significant 
regions of the world like Southeast Asia.  
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Indian analysts contend that in spite of improvement in bilateral relations, these indirect 
challenges to Indian security (some real and some perceived challenges) result in the 
continuous conflict. 
 
Even amidst steady improvements in Sino-Indian bilateral relations, China has continued 
to take advantage of the enduring India-Pakistan rivalry as it constitutes to be an 
important player in this trilateral relationship. Though India is uncomfortable about the 
continuous military and technological shipments from China to Pakistan, yet it needs to 
be reminded that the strategic and political benefits that China receives from its ties with 
Pakistan far outweigh those that it might receive from its ties with a rising India. Besides, 
Pakistan is the only country that challenges Indian hegemony in the subcontinent and this 
significantly serves China’s India (or South Asia) policy. John Garver had once summed 
up China’s Pakistan policy as: 
“China’s overriding strategic interest is to keep Pakistan independent, powerful and 
confident enough to present India with a standing two front threat…Were India able to 
dissolve this two front threat by subordinating Pakistan, its position against China would 
be much stronger…conceding South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. Such a move 
would spell the virtual end to Chinese aspirations of being the leading Asian power and 
would greatly weaken China’s position against Indian power”.80
 
Moreover an ally and a client state like Pakistan, also does provide access to the naval 
bases like Karachi and more recently the Gwadar port. Even amidst progress in Sino-
                                                 
80 John W. Garver, ‘China and South Asia’,  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol.519 (January 1992), pp.67-85. 
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Indian bilateral relations, certain scholars are skeptical about real improvements. They 
argue that it was against this façade of improving ties with India that China managed to 
covertly transfer the first missile systems to Pakistan. Further, some Indian analysts also 
argue that the Chinese construction of the plutonium-producing Khushab reactor in 
Pakistan had also begun in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi's so called successful visit.81
 
Questions arise as to what could possibly be the Chinese logic behind its building up of 
the strategically located Pakistani port of Gwadar into a deep sea harbour? The Chinese 
advance strategic economics to justify their decision to build the port. It is out of a need 
to create shortcut to the sea for China’s vast interiors and also to secure the oil supply 
lines from the Persian Gulf region. However the geo-strategic value of the Gwadar port in 
such a volatile part of the world just cannot be overlooked. Strategists think that it could 
so happen that just like China has set up a surveillance station in the leased Coco Islands 
of Myanmar in the Indian Ocean on the east of India, similarly it could also set up its first 
naval base at Gwadar, thereby enabling it to oversee developments in the Indian Ocean. It 
would also enable China to hold India in a tighter grip. The Chinese would further be in a 
position to watch all traffic to and from the Persian Gulf, as well as monitor American 
military movements from Diego Garcia, which played a pivotal role in the wars against 
Afghanistan and Iraq.82  Moreover, Beijing’s concerns arising out of separatist Islamic 
unrest in Xinjiang province also further motivates its moves and needs for indulgence 
with Pakistan. 
                                                 
81 Brahma Chellaney, “Beware of the Dragon”, Hindustan Times, 7 June 2003. Text found in 
http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/6/21_4.html. 
82 Sunanda K Datta-Ray, “Port of Contention: Why are the Chinese so interested in Pakistan's Gwadar 
port?”,  The Straits Times,  26 June 2004. 
 59
Thus Sino-Pakistan nexus continues to be significantly beneficial for China, as it serves 
Chinese needs based on energy security, military and maritime security, geopolitics, 
territorial integrity and most importantly provides it a bargaining chip vis-à-vis India and 
Indian dominance in South Asia and Indian aspirations for a greater Asian role. 
 
The China-Myanmar factor 
Sino-Indian interaction in Myanmar is often regarded as a good example of how a third 
party can affect bilateral relations. Myanmar forms the conflict ground for China and 
India seeking to exert influence and domination. Though both India and China had 
longstanding linkages with Myanmar (then Burma), after the formation of the new 
Chinese state and the Indian independence, the two nations did not however entertain any 
special relationship Myanmar.83 But China was quick to cash in with support, when the 
new military regime of Myanmar, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
was seeking friends in the international arena after coming to power in 1988.84   
 
This was a multifaceted support aimed at developing Myanmarese infrastructure, 
primarily as an avenue for Chinese trade with the rest of the world; arms sales; symbolic 
high level official visits and most controversially, to develop Myanmar’s military 
infrastructure. It is here that India and China are engaged in a direct strategic conflict. 
Since 1990, China is reported to have supplied to Myanmar, over US$1.5 billion worth of 
arms, where most of the Chinese weaponry was reportedly deployed on India-
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Myanmarese border.85 Chinese support for Myanmar’s military infrastructure, 
construction of new ports and reports of upgrading of its naval and electronic facilities 
facing the Indian Ocean are significant from Indian strategic calculations. It not only 
implies that China is using Myanmar as a possible entry point for trading with Southeast 
Asia but also indicates increased Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. Sharing 
this Indian concern, notes Kent E Calder, 
"China has used its leverage strategically. In late 1992, Western spy satellites, for 
example, detected a new 150-foot antenna used for signals intelligence at a naval base on 
Coco Island, a Myanmarese possession on Indian Ocean sea routes... Western analysts 
believe Myanmar is allowing Chinese technicians to operate this as a listening 
post. More recently, China has been pressing Myanmar to allow access to Victoria Point, 
a long, rugged Myanmarese island within three hundred kilometres of the Strait of 
Malacca, the vital seaway through which much of Northeast Asia's trade must pass. 
China is also upgrading the Myanmarese Navy, together with the roads and railroads that 
lead from its Yunan province southward towards this Indian Ocean..."86
 
Reports of China’s involvement in the development of the naval base in Hainggyi Island 
and radar station at Coco Island, which are close to the Indian territory of Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands and their possible military usage, have introduced an entirely new 
dimension to Indian threat perceptions from a powerful neighbour.87
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Indian scholars like Brahma Chellaney believe that China is following a policy of 
encirclement and at a macro level, China may desire to transform its presence in 
Myanmar and Indian Ocean into a military capability that encircles India. 
 
Even from the Southeast Asian perspective Chinese activities in Myanmar is a cause of 
worry. “There is a fear that the Chinese are coming in (to Southeast Asia) from the other 
side, via the Indian Ocean. This will give them access to the Straits of Malacca. If China 
has access through that area, it will give Beijing a better basis for power projection.”88
 
G.V.C. Naidu, clearly illustrates in his book The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia, how 
Chinese military activities in Myanmar have prompted the Indian Navy to upgrade its 
Andaman facilities into a full fledged command system, called the Far Eastern Naval 
Command (FENC).89 “The FENC has come into place because of India’s growing geo-
economic realities in the Andaman Sea and in accordance with the Government’s Look 
East Policy”.90 Therefore according to Indian strategic thinkers, China is seen as a threat 
factor in the east, as well as in the north.91
 
The growing military relationship between Myanmar and China resulted in the Indian 
decision to change its course and engage directly with the military junta. From an Indian 
perspective, Chinese ties with Bangladesh and its inroads into Myanmar make serious 
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enough encroachment of India’s sphere of influence. This has resulted in India pursuing a 
two-dimensional strategy to counteract Chinese moves since 1993. 
 
The two-prong Indian strategy 
First, there has been a significant shift in India’s Myanmar policy. In spite of having deep 
roots in Gandhian and Nehruvian diplomacy, Indian strategic thinkers faced with political 
and geostrategic realities, abandoned India’s earlier stance of isolating the military junta. 
India has now embarked on the policy of a charm offensive and “constructive 
engagement” with Myanmar, in return for the Myanmarese army’s cooperation to curtail 
funding and sponsoring of drug trafficking and other insurgent activities in India’s 
vulnerable northeast. As a landmark move, at the invitation of Indian President Dr 
A.P.J.Abdul Kalam, Senior General Than Shwe paid a state visit to India in October 
2004. The Indian President too reciprocated by a state visit to Myanmar in March 2006. 
This can be regarded as a reassessment of India’s Myanmar policy.  
 
There are certain elements of ambiguity in this change in policy, as there is no 
reconciliation between India’s constant commitments to the democratic movement in 
Myanmar on the one hand and its strategic needs to cooperate with the junta on the other. 
However it appears that this ambiguity in Indian foreign policy was deliberate. It was a 
tactical move based on reports by Indian delegation to Myanmar in 1994, which 
concluded that China was expected to exercise significant strategic influence within a few 
years, as well as avail of essential interests in the area, as Myanmar was exclusively 
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dependent on China.92 While the military junta responded positively, India too was quick 
to seize the opportunity. It responded with a new move that comprised a re-invigorated 
strategy to develop Myanmarese infrastructure, technology and also to extend economic, 
military and political cooperation. In the recent high level visit of Myanmarese officials 
to India, the two sides recognised that while there had been a steady increase in bilateral 
trade, it was however not commensurate with existing potentials and thus they agreed to 
take appropriate measures to raise bilateral trade to US$1 billion by 2006.93  
 
From the long term perspective, fighting for restoration of democracy in Myanmar is also 
a fight for India’s security. However it is also an Indian objective to build economic 
linkages with Myanmar. It was a move aimed at not just ending Myanmarese support for 
ethnic insurgents in India’s northeast but also to counter Chinese influence.94 As seen 
against the backdrop of persistent reports of Chinese support to Pakistan, its activities in 
Myanmar were interpreted by Indian strategic thinkers as deliberate attempts to 
undermine Indian interests and influence in the region. This led the delegation which 
visited Myanmar in 1994 to justify India’s new policy thrust in attempting to play a 
counter-balancing role and filling the diplomatic void in the region.95
 
The second strategic dimension to counter Chinese moves had been to find similar set of 
interests with Southeast Asian states, who share a common perception of “China threat”. 
The Look East policy becomes particularly relevant in this context. In the late 1980s, the 
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absence of interaction between ASEAN countries and India on the one hand and India’s 
close linkages with the erstwhile Soviet Union made the Indian naval build up a factor of 
concern for the ASEAN states. Even in the wake of the withdrawal of American forces 
from the Philippines, many apprehended that India would contend along with Japan and 
China to fill in the power vacuum in the region. India’s concerns vis-à-vis ASEAN 
should be seen against the backdrop of emerging naval balance in the region, especially 
in relation to China.96 It was only with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from 
Cambodia and its move towards joining the ASEAN, did the strategic divide between 
India and the ASEAN start to fade. The perception of China being a threat was present 
historically amongst the Southeast Asian countries. It was now seen as a threat emerging 
through Indochina and the South China Sea. While Beijing helped the new military 
Myanmarese regime to shape its diplomatic and military future, it was the excessive 
militarization of Myanmar which also became a cause of concern for the Southeast Asian 
states, as it had significant implications on the region’s security environment.97  
 
Though ASEAN concerns about China’s military buildup has rarely been clearly 
articulated, yet it must be noted that even Singapore, with its outspoken pro-China 
standpoint expressed its concerns about Chinese power projections.98 It was observed in 
the statement of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong who held that “In Asia, China’s rising 
power and arms buildup has stirred anxiety”. He further held that “it is important to bring 
into open this underlying sense of discomfort, even insecurity about the political and 
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military ambitions of China”.99  India capitalised on the Southeast Asian worries by 
simultaneously advancing its own interest in the region and invited several Southeast 
Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines to strengthen 
defence ties and engage in joint naval exercises.100 Following the harsh treatment of the 
minority Muslim population of Myanmar, there was a public expression of concern by 
Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia stating their unease about Chinese presence in an area, 
close to the Malacca Straits.101 India was quick to play on these sentiments of concern, 
which was evident in Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s talks with his Thai counterpart, 
Chuan Leekpai, where the former raised the issue of “India as a possible strategic counter 
balance to China in Asia”. 102  
 
The Nuclear Issue 
China has been one of the important factors though not the decisive factor in influencing 
the course of India’s nuclear policy. However there has also been a complex set of 
intermingled domestic and international relationships both within India and among India, 
Pakistan, China and the US to name a few, which further complicates each states 
approach to the nuclear issue. 
 
Questions arose as to why China was cited as a threat to Indian security considerations, 
when it was Pakistan that appeared as the primary external threat to India’s nuclear 
policy? Reports showed that it was China, whose continuous material assistance to 
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Pakistan’s maturing nuclear weapons program, which actually contributed significantly to 
this Indian threat perception. China had supposedly transferred enough tritium gas for ten 
nuclear weapons, besides concluding a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Pakistan. 
It was also the Chinese initiative that made the plutonium producing Khushab reactor 
possible.103  
 
In spite of the gradual improvement in Sino-Indian bilateral relations since1988, still 
China continued to be a factor in Indian threat perceptions. In December 1992, 
intelligence reports revealed that China had shipped thirty-four complete M-11 missiles 
to Pakistan, followed by the assistance in the construction of the Rawalpindi missile 
producing plant in the mid 1990s. Thus, the most direct Chinese threat to India actually 
came in the garb of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan.  
 
When India conducted its nuclear tests under the nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) in 1998, it cited China as the main reason and ‘future potential threat’ that led India 
to such a course of action.104 The Indian nuclear tests were also to guarantee India 
strategic autonomy while simultaneously positioning itself as a modern world class 
power. Though the tests and India’s ‘China-threat’ comments led to the deterioration of 
Sino-Indian relations in the immediate aftermath of the tests, the reality of becoming an 
overt nuclear weapons possessor necessitated India to address directly the technical 
challenges of deterring China. The interaction of the quests for security and status 
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becomes obvious when the nuclear issue is addressed in Sino-Indian relations.  Chinese 
analysts note with concern India’s strife towards great power status and India’s policies 
of entente beyond India’s traditional strategic domain. This was evident in the Indian 
desire to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) when it followed China and 
expressed its own intentions of signing the protocols of the Southeast Asian Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). 
 
As far as India is concerned, the military and security strategists have added much nuance 
to their depiction of ‘China threat’ ever since the Pokhran tests. While the Ministry of 
Defence’s 1998-99 annual report did not portray China as an adversary, yet the 2000-
2001 report noted that China was extending its political and military clout in India’s 
neighbourhood. Yet, there are divisive views, like that of Rear Admiral Raja Menon, who 
held that ‘…the Indian arsenal is not required because of an immediate military threat 
from China.’105 However, scholars like John Garver, who analysed the root conflictual 
elements of Sino-Indian relations based on geopolitics, assert that the undertone of 
conflict remains pivotal even amidst recent attempts at cooperation between the two 
countries. Indian threat perceptions vis-à-vis China had always been with regard to South 
Asia. John Garver further states that for India, a possession of a credible nuclear deterrent 
vis-à-vis China would give it greater confidence and assertiveness in dealing with issues 
related to the overall balance of power in South Asia.106
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Role of the Indian Navy 
Sino-Indian conflict has acquired a new maritime dimension further adding to the strains 
in the relationship. While neither China nor India have blue-water naval capabilities, 
Indian strategic thinkers note with caution that China is rapidly expanding its naval 
forces, as Chinese military literature clearly indicates its intentions to build up a blue-
water navy.107 If China assumes this capability it would be able to operate also in the 
Indian Ocean region, far from its own coastal waters, thereby enabling it to have a greater 
power projection. 
 
The Indian Navy’s perspective does play a role in the context of Sino-Indian conflict, as 
it is not worried about threats emanating from Southeast Asia per say, but from China in 
connivance with Myanmar, in the Indian Ocean region. India’s Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands being closer to Southeast Asia than to mainland India makes it vulnerable to 
transitional security issues. Myanmar is in the centre of regional concerns for both India 
and ASEAN as increasingly it is becoming an outlet to China in the Indian Ocean region. 
Indian strategists do not rule out possible eavesdropping and intelligence collection of 
Indian missile activities in the Bay of Bengal, coupled with the Chinese maritime 
skirmishes in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the near future.108 For this 
reason, India had strategically lent its support to ASEAN’s constructive engagement 
policy to draw in Myanmar, as otherwise Myanmar added to the rising maritime 
dimension of China’s military strategy.  
 
                                                 
107 Goh Sui Noi, “Why Beijing lies low at regional security forums”, The Straits Times, 8 June 2006, p.15. 
108 “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean”, Strategic Analysis (July-September 2004),  pp.411-426. 
 69
Chinese activities in Myanmar did result in an implied strategic consensus between 
ASEAN countries and India on the necessity to counter Beijing and its expansionist 
tendencies in the Indian Ocean.109 India was quick to play on this conflictual aspect of 
renewed Chinese connections with Myanmar by enabling it to convince Southeast Asia of 
India’s security and economic importance in the region, while at the same point of time, 
diverting attention away from India’s strategic ambitions. In spite of improvement in 
Sino-ASEAN economic relations and the establishment of the India-China Strategic and 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, Chinese strategic plans, including its 
programme for naval expansion is likely to engage the attention of both India as well as 
the ASEAN countries.110  
 
Further, the Chinese development of the Gwadar deep sea port in Pakistan and Chinese 
attempts to persuade Maldives to grant a naval base at Gan, could be seen as a policy of 
complete naval encirclement of India by China in the near future. Even from the 
Southeast Asian perspective, India lies amidst vital sea lanes of communication making 
India’s own stability, as well as its role as a potential counter balance to China in 
Southeast Asia of much importance. Besides, in Southeast Asian calculations India also 
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serves as a vital state responsible not just for the stability South Asia but is also critical 
for ensuring Asia’s trade and energy supply.111   
 
The Look East policy serves as a particularly useful framework in the pursuit of Indian 
objectives aimed at changing the Asian strategic landscape. This can be clearly envisaged 
in the extraordinary dynamism in Indian foreign policy as reflected in Indian attempts to 
counter Chinese strategic moves, by building up security arrangements and new strategic 
alignments. Indian Navy has been a part of Indian diplomacy. According to Admiral 
Vishnu Bhagwat, former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, through the Indian Navy, India 
wanted to increase its influence amongst the countries of the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for seeking greater regional cooperation.112 India is manoeuvring its position 
by building up relations with Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries in the West and 
the Southeast Asian nations in the East. The Look East policy serves as a particularly 
useful framework to strive towards achieving Indian objectives aimed at changing the 
Asian strategic landscape. 
 
New Delhi further believes that developments in Southeast Asia often have either a direct 
or an indirect impact on it. It is in this context that the Look East policy helps India to 
align more closely with the political and economic affairs of the region.113 Post Cold 
War, Southeast Asia is becoming a prime domain of an open multidimensional struggle 
between China and India. The main conflict between the two Asian giants is reflected in 
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the strategic, political and economic nature of their interests in Southeast Asia, which is 
perhaps aimed at countering each other’s level of influence in the region. 
 
Having become a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and recently the East Asian Summit (EAS), India is trying to use 
the Southeast Asian platform (through its Look East policy) to spell out its strategic 
objectives in the region. It is to have a sufficient presence of its own and to advance its 
own interests and influence in the region in competition with China. It can assure this by 
ensuring that Southeast Asia does not come under the spell of any particular dominant 
power while remaining stable and peaceful as well. This aspect perhaps appeals to 
ASEAN’s imaginations and thereby also does coincide with their interests. India provides 
not only an attractive market but also the potential of playing a future balancing role. It 
must be noted that the Indian navy has been holding joint naval exchanges with several 
key ASEAN states like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia to name a few. Besides, 
India has also entered into naval exercises with other players in the region like Japan, 
South Korea and even Australia.  
 
Critics may point out to the recent joint naval exercises that India had with China. While 
that is a recent positive development in Sino-Indian bilateral relations, however, it needs 
to be remembered that Indian forays into the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea, 
through joint patrolling of the Straits together with the US, has come about as a 
retaliatory move against Chinese intentions of expansion in the Indian Ocean region. 
Moreover, it is an expression of Indian intention of offering itself as a potential 
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counterweight to China, while at the same time emphasising its own importance in the 
overall Asian balance of power.114 It needs to be highlighted that India has repeated its 
offer to share its expertise in maritime security in the region. India’s Defence Minister 
Pranab Mukherjee, has recently again expressed Indian willingness to patrol the Malacca 
Straits. This can be regarded as a clear Indian attempt to enhance its geopolitical clout 
among the ASEAN states. 
 
Another evidence of open rivalry between India and China is the attempt by China to 
develop a north-south corridor in Myanmar that would provide it an access to the Indian 
Ocean, while India too, is simultaneously seeking to build an east-west corridor through 
Myanmar to Thailand and Vietnam.115 The Kunming Initiative and the Mekong–Ganga 
Cooperation by China and India respectively are important steps towards greater 
integration with the immediate strategic regions. However, what is to be noted is that 
both China and India have kept each other out of the projects they initiated. The two 
Asian powers are trying to rival each other in their attempts to draw in Southeast Asia 
into their respective sphere of influence. Notes China expert Uday Bhanu Singh,  that 
“just as China has been seeking to limit India by cultivating its immediate neighbours like 
Pakistan and Myanmar, India is now reaching out to countries like Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia that have borders with China.”116  
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 Concerns about security, economics and an ambitious China, have also resulted in many 
Southeast Asian countries to seek an alternative power in India.117 The focus of the Bay 
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 
has shifted from being just an economic cooperation agreement to one which would lead 
to the creation of a more concrete kind of Bay of Bengal community. Highlighting the 
ASEAN position in the context of India-China relations, an analyst from the region had 
once observed that “economically and in terms of security, China and India are two huge 
blocks for Southeast Asia. ASEAN has no defence-related problem with India but is 
conscious of China’s ambitions and intentions.”118  
 
Conclusion 
The very concept that defines this conflictual relation between the two Asian powers is 
their underlying self image and power rivalry. As both are striving for greater power, they 
are poised for certain degree of geo-political conflicts. There is always a security 
dimension to the aspect of rivalry present between them.  Sino-Indian relations continue 
to remain vulnerable and perhaps are getting more competitive than conflictual. 
Competition between the two Asian giants is inevitable and in fact has increased in 
significant proportions when analysed in the context of the importance of Southeast Asia 
in this relationship. Southeast Asian countries on their part, played with the carrots 
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dangled before them previously, by trying to exploit the Sino-Indian differences to seek 
their own gains for assistance in all round developments. This strategy of competition 







































































As China’s status in world affairs increased enormously by the end of the twentieth 
century, India was increasingly dismayed by its own marginalization in international 
affairs. In all indices of comparison for national power and social prosperity, i.e. 
economic growth, global influence and military might, India cannot help but measure 
itself against China where it has dismally lagged behind.  
 
The table below gives some of the key socio-economic indicators, or a brief comparison 
of India and China on the basis of population, territory, GDP and military expenditure.119  
 









Gross Domestic Product  
($ bn) 




(% of GDP) 
Year China  India China  India China  India China  India China India 
2000 1 2 1263 1016 9598050 3287260 1198 457 2 2 
2001 1 2 1272 1032 9598060 3287260 1325 476 2 2 
2002 1 2 1280 1049 9598060 3287260 1454 509 2 2 
2003 1 1 1288 1064 9598060 3287260 1641 601 2 2 
2004 1 1 1296 1080 9598060 3287260 1932 691 2 2 
 
 
It was amidst this ambience that restoring balance with China by acquiring similar 
international standing, respect and status became an unstated national objective for India 
in the 1990s. The chief means of achieving some semblance of parity with China in 
international affairs was first through emulating and then competing with China. 
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The reorientation of Indian foreign policy thinking since 1990s can be regarded as having 
been influenced by China’s realism. Just like China’s positive de-ideologization of 
foreign policy that took place during Deng Xiaoping’s era, India too followed a similar 
pattern by toning down its earlier rhetoric of non-alignment and displaying a reluctance to 
put itself ahead in the battle against the western world, especially against the US.120
 
Though various bilateral disputes between India and China have gradually got muted, 
their mutual interests in their overlapping spheres of influence in South and Southeast 
Asia has in turn become a major source of tension and competition between the two 
Asian giants. Sino-Indian relationship is actually characterized by both competitive 
elements and cooperative possibilities. Current Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis China is 
that of engagement, détente and enhanced cooperation, which tends to serve India’s long 
term interest. However any policy emphasizing just diplomacy and cooperation without 
working on modernization and military capabilities, would prove to be inadequate in 
dealing with a rising, powerful China.121 Even amidst all round cooperation, the realistic 
competitive dimension in Sino-Indian relation comes out clearly in the words of the 
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in an address at the Peking University.  He 
notes,  
“As two large developing countries at roughly the same stage of development, sharing the 
same neighbourhood, pursuing similar growth trajectories, with comparable economic 
priorities and similar political ambitions, it is inevitable that comparisons will be made 
                                                 
120 C Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: the shaping of India’s new foreign policy (New Delhi: Viking, 
2003),p.153. 
121 Sujit Dutta, in Pollack and Yang, pp. 91-114. 
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between India and China. It is also an unavoidable characteristic of human nature that 
there is always a sense of competition between two close and equal neighbours”.122
 
For India, an equal and balanced relationship with China becomes imperative for its 
overall interests as it continues to enhance its all round capabilities in order to keep pace 
with a rising China. This clearly brings out the aspect of competition in Sino-Indian 
bilateral relationship 
 
Foreign policy analysts expect China to become increasingly assertive and believe that 
India’s Asian forays can be attributed to the growing presence of China in the regional 
strategic order. The potential arena for competition in Sino-Indian interactions is 
undoubtedly the Asian continent which has become the strategic nerve centre of the 
world and also the hub of economic activity. The following sections analysing the 
geopolitical competition and competition for maritime and energy security would clearly 
bring out these aspects. What evolves throughout the chapter is again bilateral 
competition for the security, wealth and status. Indian Member of Parliament, Jairam 
Ramesh sums it up, “we will be jostling for influence whether it is in Bhutan, Nepal or 
Southeast Asia.”123  
 
The role of Southeast Asia is that of an important platform where both China and India 
are vying to accumulate greater capabilities required to fulfill their respective leadership 
                                                 
122 Speech by Prime Minister of India Shri Atal behari Vajpayee at Peking University,  23 June 2003. 
Source: meadev.nic.in/speeches/pmpekingunvi.htm. 
123 “India starts flexing economic muscle” by Anand Giridharadas in International Herald Tribune, 12 May 
2005. Text found in  http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/11/news/india.php. 
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aspirations. While analyzing the position of Southeast Asia in this comparative study of 
Sino-Indian competition, what evolves is that there has been a significant shift in Indian 
foreign policy. It has now restated its earlier official stand that its Look East policy had 
nothing to do with any threat or competition from China. Instead there is a new public 
acknowledgement by the Indian premiere Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2002, that there does 
exist a ‘healthy competition’ between India and China.124  India’s Look East policy 
clearly clashes with China’s long term interests in Southeast Asia, as both are competing 
for influence in Asia.  
 
The primary focus of Sino-Indian competition in this chapter as divided into several 
sections, is an analysis of the competition in the field of economics, geopolitics, maritime 
and energy security and the nuclear issue.  
 
Economic competition  
As two biggest Asian countries and the oldest civilizations in the world, India and China 
do share close matches with regard to political and cultural standing and economic 
development. They possess similarities that could position them as rivals in the global 
economic and political structures. According to a report published in the Beijing Review, 
it is this economic development gap between the two countries that has resulted in India 
developing the ‘China threat’ theory.125 As there had not been much of economic and 
political exchanges between India and China over the years, it is often held by the 
                                                 
124 Mohan Malik,  Security Beyond Survival, p.152. 
 
125Fu Xiaoqiang and Kuang Ji,  “Avoiding the clash: Paving the way for Sino-Indian Cooperation”, Beijing 
Review, 13 November 2003. Text found in News From China, February 2004, p.7-9. 
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analysts that it is not appropriate to talk of the competitive elements of Sino-Indian 
bilateral relations based on their economic relations. 
 
However as bilateral trade has been growing leaps and bounds over the years, it does 
bring in the elements of cooperation and also competition. Based on current trends, 
China’s comprehensive national power has increased immensely and it is well poised to 
become the world’s largest economy, which would exercise significant influence 
especially on its Asian neighbours. Former Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha had 
said, “given the state of our economic relationship, we haven't yet become strategic 
partners. Our trade exchanges have been rising rapidly. I think both countries are 
realising each other's potential and are trying to take advantage of them …We are 
competitors, like everybody else is competing with everybody else in global trade.”126  
While China’s GDP has been growing at the rate of 9.3% in the 1980s, rising to 9.7% 
between 1991 and 2003, India’s real GDP grew by an average of 5.6% a year in the 
1980s and by 5.8% from 1991 to 2003.127
 
The comparative GDP growth rate of India and China from 1990 to 1999 and annually 
from 2000- 2005 is given on the next page.128
 
 
                                                 
126 “Resurgent India-Vision and Agenda for Growth”,  speech by Mr. Yashwant Sinha, Finance Minister for 
India, at Asia Society Hong Kong Centre, 15 May 2001. Text found in 
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/sinha.html. 
127 Simon Long, “The Tiger in Front: The Great Divide”, The Economist, 5 March 2005, pp.3-20. 
128 Data from 2001-2005 found in web.worldbank.org and from 1990-2000 found in Richard J Ellings and 
Aaron L. Friedberg edited, Strategic Asia: Powers and Purposes- 2001-02 (Seattle, the National Bureau of 
Asian Research), 2001. 
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Table 2: Comparative GDP Growth Rate
  
Gross Domestic Product  
($ bn) 
(Million tonnes oil equivalent) 
GDP Growth
(% increase) 
Year China  India China India 
1990 396 275 4 5.7 
1995 700 353 10.5 7.7 
1999 964 449 7.1 6.5 
2000 1198 457 8 5 
2001 1325 476 8 5 
2002 1454 509 9 4 
2003 1641 601 10 9 
2004 1932 691 10 7 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, World Development Indicators 2001 
Central Bank of China (Taipei), Financial Statistics, March 2001. 
 
India and China do share certain common features as two large populous nations. With   
the world’s fastest growing economies and a need for technology and investments, both 
have embarked on a path of economic cooperation to expand bilateral trade.129 However 
it is competition and not complementarities that characterizes Sino-Indian bilateral 
economic relations. In the immediate term, India is not an economic rival to China in 
Southeast Asia, but a more robust regional policy and rapid economic development in the 
coming years could position India to engage China in a healthy commercial competition. 
The national economic strategies of the two states is becoming apparent when both are 
simultaneously trying to lure the Western developed countries for engineering projects 
and foreign direct investments (FDI). An article in the Beijing Review highlights the 
economic competition between the two countries by in turn referring to a news article 
published in the Indian newspaper Statesman, where it had been reported that Indian 
                                                 
129 India with its 7.7 % annual growth in 2003-04 registered the second highest growth rate after China, 
among all other Asian economies. Source:  World Economic Outlook September 2005 (Washington D.C.: 
International Monetary fund, 2005), p.36. 
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Defence Ministry regards China to be busy with economic construction and unlikely to 
devote energy and resources to military development. While the two countries were 
strengthening their bilateral political cooperation there was also an element of relaxed 
competition which was primarily economic.130
 
The intersection of status and wealth becomes evident when the bigger challenge for 
India appears to be the management of Chinese economic and hence political influence in 
Southeast and South Asia.   
 
Though there are many similarities in the strategic cultures of the two countries, however 
their difference is also clearly spelt out in the new knowledge economy, where China has 
grown as a hardware giant while India has emerged as a software superpower. This 
however does not mean that there is no element of competition since they have diverse 
spheres of specialization and division of labour. An underlying element of competition is 
prevalent as both China and India are closely watching the other’s economic growth 
together with the growing prowess in information technology. Truth lies in the fact that 
while India needs to achieve similar success in the manufacturing sector, China on the 
other hand needs to develop its software prowess to retain its competitive manufacturing 
edge. As one commentary in the Beijing Review put it, “A fierce face-off with an old 
competitor—India—has [just] begun.”131 It has been argued that in India, there are just 
pockets of excellence, such as the ‘campuses’ built by the large software firms, which do 
not really spill over to the general infrastructure as such. Besides, though the Indian 
                                                 
130 Fu Xiaoqiang and Kuang Ji, Beijing Review, 13 November 2003.  
131 Beijing Review, 25 March 2004. 
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software industry is booming and the income in exports of software and services 
accounted to a quarter of India’s merchandise exports, yet it needs to be noted that the 
sector makes up for only 4 % of the Indian GDP. Many Chinese analysts also believe that 
they will be able to leave India behind in the software sector just as they had done in the 
nuclear arena in the 1950s when too India had an edge over China.132  
 
China is wary that India might very soon emerge as a potential competitor for 
investments, trade, technology and markets. After the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Behari Vajpayee to China in 2003, the former Indian defence minister, George 
Fernandes, who had earlier qualified China as a potential threat number one, said that 
there was a new found positive tenor in Sino-Indian relationship. However, by 
underlining the difference between ‘healthy competition and divisive rivalry’ he did point 
to the prospects of competition in the field of FDIs, just as it had been indicated by the 
Indian premier in his trip. According to him, this differentiation has already led, to a new 
"level of maturity" in bilateral relations, which allows the two nations to address their 
differences with a greater sense of urgency without letting them come in the way of 
development of relations in other areas.133  
 
No other country attracts as much FDI as China does, where in 2004 it had over US$ 60.6 
billion dollars flow in, almost twelve times that of the flow to India.134 A management 
consultancy firm A.T.Kearney did a survey of big firms and found that India was the next 
                                                 
132 “We will defeat India in Software Battle: China”, Sifynews.com, 10 March 2002. 
133 C. Raja Mohan, “India Rethinks China Policy”, The Hindu, 26 February, 2004. Text found in 
http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/26/stories/2004022601160800.htm. 
134 “FDI in China” in Economy Watch. Text found in www.economywatch.com. 
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most popular destination for foreign investments in manufacturing. However, in the past 
four years, it has received almost two hundred billion dollars less in FDI, as compared to 
China.135 Though China is wary of India’s potentials to emerge as a competitor for 
attracting foreign investments, yet China receives a much larger net flow of foreign direct 
investments. India’s emerging economic strength and its geophysical position makes it 
important for China’s long term security calculations. The competitive elements in the 
Sino-Indian economic relations are rather deep rooted in the geopolitics of the two 
countries and cannot be easily offset by increasing economic linkages. 
 
Southeast Asia, which forms a vital source for natural resources and a market for goods, 
has become an arena for intensified competition between India and China. In fact India 
began to talk of a second phase of the Look East policy, which was to focus on 
developing more intensive economic contacts, while emphasizing on mobilizing 
investments, expanding trade and sourcing energy from this region. In this context it 
needs to be mentioned that India desired to join the APEC to strengthen its increasing 
economic cooperation and trade with the region, also to make a statement of its arrival as 
an important economic and geopolitical power in the Asia Pacific region. However its 
attempts had been futile so far because of US opposition (also China’s) to grant India the 
membership of the forum, which could elevate India’s status in the region.   
 
Southeast Asian nations have on their part successfully exploited Sino-Indian rivalry to 
gain valuable technological, economic and infrastructural assistance for their own benefit. 
                                                 
135 Simon Long, “The Tiger in Front: The insidious charms of foreign investments” in The Economist, 5 
March 2005, pp.9-13. 
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China is wary of the fact that India could not only compete as a potential rival for 
influence in Southeast Asia, but coupled with its growing naval capabilities, India could 
dominate the sea lanes through which passes the oil supply pivotal for China’s energy 
security.  In the competition aspect, China is much better positioned than India in the 
Southeast of Asia, as it forms an integral part of the ASEAN +3 states while India is only 
a dialogue partner of the ASEAN. China-ASEAN trade has grown at double digit rates 
over the last couple of decades. Observes ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong, 
that there has been a phenomenal growth in ASEAN-China bilateral trade since both 
sides agreed to establish the FTA in 2002. Bilateral trade has grown at an annual rate of 











                                                 
136 Welcome Remarks by H.E. Ong Keng Yong, Secretary General of ASEAN at the 2nd China-ASEAN 
Expo, Nanning , China , 19 October 2005. Text found in www.aseansec.org.  
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The following table gives China’s trade statistics with the ASEAN states.137
Table 3: China’s Trade with ASEAN
Exports (Millions of US dollars) 
        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
        
BRUNEI  9 8 13 17 21 34 48 
CAMBODIA  114 104 164 206 252 295 452 
INDONESIA  1172 1779 3062 2847 3427 4482 6259 
LAOS  18 22 34 54 54 98 101 
MALAYSIA  1594 1674 2565 3223 4975 6141 8087 
MYANMAR  533 407 496 498 725 908 939 
PHILIPPINES  1499 1379 1464 1622 2042 3094 4269 
SINGAPORE  3901 4502 5761 5795 6969 8869 12687 
THAILAND  1170 1436 2243 2504 2959 3828 5802 
VIETNAM  1024 964 1537 1805 2150 3179 4261 
 
Imports (Millions of US dollars) 
        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
        
BRUNEI  - - 61 148 242 312 251 
CAMBODIA  48 56 59 35 25 26 30 
INDONESIA  2462 3051 4402 3888 4501 5748 7224 
LAOS  8 10 6 7 10 11 13 
MALAYSIA  2675 3606 5480 6206 9295 13987 18174 
MYANMAR  181 194 212 239 223 284 460 
PHILIPPINES  517 908 1677 1945 3217 6306 9059 
SINGAPORE  4226 4061 5060 5143 7054 10484 13997 
THAILAND  2423 2780 4380 4713 5599 8827 11542 
VIETNAM  217 354 929 1010 1115 1456 2482 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2005. 
 
The economic aspects of India’s engagement with Southeast Asia, shows that while the 
region is definitely assuming growing importance from the point of view of trade, it is 
only some countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand which have become 
                                                 
137 Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005), p.134. 




important trading and investment partners.  India has set a target of a trade turnover of 
thirty billion dollars by 2007 with the ASEAN and also the setting up of a free trade area 
by the next decade.138  The rising relevance of Southeast Asia to India’s economic growth 
and development can further be enunciated from the support which India has lent to the 
creation of trade pacts like Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 
(IORARC) and the BIMSTEC. India has also supported the idea for the creation of a Bay 
of Bengal Community (BOBCOM).   
 
Addressing a BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in July 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh stated that the Indian participation in the BIMSTEC was a key element of India’s 
Look East policy and a long standing approach of good neighbourliness by land and 
sea.139 As far as the Southeast Asian states are concerned, their strategy has been to use 
the support of extra regional forces like the US, Australia and Japan to simultaneously 
engage both the Asian powers in various cooperative endeavours, while also using the 
power of each to limit the influence of the other.  
 
With regard to trade competition, China has carefully plotted its trade siege against India 
for over a decade. The Chinese economic infiltration in Myanmar can be scrutinized as a 
significant factor indicating the nature of future trade competition. China is trying to 
counter Indian influence in India’s own backyard of South Asia. It is infiltrating the 
                                                 
138 Prime Minister Vajpayee’s speech at the India-ASEAN Business Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 
2003. Text found in mea.gov.in. 
139 Inaugural Address by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the BIMST-EC Summit, Bangkok, 31 
July 2004. Text in Strategic Digest (September 2004), pp.1255-1257. 
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markets of Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh by dumping cheap Chinese consumer 
products to enhance its economic presence and therefore influence.   
While China, with its economic assets is trying to secure positive ends, access to 
resources, have a forward policy and recreating a zone of influence, India also is 
simultaneously striving to utilize its influence to curtail Chinese enmeshing policies of 
penetration through engagement, forward operations and finally influencing local 
political choices. Scholars S.D.Muni and C.Rajamohan hold the view that India can also 
profitably evaluate and learn from the Chinese use of employing economic diplomacy for 
advancing their strategic objectives in the Southeast Asian region.140  
 
Likewise, India too is trying to capitalize from the fact that even in Myanmar there is a 
growing concern about excessive reliance on China and the need to counterbalance 
Chinese influence through its ties with the ASEAN and India. With regard to trade there 
is a rising discontent in Northern Myanmarese towns about the influx of ethnic Chinese, 
who have taken over the business thereby forcing the natives to move outwards.141
 
Indian policy makers are trying to promote a vigorous Look East policy that would 
actually go a long way in contributing to India’s growth and dynamism, while 
simultaneously enhancing its influence in the region. East and Southeast Asia now form 
the epicenter of India’s extra regional economic and political outreach.142 It has been a 
clever tactical move to reach out to states which have an underlying threat perception of 
Chinese actions. This strategy further enhances Indian geopolitical clout in the evolving 
                                                 
140 S.D.Muni and C.Rajamohan, “Emerging Asia: India’s Options”, pp.313-333. 
141 “Intelligence: Road to Mandalay”, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.156, No.18 (6 May 1993), p.9. 
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balance of power game.  The following table shows the trend in India-ASEAN two-way 
trade over the last decade.143
 
Table 4: India-ASEAN Total Trade (1991-2001)
Year $ Million Year-on-Year Growth (%) 
1991 3488  
1992 3164 -9.3 
1993 3762 18.9 
1994 4651 23.6 
1995 6423 38.1 
1996 8621 34.2 
1997 8199 -4.9 
1998 7742 -5.6 
1999 8588 10.9 
2000 10162 18.3 
2001 10026 -1.3 
 
 
In fact India-ASEAN trade has increased to US$15 billion in 2004-2005, that too 
excluding India’s trade with Brunei, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. It was an increase of 
over 350 per cent over the 1993-94 trade figures. India’s goal is to take this to US$30 
billion by 2007.144
 
The table on the next page gives a breakup of India trade statistics with individual 
ASEAN countries.145  
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 Table 5: India’s Trade with the ASEAN states
Exports (Millions of US dollars) 
        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
        
BRUNEI  3 2 3            3Y 4 5 5 
CAMBODIA  5 7 8            3V 18 19 17 
INDONESIA  248 291 386        442V 754 1053 1251 
LAOS  1 1 5            6Y 2 1 2 
MALAYSIA  364 416 568        702V 755 857 970 
MYANMAR  35 33 48          53Y 72 86 105 
PHILIPPINES  149 137 188        226V 416 359 376 
SINGAPORE  583 634 826      1017V 1309 1949 3378 
THAILAND  327 417 510        612V 692 802 850 
VIETNAM  126 147 208        207V 308 392 497 
 
 
Imports (Millions of US dollars) 
        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
        
BRUNEI  - - -            -Y - - - 
CAMBODIA  2 1 1            -V 1- - - 
INDONESIA  805 926 922      1159V 1295 1937 2412 
LAOS  - - -            -Y - - - 
MALAYSIA  1501 1920 1389      1735V 1382 1901 2177 
MYANMAR  186 172 179        197Y 346 391 400 
PHILIPPINES  35 51 61          78V 117 123 167 
SINGAPORE  1338 1497 1482      3018V 1402 1923 2458 
THAILAND  263 314 335        530V 390 552 777 
VIETNAM  9 11 12          50V 27 36 70 
        
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2005. 
 
Just after China signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN in 2002, India 
followed suit by declaring its objectives to set up a FTA with ASEAN over the next 
decade. It is economic growth, coupled with increasing strategic power that is making 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicates consolidated data derived solely from partner records; “Y” indicates consolidated data estimated 
by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner records. This table reveals that the ASEAN-India 
two-way trade has registered a steady increase. However, India’s trade with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos 
had been negligible. 
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Indian foreign policy increasingly assertive. A vigorous Look East policy goes a long 
way in contributing to India’s growth and dynamism while enhancing its involvement 
and influence in the region. When the economic engagement with the region is concerned 
China is still way ahead as compared to India.  An important factor is that India is still not 
a member of the APEC which is crucial from the standpoint of getting a better foothold in 
the economic affairs of the region. However, Indian free trade agreements with Thailand 
and Singapore are significant moves towards greater engagement in the region but in 
spite of signing the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement with ASEAN in November 2003, the proposed ASEAN-India FTA hit a snag 
in 2005 after ASEAN started to press on India to remove import duties on 90% of 
agricultural and non-agriculture products by 2011.146 ASEAN-India negotiations are 
nevertheless on to arrive at a compromise. 
 
Geopolitical competition 
Geopolitics is an undeniable factor in inter-state relations and it is bound to have 
competitive elements. Sino-Indian competition likewise should not be regarded as a zero-
sum game. According to an Indian scholar, “The idea that neighboring countries 
especially if they are big and strong are destined to be rivals is precisely the kind of 
historical notion of inter-state relationships. India and China are no more destined to be 
rivals or opponents now or in the future, than USA and Canada, or France and Germany, 
or Britain and France, or China and Japan. If the US-USSR rivalry indicated anything, it 
is that in our times adversary of strategic kind is not ‘natural’ function of territorial 
                                                 
146 Monica Gupta, “India- Asean free trade agreement hits a snag”, 9 December 2005. Text found in 
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contiguity.”147 If major powers can accommodate each other, so can India and China, 
whereby they can keep their competition managed without becoming strategic 
adversaries. When political elites of either country speak of their country’s pre-eminence 
in the Asian geopolitical context, there is an underlying element of perception, which has 
on its own become a major factor influencing Sino-Indian relations. According to an 
Indian observer, “There is fundamental clash of interests between China and India which 
is rooted in history, strategic culture and geopolitics and manifested in China’s 
determination to prevent India from emerging as a great power and play a role it once 
played as a great power and a great civilization from Central Asia to Southeast Asia.” 
Strategic thinker Mohan Malik believes that India and China share similar aspirations 
towards status and influence. However as China has the lead in this regard, it inevitably 
introduces a more competitive aspect into Sino-Indian relationship.148  On the other hand, 
while some Chinese scholars perceive the Sino-Indian relationship as one of common 
historical experiences and similar future challenges, where common interests and 
concerns have laid down a firm base for cooperative partnership, there is another view 
which regards India to be an expansionist state in the South Asian context, competing 
with similar global power ambitions with China, thereby presenting itself as a potential 
strategic rival.149
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There is an inherent element of competition in the mutual perception of self images of 
each nation as natural great powers and centres of civilization. Both are also vying to 
keep the US attracted in order to help balance their relationship with each other. 
In the power competition game, China has clearly moved ahead with a clear strategy to 
achieve broader objectives, coupled with economic, technological and military 
capabilities. 
 
As material power is a key determinant for any country seeking international status, for 
China too, power plays an important role in its status conception, as evident in the fact 
that it places great emphasis on increasing its “zhonghe guoli” or comprehensive national 
power.150 India on the other hand had been impeded in the great power run by domestic 
political uncertainties and economic weakness. Competing for influence in Southeast 
Asia, China does not want India to strive to undermine its power and influence or to even 
achieve strategic balance. Chinese analysts have argued that a ‘growing Indian and 
ASEAN naval cooperation could impinge upon China’s maritime interests’.151 India, too 
has made an u-turn from its earlier posture by clearly acknowledging the presence of the 
element of competition in Sino-Indian interactions.. A new dimension of the Look East 
policy was highlighted, which would be to adopt an aggressive strategy to counter 
Chinese influence in Southeast and East Asia. Since both India and China are competing 
for great power status in the same geo-strategic space, it implies clearly that both would 
face each other in a common conflict of interests, which requires careful management of 
this power competition.  
                                                 
150 Yong Deng, p.53. 
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With their growing economic and political clout, coupled with missile and nuclear 
capabilities, the two Asian giants have moved into an era of realism in their bilateral 
relationship. As traditional Sino-Indian rivalry has acquired a new maritime dimension, a 
new Chinese threat perception has developed with regard to the presence of Indian and 
American navies along vital sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The Straits of 
Malacca, Indian Ocean and the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, are the maritime 
chokepoints, through which pass about 70% of China’s trade. To protect its economic and 
energy security interests, China is laying the groundwork for naval presence along crucial 
points in these lanes through acquisition of naval bases in Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Cambodia.152  Although the Chinese moves have been primarily 
motivated by its increasing dependency on sea borne trade and energy supplies, India 
however views this with skepticism, as a Chinese strategy to contain India in South Asia.  
India’s present concern about Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean relates more to 
general concern about expanding Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.  
 
To counter maritime competition India has set up defence cooperation with Iran, Oman 
and Israel in the west. Under India’s ‘Look East’ strategy, India has set up a series of 
military tie-ups, defence cooperation agreements and naval exercises with a host of 
countries in Southeast Asia, like Singapore, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Taiwan and also with Japan, Australia and the US. In this regard it needs to 
be mentioned that Indian Navy had escorted US ships in the region during the 
Afghanistan War. Southeast Asia, which largely comprises maritime states have the 
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potential for immense maritime dividends through cooperation.  In the Chairman’s 
Statement at the recently held Fourth ASEAN-India Summit, it was observed that both 
ASEAN and India had exchanged views to forge closer cooperation to combat 
transnational crimes. In this context India expressed its interest to cooperate with the 
littoral States of the Malacca Straits on maritime security and to intensify cooperation 
with ASEAN on counter-terrorism, especially sharing of experiences.153 At the recently 
held Milan 2006 naval exercise in India, the Indian government announced a siginificant 
policy shift to enhance cooperation with the Indian Ocean littoral states through 
multilateral diplomatic avenues. It approved the Indian Navy’s plan to approach 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia with a new multilateral plan that safeguards 
India's interests along this vital sea route.154  They are no longer apprehensive about 
India’s naval diplomacy.  
 
Keeping ASEAN’s concerns in view, India supports the ASEAN approach of 
constructive engagement with Myanmar, by having it incorporated into the association. 
India is also carefully and silently observing Chinese claims well into the South China 
Sea, since such an outcome could threaten the SLOCs into and out of the Indian Ocean 
and likewise would also result in a significant enhancement of Chinese position and 
influence in Southeast Asia.155
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Another example of the rising geopolitical competition can be seen with the 
demonstration of Indian assertiveness, when on January 2001, India undertook the test 
firing of the Agni-II ballistic missile capable of reaching the Chinese soil. This event took 
place while the Chinese Premier Li Peng was still on his Indian tour. From the Indian 
perspective, this was a quite a similar tactical move, just like China had undergone a 
nuclear detonation during the Indian President’s state visit to China in 1992.156  
 
In Chinese strategic posture, there used to be an attitude of indifference towards India 
(which is gradually undergoing a change) together with a denial of the fact that it remains 
a potential rival. Now there are efforts to minimize direct conventional competition with 
India while continuing to subtly treat India as a nuclear threat. Evidence of the real 
competition lies in the fact that China continues to maintain its lasting relationship with 
Pakistan without however encouraging its anti-India stance, besides, it is also 
strengthening Chinese linkages with other South and Southeast Asian states. At the same 
time China continues with its rather impressive economic growth rate which would be 
conducive not only to attract foreign investments but also to enhance its global power.  
 
China continues to neglect India (in rhetoric at least) as a potential threat. Nevertheless in 
actual strategic calculus India can be characterized as a potential competitor with a low-
order threat.157 In reality, China has paid greater geo-strategic attention to India than it 
                                                 
156 Swaran Singh, “Building Security and Confidence with China” in Tan Chung edited Across the 
Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China. Text found in 
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would be willing to admit. Chinese stance had been to minimize any active security 
competition with India not only because it has other more formidable challenges but also 
because India does have a conventional superiority along the common border and India’s 
competent military forces could pose significant threat to the southwestern Chinese 
territories. Moreover, this refusal to acknowledge India as a competitor also helps to deny 
India the chance to seek the status of being China’s sole regional competitor. Chinese 
refusal to Indian memberships to important forums like the Asia Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), APEC, the EAS, etc, can be perceived in this light. 
 
However China is also cautious of the fact that India could assume much significance in 
this competition for status and influence. The statistics for defence expenditure in either 
country indicate that both are equally keen to strengthen their armed forces in their 
respective moves towards great power status. The following table indicates the 
comparative defence expenditures of India and China.158
 
Table 6: Defence Expenditure
US Dollars (millions) % of GDP 
 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
China 68963 75500 84303 1.6 1.5 1.5 
India 13749 15508 19821 2.7 2.6 2.9 
Source: The Military Balance, 2006. 
 
It is to be noted that India could well serve as a potential link for any containment 
strategy that either the US or the countries of maritime Asia might come up with. 
Keeping this competitive element in the backdrop, China is aware that India would be 
                                                 
158 The Military Balance, Vol.106, No.1 (June 2006), p.400. 
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attracted to the geopolitical advantages offered by American unipolarity than any 
prospective multipolarity arising from a common Sino-Indian desire, which brings with it 
grave imbalances in future Sino-Indian power equations.159 As such closer Indo-US ties is 
also a concern for China, especially since Southeast Asian countries are also close to the 
US and the US is demonstrating a containment like strategy these days. 
 
The US factor 
Till lately US policy towards India was essentially driven by non-proliferation and the 
Pakistan factor. It was primarily to preserve a five power global nuclear monopoly which 
allowed China to build up its nuclear capabilities but constrained India’s defence 
programme. With the setting in of pragmatism in Indian foreign policy, India was 
determined to nurture its relations with the major powers of the world to its advantage. 
India strived for a similar arrangement with the US, just as China had, which would 
include dialogue and agreements on entire range of issues not just to enhance India’s 
security and economic interests but also to provide a much required balance of forces 
between two most important rising powers of Asia. 
 
India has been vigilant of the fact that the Chinese economic strategy which is reflected in 
the enactment of its foreign policy with regard to its strategic environment and long term 
interests and objectives, clearly rested on the preservation and improvement of relations 
with the US.160 A relation with the US is an imperative for India, if it strives to compete 
                                                 
159 Ashley Tellis, “China and India in Asia”, pp.134-173. 
 
160 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions” in Asian Survey, Vol.33, 
No.3 (March 1993), pp.252-271.  
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with China for influence in the region of Southeast Asia. Indian motivation also arises 
from the fact that engaging with the major powers affords it an opportunity to raise its 
profile among the regional countries. ASEAN states for one have always perceived India 
in the context of its relations with the major powers. India’s relationship with the US and 
China has always been an enduring concern for ASEAN region. Of late there has been 
growing concern among these states with regard to the new found warmth in Indo-US 
relations, which does have the potential to checkmate Chinese ambitions in the region.161 
Demonstrating a significant improvement in Indo-US military relations, India has 
dramatically transformed its maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the 
Tsunami Diplomacy in 2004-2005.162 This earned India greater goodwill for its not only 
marked a change in Indian strategic thinking but also reflected the changing perceptions 
of the regional states in its favour with regard to Indian activities in the Indian Ocean 
region. It also marked a significant transformation in Indian naval policy which now 
moved to a new level of multilateralism.  
 
China has been carefully watching the developments of Indo-US relationship. Admiral 
Falcon, the US Navy Commander (Pacific Command), recently stated that India’s 
emergence as a rising power was important to the region and the world. Addressing the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, he asserted that “Our relationship with the Indian 
Integrated Defense Staff and the Indian Armed Services continues to grow. Our programs 
                                                 
161 Kripa Sridharan, “Regional Perceptions of India”, in Grare and Mattoo, pp.67-89. 
162 Tsunami diplomacy: In the wake of the tsunami disaster that took place in the Indian Ocean on 26 
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are designed to increase our proficiency and interoperability with Indian forces. U.S. and 
Indian security interests continue to converge as our military cooperation leads to a 
stronger strategic partnership”.163 Endorsing this view was the statement made by the US 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who after her visit to South Asia said that the US 
was looking forward to take the Indo-US bilateral relationship to “an even greater 
strategic partnership”.164 This offered a whole new arena for the transformation of US’ 
relationship with India, which has been prudently taken note of by China.165 A senior 
administration official of the Bush Government stated that the US’ new South Asia policy 
was ‘to help India become a major world power’.166  Indo-American military to military 
contacts have increased several folds over the last couple of years. The US has not only 
offered India access to premier military equipments like the F-18 aircrafts, but talks were 
also held regarding placing of a theatre missile defence against possible nuclear attacks.  
 
India has been wise to present its fast developing ties with the US not as a counterweight 
to China and to simultaneously ensure that it would not be drawn into any containment 
policy of its eastern neighbour. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently stated 
that “I don’t look upon our relations with the US as meant to rival China. I look forward 
to enhanced cooperation with China”. Besides, he further reiterated that “The US and 
                                                 
163 Admiral Falcon, “India’s emergence as a rising power is important to the world” in report of Indian 
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166“US to help India become ‘major world power’”, Hindustan Times,  27 March 2005. (Accessed through 
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China have enough capacities and channels to resolve their problems. They don’t need 
our brokerage”.167 Just like the major powers, for India too, the challenge lies in the fact 
that it has to try and act as a balance to a rising China, yet not apparently trying to do so. 
Both the US and India have a strategic interest in rivaling or competing China. This is 
particularly more for the US which needs India as a partner in order to meet the rising 
Chinese challenge which could overtake the US as the foremost power of the world, 
where knowledge will be the currency of power.168 The recent US-India nuclear deal to 
grant India access to civilian nuclear technology resulted in sharp reactions from China 
(though it became muted later). It was a clear US attempt to draw India for its own 
inimical interests of strategically containing China and in turn create a new balance of 
power in Asia. 
 
As China and India rise simultaneously in the twenty-first century, a US-China-India 
triangular relationship is likely to become more important because of the inherent 
security challenges and opportunities that the others might present.169 So long this 
triangle never materialised in the past as the US never perceived India to be powerful 
enough to be in the same league as China. However as the two Asian giants rise, the 
triangular relationship might hold more potential in the future. 
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Competition for Energy Security 
Global energy equations have undergone significant realignments. Both India and China 
are today locked in a fierce competition for ensuring energy security as they have entered 
into a new growth phase, fuelled by rising demands for energy. There are increasing 
stakes in overseas oil and gas fields in Myanmar, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Libya , Russia and 
Vietnam to name a few. The centre of gravity of global energy markets is rapidly shifting 
to the Asian continent. Competition for energy between India and China have also 
increased tremendously in regions like the Southeast Asia and Central Asia which are 
considered as vital energy sources. Economically and diplomatically however, China has 
made overwhelming progress as compared to India. In an attempt to outplay each other, 
both have come forward with their own proposals for multilateral cooperation excluding 
the other. 
 
Sino-Indian competition over energy is increasingly intensifying as even though both the 
economies are booming, yet there is a sag in the oil production of each country which is 
insufficient to meet the growing demands. The table below gives the comparative energy 
consumptions.170  
 
Table 7: Energy Consumption
  
 Energy Consumption  
(quadrillion Btu) Rank 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 1990 2003 
China  27 35.2 38.9 45.5 2 2 
India  8 11.5 13.5 14 5 5 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information and Administration 2005. 
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China and India today rank second and fourth as world’s largest energy consumer, just 
behind the US and Russia respectively.171 According to reports of the US Energy 
Information Administration, India’s total oil consumption was 34% of its total energy 
consumption in 2005 and was projected to grow to 3.1 million bbl/d by 2010 from 2.5 
million bbl/d in 2005. Moreover India’s consumption of natural gas is estimated to rise 
from 0.63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year in 1995 to 1.4 Tcf in 2010.172
 
The graph below gives an estimate of India’s oil production and the rising consumption 
rates for the period 1980 till 2005. 
 
 
This perhaps explains the increasingly urgent grab for oil and natural gas fields all over 
the world, where both India and China are not just racing against each other but also 
against important world players in an attempt to bid up energy prices. 
                                                 
171 Keith Bradsher, “India joins China in stepped-up thirst for oil”, The New York Times, 18 February 
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172 Country Analysis Briefs: India. Text found in the Energy Information Administration official 
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 Maritime competition is increasingly getting interlinked to competition for energy 
resources. Both the Asian giants are expanding their navies in order to safeguard their 
presence in important sea lanes, as they are immensely dependant on lines of oil tankers 
from the Middle East. To meet rising domestic energy demands, China and India are not 
only vying against each other, but interestingly also cooperating at times to seal contracts 
and negotiations with companies in countries like Sudan, which have been isolated by the 
American and European governments for political reasons. India’s Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation (ONGC) recently began building a pipeline, as well as producing oil in 
Sudan, in cooperation with state owned Chinese firms. According to the secretary general 
of Sudan’s Ministry of Energy and Mining, Omer Mohammad Kheir, “the Asians came to 
Sudan in a very difficult time, and we created a very good strategic relationship with 
them”.173   
 
Similarly Iran and surprisingly even China, are emerging as key and strategic partner 
countries for India in its calculations for oil security. As opposed to earlier strategies, 
India is now trying to develop long term relationship with both Iran and China. Iran, as it 
enables India to reach out to the oil and gas assets of Central Asia, and China, as it helps 
to market downstream products and petrochemicals.174 India acquired a 20 % share in the 
development of Iran’s biggest on-shore oilfield, which is operated and 50% owned by a 
Chinese state owned company, Sinopec. 
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New Delhi and Beijing are now both following a long held tradition of rising economic 
powers striving to secure energy supplies. A new debate which has emerged in India, is 
whether the thirst for oil would put India and China again at odds with each other?  
Although increasingly Indian official statements claim that India seeks cooperation with 
China to pursue its energy needs, reality is that both are racing against each other all over 
the world to secure supplies for their energy security. India is clearly losing out to China 
in this race to seize more deals and contracts in oil and gas producing countries. It should 
be noted that increased Chinese activism to lock up the energy sources is a cause of 
concern not just for India but also for the US. China is making its strategic presence felt 
by acquiring control of scarce energy resources all over the world, which is a serious 
geopolitical concern for the US as well. Former Indian Minister for Oil and Natural Gas, 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, feels that just like other Asian nations, India too needed to pursue it 
own interests in the oil market. For over a decade now, India’s energy consumption has 
grown faster than its economy and it is likely to increase at the rate of five per cent every 
year till 2010-11 at the current rate of business.175  
 
According to reports of the Indian Embassy in Myanmar, the swift Chinese move to snap 
up six more oil deals in Myanmar in a period of four months from October to January 
2005, had become a concern for not just Myanmar but more specifically for India. 
Myanmar wanted India to offer ‘some balance’ to this swift and aggressive Chinese act 
by bidding for a few more exploration blocks. To bring this feud to a close and also to 
bring about greater beneficial coordination between the two, Mani Shankar Aiyar, held 
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talks with China’s National Development and Reform Commission Vice Chairman 
Zhang Xioqiang, on areas of synergy, such as working together bilaterally and also in 
third countries.176 India had also floated the idea of an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline to 
China, via Myanmar, to establish a pan Asian energy grid.  
Another source of energy which could emerge as an area of competition between India 
and China is the Central Asian gas or the Russian oil route. Though India is currently 
primarily dependent on Gulf for oil supplies, yet Russian and Caspian energy sources 
would in future go a long way in meeting the energy demands of the Asia Pacific region. 
States newly independent of Russian rule would not be averse to increasing Chinese 
influence in the region to keep the Russians at bay. It is possible that China and the 
important Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could forge 




The Nuclear Question 
India’s power equation has to be seen in relation to China, even though it might not face 
any immediate threat. China is in such a geostrategic position, so as to provide the 
greatest challenge to India, as a regional and a global power. India’s great power 
diplomacy since the nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998 has placed it in an advantageous 
situation in Asia after a long span of time. The tests have given India, its long sought 
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nuclear equivalence, if not parity with China.178 It clearly depicts the intersection of the 
Indian quest for security and status in global affairs as the tests enabled India to redefine 
Indian approach to the question of power.179
 
The question of India competing with China, to arrive at a strategic equation, is primarily 
linked to one with Pakistan. Current Chinese position is that it would not use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear state; however, now that Pakistan has acquired nuclear 
weapons following India, the erstwhile protective status of being a non-nuclear state, vis-
à-vis China, has been lost by India. There is however much difference among various 
strategic thinkers180 as to whether Chinese military, missile and nuclear capabilities pose 
a threat to Indian interests and security. A prominent line of thought is that China counts 
as a long term threat and so India cannot afford to let off its guard and stop striving to 
achieve parity with China.  One major strategic rationale provided for the construction of 
a credible and effective Indian nuclear weapon posture, is to provide a hedge against the 
possibility of a belligerent China in an uncertain anarchic world.181 It is more so because 
China bases its strategic defence on a nuclear triad, with its strategic submarine force 
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positioned as an important component at the vital eastern chokepoints of the Indian 
Ocean, thereby playing a decisive role in Indian security and strategic calculations.182  
 
Concerns have also been expressed about Chinese intent in aiding Pakistan’s nuclear and 
missile programmes and therefore the need to have missiles capable of targeting Chinese 
cities. The Indian decision to test its nuclear capabilities in 1998 and consequently begin 
a process of developing a modest deterrent is one of the prime examples of such an 
insurance policy that India has adopted vis-à-vis China. At the heart of India’s security 
policy lay a continuous commitment to possess best military technologies available and 
also to maintain its defensive capabilities. Chinese efforts to modernize its military 
through the purchase of advanced weapons technology, the creation of a blue water navy, 
its nuclear programme and sale of dual use technologies to countries like Pakistan and 
Iran do create concerns for India. 183 From the Indian perspective, its threat perceptions 
have risen also because of the Sino-Pakistan security nexus, which also includes 
collaboration in the nuclear and missile areas. The close ties between China and some 
other South Asian states, operating in an anti-India framework makes the challenge even 
greater for India.184  China has on its part been careful to position and portray itself along 
the world opinion by signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 185     
For India, a China-strategy necessitates a combination of skilled diplomacy and rapid 
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development of national power and prestige. Research and developments aimed at force 
modernization are other examples of such an insurance policy vis-à-vis China.186  Since 
India views itself as a stabilizing force in Asia, without any pan-Asian hegemonic 
aspirations, its economic, security and political interests span across the Indian Ocean, 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia. So the competition posed by China could only be met 
by ensuring sustained levels of economic growth, restructuring of military forces and 
modernization of the military technological base, so as to prevent any negative fall out to 
India’s security and interests. 
 
However, there are others who hold that there is no immediate threat perception which 
necessitates such nuclearisation. Both the countries have attempted to repair their 
relationship since 1988, thereby managing mutual competition and encouraging 
cooperation in those areas where there could be joint gains. Besides, the present Sino-
Indian relations are based on political foundations envisaging settlement of disputed 
issues while focusing on trade and investments. The possibility of escalation of tension, 
driven by nuclear technological competition is quite remote as India does not at least 
openly express its interest to catch up with China, which is way ahead anyways. Noted 
Indian strategic thinker K Subrahmanyam asks, ‘Will the Chinese risk Kunming and 
Chengdu at present and even Shanghai and Guangzu later…for any conceivable political, 
military and strategic objective?’187 However Indian strife towards achieving competitive 
nuclear missiles and capabilities vis-à-vis China continues, which is evident in the steady 
progress in developing a China specific deterrent capability, the Agni III. 
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 While trying to address the competitive aspects with regard to the process of 
nuclearisation, what has to be understood is how much of minimum credible deterrence 
would be regarded as sufficient for India? Only if the newly developing bilateral 
relationship between India and China deteriorates would there be an actual scope for an 
expanding arms race. Sino-Indian relations can be regarded as a form of oligopolistic 
competition, in which rivals compete in a stable environment, cooperating in numerous 
ways, ensuring a fundamentally stable relationship.188 Indian response vis-à-vis China is 
somewhat of a soft realism. While India does possess the capability to deter China, still 
there remains a significant concern about an active Chinese containment like strategy. 
Another underlying cause of caution is the fact that China is yet to demonstrate its 
commitment to non-violent resolution of disputes. While only an enhanced Chinese threat 
would result in competition for expansionary arms race, it would be difficult to deny the 
competitive efforts at encirclement and counter encirclement. At the moment India’s 
missile and nuclear capabilities are just no match for China’s inventory which consists of 
over two dozen ICBMs, assorted short range missiles, some seventy IRBMs and 500-
1500 nuclear weapons.189  The real challenge is not to openly confront China, but to 
prepare for the inevitability of competition, even while simultaneously engaging and 
cooperating with China. 
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Sino-Indian competition and Southeast Asia  
Developments in Southeast Asia could affect Indian interests either directly or indirectly. 
Generally interaction with Southeast Asia falls at the intersection of security, wealth and 
status or influence. While discussing the position of ASEAN states in the context of Sino-
Indian competition, Myanmar plays a significant role.  
 
Myanmar’s position (now an ASEAN member) in Sino-Indian interactions has been 
highlighted in the chapter emphasizing the conflictual interactions in India-China 
relationship. What needs to once again be re-emphasised is that both New Delhi and 
Beijing are competing in an open struggle for influence and domination in Myanmar. 
Chinese efforts to develop Myanmarese military infrastructure and facilities could 
actually go a long way in paving the path for significant Chinese presence in the Indian 
Ocean. India, views this with much skepticism, as attempts to curb its influence in 
Southeast Asia by having a robust presence on India’s eastern seafront and finally to 
contain and also encircle it in its own backyard, South Asia. To compete in this sphere, 
India has changed its course and restored relations with the Myanmarese Junta and also 
began to position itself as a secondary source for military supply. Interestingly sea-borne 
trade between India-Myanmar is much easier than overland trade between Myanmar and 
Yunnan. Ashley Tellis notes that while China would try to gain strategic access through 
its economic and military instruments, India would likewise compete by emphasizing 
similar instruments to block them.190 Although China is way ahead in this competition, 
India does possess substantial resources and locational advantages as far as naval 
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competition is concerned. India’s objective in this competition is primarily to limit and 
curb Chinese influence in Myanmar, which would have otherwise gone a long way in 
curbing its own influence and status among states in the Southeast and also South Asia. 
 
It is often the considerations for wealth and security that have influenced as well as 
shaped Sino-Indian interactions and competitive diplomacy in the Southeast of Asia. The 
ASEAN-China trade figures are rather impressive. In 2005 ASEAN-China FTA took 
effect and it was decided that by 2010 all commodities would be exempt from taxes and 
the target for bilateral trade was set as US$100 by the end of 2005.191 These 
developments coupled with the permanent nature of geopolitics, thanks to the 
geographical location of many ASEAN states with regard to China, make Southeast Asia 
crucially significant in China’s grand strategy. On the other hand India’s relationship with 
Southeast Asia was only revived with the dramatic economic success of the ASEAN 
states and also China, which led to the initiation of the ‘Look East’ policy, which has 
since then substantially redefined this vital relationship. As far as ASEAN is concerned, 
they receive nearly five times FDIs from China than India.192  India’s strategic objective 
in the region is to ensure that Southeast Asia remains peaceful and stable without being 
influenced by any major power. Notes G.V.C. Naidu that this is where Indian and 
ASEAN strategic aims coincide and ASEAN is willing to have Indian involvement in the 
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security affairs of the region, as a major economic and military power which has the 
potential to play a kind of balancing role.193
 
Indian policy makers have been cautious of not just the opportunities but also the inherent 
challenges before ASEAN, which have been brought forth by the economic rise of China. 
Chan Heng Chee, Singapore’s Ambassador to the US, points out that ASEAN does not 
underestimate the economic challenges posed by China, which has in turn spurred the 
former into action.194  Time and again India strives to capture such common strategic 
elements in ASEAN-Indian relations which in turn have a bearing on Sino-Indian 
relationship. 
 
Though India does recognize that Southeast Asia is not as fundamentally valuable to 
India as it is to China, nevertheless it is important to Indian strategic calculus, which 
makes it imperative for India to remain comprehensively engaged in the region. India’s 
aim of greater activism and a future strategic presence in the region is aimed at 
preventing China from acquiring not just presence but also influence which could coerce 
the regional states in supporting China, to contain India. India is actually trying to 
reinforce its earlier initiatives taken in the field of building defence and security and 
cooperation. India is trying to increase its capacity to influence by greater involvement in 
the region through its bargaining skills, so as to reap benefits from the attractive market 
that Southeast Asia has to offer. In a sense, India has succeeded in making its presence 
felt by being invited to join the East Asian Summit in December 2005. 
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 Status issues also bring out the competitive elements between the two countries. In order 
to signal India’s emergence as a crucial power in Asia, India has tried in vain to join the 
ASEM process, aimed to address political, cultural and economic issues to strengthen the 
relationship between Europe and Asia, mostly because of China’s reluctance to endorse 
India. This can be regarded to be more in line with China’s Asia policy, which is to 
prevent the rise of any peer competitor which could challenge its position as the sole 
Asian ‘Middle Kingdom’. China does not want India to emerge as an equal in this 
arena.195 Both India and China share similar set of self images as natural great powers 
who are destined to restore their countries’ great power status. China has consistently 
opposed Indian claims for membership in important groupings like the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), APEC, ASEM and the N-5(Nuclear Club). The EAS is another 
new platform where India and China are engaged in a game of regional competition. Not 
just strong security perspectives but also a desire for simultaneous status claims and 
enhancement of political power and influence has further motivated India to seek 
memberships of such powerful groupings. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, therefore, a study of the competitive aspects in Sino-Indian relations clearly 
shows that it is an era of competition for power and influence between Asia’s two most 
emerging nations. While China has already made its mark as a great power, India with its 
impressive economic growth rate is following suit. India is also a rising Asian power 
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simultaneously seeking influence in its interactions in Asia. Competition between the two 
countries becomes even more inevitable as both share similar aspirations to restore their 
great power status, besides having set of complementary interests and capabilities in 
terms of military technologies. It is a web of complex interactions of various issues which 
characterise this relationship. In its interactions with the ASEAN, India aimed at 
emphasizing all round economic and diplomatic strategies that would limit Chinese 
influence in the region, without apparently presenting itself in a negative light. 
 
China’s Asia Policy has been to prevent the rise of any rival which would challenge it 
Middle Kingdom status in Asia and the Asia Pacific. It therefore adopts the means of 
employing hardcore realpolitik of balance of power to preserve its pre-eminence. China’s 
evolving naval doctrine ensures dominance and control over trade, energy and naval 
routes, which would suffice to contain India in South Asia, thereby succeeding in denying 
India, the status it would much like to claim in Asian geopolitics. Fact remains that in the 
energy sector where India aims to cooperate with China hoping to bring down prices, it 
would perhaps serve Indian interests better if India tried to cooperate with Taiwan to 
jointly bid for the resources. Thus on balance, Sino-Indian relations will continue to be 
determined by competition, though not of a destructive kind. India-China cooperation, 
which has become the latest sensational focus of the academicia, the business 
community, the policy makers and even the media of the region, is more of cooperation 





















































The Sino-Indian relationship had so far been primarily analysed through a realist 
framework, which assumed the underlying elements of conflict and competitiveness, two 
aspects which have lodged firmly in bilateral security calculations. However, relations 
between any two states cannot be reduced entirely to conflict as there are always certain 
areas of positive cooperation.196 States cooperate essentially in order to reduce costs and 
thereby increase their efficiency.197 Cooperation also emerges out of common concerns 
where the governments are compelled to cooperate.  
 
Over the last couple of years there have also been certain positive developments in the 
overall relationship between India and China. The annual report for 2001-02 published by 
the Indian Ministry of External Affairs states that India "seeks friendly, cooperative, good 
neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations with China, on the basis of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly enunciated by India and China. India seeks a 
long term, stable relationship based on equality in which both sides are responsive to each 
other's concerns." 198 Moreover India and China had for the first time entered into a 
strategic dialogue in January 2005 with the aim of broadening the Sino-Indian bilateral 
relationship. This dialogue provided the platform for discussions on common issues of 
concern like globalisation and trade, energy security, multipolarity, non-proliferation and 
terrorism to name a few.199  This explains the rationale behind the selection of a wide 
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range of issues from economics to geopolitics for study in this chapter. 
 
It would be interesting and important to analyse to what extent these positive moves in 
the likes of the recent strategic dialogue would bring about Sino-Indian cooperation, but 
before that it is necessary to interpret the term ‘cooperation’ in the context of Sino-Indian 
relations as studied within the scope of this thesis. 
 
Cooperation here can be understood by being broadly categorised into two aspects.              
i) Cooperation could be a process to build upon the bilateral relationship existing between 
India and China, which is demonstrated through the series of high level visits and 
confidence building mechanisms that are taking place between the two countries. 
ii) Cooperation could also be employed as a means (as a tool) to tackle the elements of 
conflict and competition that exists between India and China; it is more of cooperation 
under duress, as a literature review shows that cooperation is not really intrinsic in this 
relationship. Here, it becomes a necessary element out of an imperative need for India not 
just to keep pace with China in its economic and military modernisation aimed at 
enhancing its geopolitical clout, but also to position India as a great power worth 
reckoning. While it would be wrong to argue that India’s commitment to cooperation 
with China lacks sincerity, nevertheless there is generally a gap between the stated and 
the implied objectives of a nation’s foreign policy. India’s stated objective is to seek 
better relations with China; however, given the geo-strategic realities of the time, India is 




The main focus of this chapter would be to study the cooperative aspects of Sino-Indian 
bilateral relationship based on the widening of their common interests and also to study 
the factors that have been compelling India to adopt a cooperative posture. 
 
There has been a rapid improvement in the bilateral economic relations of the two 
countries from the last decade of the twentieth century. As trade has grown commendably 
under the changing international milieu where the focus is on globalisation, the political 
dynamics of both the countries have undergone significant changes. It is the systemic 
changes that have necessitated a new pragmatism in Indian foreign policy thinking and 
for the first time do both India and also China appear to be willing to boost bilateral 
economic ties and give economics a larger role in moving the relationship forward. 
Economics on its own is neither non-controversial nor non-competitive; however in the 
age of globalisation, economic exchanges and interactions do significantly influence a 
nation’s foreign policy. Improvement in Sino-Indian relations was also in China’s 
interests. As it helped to focus its attentions on economic development, which called for a 
peaceful and stable peripheral environment and was in line with China’s top foreign 
policy priority. Long term peaceful peripheral milieu was considered imperative for its 
modernisation thrust. In this context it is interesting to note that Deng Xiaoping had once 
said, “If China and India are developed, we can say that we have made our contributions 
to mankind”.200
 
What does ‘process’ and ‘means’ indicate? For any emphasis on action, there is generally 
a process analysis, which implies that with the passage of time there is a continuous 
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change in relationships, including the conditions underlying change and its 
consequences201.  Cooperation as employed in this study is just one of the many processes 
involved in the analysis of action, reactions and interactions. Actions exist analytically as 
explained by academic scholars202, when the four components of actors, goals, situations 
and means are ascertained. Thus in this study, when cooperation is employed as a means, 
it indicates the ways through which ends are formed into strategies of action. 
 
This chapter would hence primarily highlight the role of cooperation as a process, 
employing cooperative security framework. It would be followed by emphasis on 
employing cooperation as a means to achieve an overall improvement in relations with 
the ulterior motive of enhancing India’s strategic interests. This would be covered in 
greater detail focusing on economic aspects, geopolitical issues, information technology, 
the nuclear issue, energy, terrorism and finally the position of Southeast Asia in this 
bilateral cooperation. Although these are a diverse set of issues, however what connects 
them is the fact that all have been conducive in bringing India and China to a common 
platform. While the nuclear question, energy issues and the US factor have been covered 
in previous chapters, nevertheless it once again deserves a mention here because of the 
inherent nature of these issues which bear both competitive as well as cooperative 
potentials. 
 
It needs to be clarified here that certain elements of cooperation in Sino-Indian relations 
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like Track II diplomacy in the form of cultural exchanges and people to people contact 
which is receiving new attention of late, have not been covered within the scope of this 
chapter. This is primarily because of the insufficient literature available on the topic.  
 
The Cooperative Security Approach 
A new framework of cooperative security could be employed to study the new 
cooperative dimensions of Sino-Indian relations. There have been two basic arguments 
on which this new thinking depends. First, threats to security are increasingly diverse. 
Threats today constitute not just the military aspect but are multidimensional as they 
range from economics to insurgencies, to environmental factors, drug trafficking and 
even conflicts over access to key natural resources including energy resources, all of 
which are key to economic development. 
 
Second, management of these emerging security issues can no longer rest on 
unilateral/bilateral measures alone but also necessitates multilateral efforts through 
discussions, negotiations, cooperation and compromise.203
 
Janne E Nolan is one of the key analysts associated with this conceptualisation. The 
central purpose of this concept of cooperative security is to recognise and articulate how 
the character of security has changed in recent years and to demonstrate how this change 
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has rendered the foundations of past strategies based on preparations for military 
confrontations as inappropriate.204
 
This approach further emphasises assurance and security with potential adversaries with 
the belief that security cannot be achieved at the expense of or isolation from other actors. 
The concept of cooperative security implies the usage of consensual and cooperative 
means at national or regional levels. It rests on the basic principles that all participants 
must accept that peace is indivisible, it can achieved only through a framework of shared 
responsibility and that security is to be regarded as comprehensive and there should be a 
commitment to the principle of mutual and equal security.205
 
It has been suggested by analysts that in the South Asian context, cooperative security as 
a strategy needs to go beyond the pursuit of mere defensive sufficiency. It would not only 
include conflict resolution but would also address a wide range of issues.206
 
As far as China is concerned, the Chinese leadership is also aware of the increasing 
interdependence in global affairs as a result of globalization. It is cautious of the 
deepening of interdependence in security among nations. China is likewise advocating a 
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new concept of security which is also based on the concept of cooperative security, 
seeking security through cooperation on the basis of mutual trust, benefit and equality.207
 
Applying this framework, Sino-Indian cooperation can be regarded as a kind of 
cooperation under duress. It is a relation which since the late 1980s has embarked on the 
cooperative security path, where India has been compelled to seek cooperation with 
China on a comprehensive basis. 
 
India regards itself to be a stabilising force in Asia and a key power not just to bind South 
Asia as geo-strategic unit, but also to link up with China, Southeast Asia, Central Asia 
and the Indian Ocean, where its interests range from politics to economics to security. In 
this context Sino-Indian ties have become a major persistent and determining factor in 
shaping India’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries. Improved ties with China 
and the Southeast Asian states, while simultaneously reforming India’s domestic policies, 
is likely to stimulate greater positive interactions among these countries.208
 
Cooperation as a process 
 
This is not a recent endeavour but the result of the search for a basic reorientation of 
Indian foreign policy which began in 1988. Following the improvement in Sino-Soviet 
relations, India was more or less conveyed the message by its erstwhile sole ally, the 
Soviet Union, to seek better ties with China. Soviet President Gorbachev was seen by 
India as an architect of change and it was largely a result of changing Soviet global 
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posture that resulted in Indian initiative to improve ties with China.209  Till then India had 
a rather inflexible foreign policy vis-à-vis China. Resolution of the boundary dispute was 
held as a key prerequisite to any attempts at improving relations. This further deepened 
India’s security dilemma.210  Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China was the first attempt to create 
a cooperative strategic frame for Sino-Indian relations. It is said to have inaugurated the 
improvement in bilateral relations and was a significant symbolic gesture from India that 
it was willing to negotiate for improvement of relations with China and simultaneously 
accelerate talks to resolve the boundary dispute. However a section of Indian strategic 
community, who adopts the so called ‘China is hostile’ perceptual position, held that the 
visit had actually hurt India’s vital interests, for it not only failed to settle the border 
issue, but also sidelined the issue to India’s detriment. Moreover by regarding Tibet to be 
an internal affair of China, India also gave away its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China, 
as there was no reciprocal gesture in the form of recognition of Sikkim as a part of India 
by the Chinese.211
 
Nevertheless, the visit was not just symbolic, but there were also tangible signals, that the 
two countries would be forward looking to pursue all round development of relations. 
Agreements were reached that both sides would maintain peace and tranquility along the 
Line of Actual Control. Five principles of peaceful coexistence were re-emphasised while 
agreements were also reached on cooperation in science and technology and civil 
aviation. There were for the first time the formation of Joint Working Groups not only to 
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negotiate on the boundary question but also to promote trade, economic and investment 
relations. There was a significant establishment of a perception in Chinese minds that the 
visit marked a turning point for the normalisation of relations and also was the start of a 
new era of peace and cooperation between the two countries and people.212
 
In the present context, while India is striving for security on the one hand and increased 
influence and status in Asian geopolitics on the other, India realises that it needs a policy 
not aimed at containing China. It is aware that realistic engagement strategy involving 
China would meet the needs of Indian quest for wealth, security and recognition. This 
would not only serve India’s interests but also help to create a new Asian balance of 
forces. Since the 1980s when the domestic reforms began gathering momentum in China, 
its socio-cultural and economic interlinkages across borders facilitated stability in 
relations. From 1988 onwards other positive developments in bilateral relations followed 
soon, including hi-profile visits from either side. After the visit of Chinese Premier Li 
Peng in December 1991, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs released an official 
statement, announcing that India and China have signed “a memorandum on the 
resumption of border trade; agreed minutes of the third session of Indo-China Joint Group 
on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and Technology and a Trade Protocol 
between India and China for the calendar year 1992.”213
 
                                                 
212 C.V.Ranganathan, “India-China Relations- Retrospect and Prospects”,  in Indian Foreign Policy-Agenda 
for the 21st century, Vol.2 (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd., 1998), pp.240-255. 
213 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.37, No. 12 (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Govt. of India, 1991), 
pp.241-246. 
 126
China was also reorienting its attitude towards India. It reflected the consolidation of the 
process that began in 1988, through high profile visits of Chinese leaders to India and an 
in-depth exchange of views on matters of common concern. This paved the way for 
further friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Foreign policy being an 
interactive process implied that reorientation of Chinese views was of equal importance. 
As part of generating mutual trust, defence exchanges between India and China have 
been carried forward. In this context the visit of Chinese naval ship “Zheng He’ to 
Bombay in 1993214, the first visit by a Chinese warship to an Indian port was symbolic of 
the reorientation in Chinese line of thinking. Commenting on Sino-Indian relations, Liu 
Jianchao, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry remarked that China was willing 
to make coordinated efforts with India, to maintain the sound momentum in relations as 
well as to promote the development of long term constructive cooperative partnership 
between the two sides.215 The hi-profile visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to India in April 
2005 symbolised China’s latest cooperative embrace of its neighbouring rival. 
 
Sino-Indian relations have rapidly developed ever since. This cooperative security 
process was first of all marked by the increase in high level exchange of visits. After 
Premier Li Peng's visit to India in 1991, Indian President R.Venkataraman and Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao travelled to China in 1992 and 1993 respectively. This was 
followed by the trip of President K.R. Narayanan in 1994 and 2000, Chinese President 
Jiang in 1996 and Premier Zhu Rongji in 2002, Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2003 and 
Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005. Besides the summit meetings between the heads of 
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state and governments and systematic exchanges of visit of foreign ministers, defence 
ministers and other military and non-military officials; there has also been 
institutionalisation of a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), leading to the 
signing of the 1993 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility and the 1996 
Agreement on Confidence Building Measures.216
 
In the Indian context, CBMs have basically been minimalist in their objectives and scope. 
Primarily they have been aimed at ensuring minimalist military clashes on the field to 
prevent any setback to the positively changing bilateral relationship. However it also 
cannot be denied that CBMs are essentially declarative in nature, conflict avoidance 
measures. Through various interventions at the political level in the negotiation process, 
the very fact that CBMs are being concluded is demonstration enough of the progress 
being made in the bilateral relationship. Critics point out to the fact that the scope of 
CBMs in the Sino-Indian context is highly limited and may not evolve in positive 
outcomes like arms control or disarmament measures.217 However, the political 
commitments of both sides to cooperate even without all problems being resolved can be 
regarded as having played a pivotal role in ensuring a forward momentum of bilateral 
relations. 
 
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003 deserves a special mention as it renewed 
the cooperative vigour in Sino-Indian relations by focusing on economic cooperation and 
trade which has set the momentum for overall improvement in bilateral relations. While 
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the Prime Minister hoped to build “ties of peace, friendship, trust and cooperation” he 
asserted that India and China had “emerged decisively” from decades of mistrust and 
were capable of offering diplomatic leadership as major developing countries.218 
Following his visit both sides agreed to set up a compact Joint Study Group (JSG) 
composed of officials and economists to examine the potential complementarities 
between the two countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation. 
 
The cooperative process set in motion by the cooperative security mechanism of 
confidence building measures have certainly laid the groundwork for all round 
improvement in relations. The more important focus however lies in employing 
cooperation not just as a form of interaction but also as a strategy to enhance India's 
international bargaining position vis-à-vis China, where economics plays a major role in 
enhancing a country's geo-political clout. The frequent exchange of high level visits 
between China and India has not only resulted in the promotion of the traditional 
friendship but also bilateral trade and economic cooperation. This cooperation has spilled 
over to other sectors of the economy. Efforts to strengthen Sino-Indian economic and 
trade cooperation have been made by The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), which serve as 
important institutions for economic, trade, and investment promotion of the two 
countries. Besides, this meeting provides a valuable opportunity for the business 
communities of either nation. The good momentum that has been created out of this 
development clearly shows that enormous latent potential lies in the two countries for 
                                                 




Cooperation as a means 
Before going into the various aspects of the present Sino-Indian cooperative endeavour, it 
would perhaps be worth noting some of the primary causes which led to the improvement 
and development of relations. 
 
Apart from the Sino-Soviet warming of relations, another superpower having a positive 
influence was the US. After the Cold War, good Sino-Indian relations were also 
important to raise India’s status in US foreign policy considerations. As India not only 
required US’ support and cooperation in obtaining economic and technological assistance 
but also support from the international monetary organisations. India was on the sidelines 
of US interests and only by seeking to alter and improve its relations with China, could it 
serve to enhance India’s position vis-à-vis the US.220
 
In the present international milieu, as the world is undergoing realignments while moving 
towards a multipolar system, it has a tremendous bearing on the economics, politics and 
foreign affairs of both India and China. While facing opportunities, challenges and 
competition, it is in their own interest to move forward with the relationship in areas 
where they can cooperate as well as share similar views on international issues. 
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India particularly supports China’s position on establishing a new international order; 
therefore emphasising that cooperation with China would be essential not only for the 
peace and development of the region at large, but also to serve India’s own interests, 
whereby it aims to increase its status in Asian geopolitics.221 In Indian foreign policy 
making circles, the primary China policy makers are basically pragmatist-realist thinkers, 
who accept the fact that India's China policy is often derived from both the aspects of 
'China threat' as well as 'China cooperation'.  
  
As two most dynamic and growing economies of the world, China and now India are 
increasingly being considered as important players with influence in regional and global 
forums. It was projected in the Goldman Sach’s Report of 2004 that the growth generated 
by the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) could become a much larger force in the 
world economy than it is now and in less than forty years they could be larger than the 
G6 in US dollar terms. It further stated that India has the potential to show the fastest 
growth over the next thirty and fifty years, as the Indian economy would become larger 
than all countries except the US and China.222  
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With a dramatic growth in bilateral trade, China has already become India’s second 
largest bilateral trading partner and is poised to become India's largest trading partner.223  
India is making efforts to move ahead with the bilateral relation and is seeking ways to 
broaden and deepen the current levels of interaction. In the post Cold War era and an era 
of globalisation, it is cautious of the need to improve its economic strengths, as an 
important component of a nation's capability. Though traditional notions of absolute 
sovereignty still remain firmly entrenched in both Chinese and Indian national security 
calculations, yet increasingly they are succumbing to forces of globalisation and are 
showing clear signs of considering a range of both potentially common  and overlapping 
interests to be factored into their overall power calculus.224
 
The challenge to Sino-Indian relations today is to graduate from a relationship where a 
large measure of political stability exists to one where the relationship would bring in 
beneficial results helping in the creation of networks of security, trade, social and 
investment concerns. Clearly from Beijing’s point of view, it is business, which is going 
to shape China’s India ties. Though concerns about big power calculations in Asia do 
remain, still future Sino-Indian ties would be largely governed by economic dialogue. At 
this juncture it needs to be pointed out that Sino-Indian trade has registered a significant 
increase over the years. The next table indicates the direction of trade statistics between 
India and China from 1998 onwards. 
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Table 8: China’s Exports and Imports with India








908 826 1350 1700 2274 4251 7677 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2005, International Monetary Fund.225
 
In fact Sino-Indian bilateral trade is expected to exceed US$20 billion in 2006. According 
to Wan Jifei, Chairman of CCPIT, in 2005 bilateral two-way trade rose to $18.7 billion, 
which recorded a 37.5 per cent increase from that in 2004 and if the trend continues the 
figure may even reach $100 billion in six years.226
 
The fact that the bilateral cooperation evolves out of an imperative (whether in economics 
or geopolitics) becomes clear in the course of this chapter. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 
visit to China resulted in Beijing granting de-facto recognition to Sikkim in maps that 
show it as part of India, while India has acknowledged Tibet as a part of China. India too 
has started to feel more confident of improved ties, following Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
assurance that the relations have entered a ‘new stage’.227
 
The common interests and concerns need to be analysed in greater details. 
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i) Trade & the WTO 
The essence of economic globalisation can be regarded to be mutual benefit and common 
gain. By advocating the new security concept with mutual trust, equality and coordination 
at its core, the two countries are attempting to face the challenges in this new security 
scenario. The basic logic behind the urge to increase bilateral rapprochement is perhaps 
the belief in mutual trust which increases with increased stakes in peace, cooperation and 
economics. Accounting for one-third of the world population, India and China could 
become a power worth reckoning if perhaps they were willing to coordinate their 
strategies. Policy makers on either side have started to acknowledge that Sino-Indian 
economic engagement has far greater positive social and political implications. It needs to 
be mentioned here, that in 2004 China and India had signed an agreement to resume 
trading at the Nathu La Pass and in April 2006, it was reported by the official Chinese 
news agency, Xinhua, that vital trade market along Sikkim on the strategic Sino-Indian 
border would be opened from June, setting up the direct trade link between the two 
countries.228  
 
While focusing on their complementary strengths, China with manufacturing and India 
with services, it appears that cooperation would become an ongoing theme as both the 
countries are becoming aware of the need to evolve a stronger partnership. In this context 
economic engagements between India and China can perhaps be described as the most 
reliable confidence building measure between the two countries in the present era.229 
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Another event which has been successful in bringing Chinese and Indian growth curbs 
closer to each other (also brought about by the relative lowering of growth rate in China’s 
GDP and a simultaneous rise in India’s GDP growth rate) has been the East Asian 
Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. It necessitated China to explore new trading partners, 
which coincided with India’s impressive economic growth, thereby contributing to the 
creation of a new phase of bold initiatives in Sino-Indian ties. China’s growth in economy 
and its predominance in global trade have turned it into a springboard for several 
developing countries, including India, where China has gradually emerged as the engine 
for India’s growth in exports.  
 
After China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), India saw in it a powerful 
potential ally to crusade against the powerful Western countries in order to settle the 
terms for international commerce. Moreover, India and China were seen as the only 
countries that could carve a real bargain at global trade talks. 
India and China also have quite similar observations about international trading regimes 
and specifically the WTO. While accommodating to the Uruguay Round Conference, 
both the countries focused on similar set of issues like the phase-in arrangements of 
considerable complexity and the technical verification problems. They have had quite 
similar expectations from, as well as reservations about the WTO.230    
 
                                                 
230 One basic similar expectation from WTO for India and China had been the search of special safeguard 
mechanisms in the field of agriculture for the developing countries. Other areas of possible Sino-Indian 
cooperation pertained to trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) with reference to 
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China to act in concert on WTO issues”,  The Hindu, 26 June 2003.  As far as similar reservations are 
concerned, the acceptance of free trade in agricultural products would present large domestic political 
challenges to the governments in both the countries. See, James Clad in Frankel and Harding, p.269. 
 
 135
From international perspectives, the growth of China over the last couple of decades has 
provided it with a clear objective where it perceives its national interests to be intertwined 
with other players of the world. In this context, countries like India, with its booming 
economy do attract greater notice. Some of the general issues demonstrating Sino-Indian 
cooperation at successive WTO meetings have been on topics like liberalising the 
movement of skilled workers across national boundaries; further liberalising trade in 
textiles; resisting attempts by multinationals to automatically invest in any country and so 
on. 
 
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China identified economic cooperation as the new 
focus in Sino-Indian ties, besides; both also agreed to coordinate their strategies in 
supporting developing countries in the WTO. Other potential areas of Sino-Indian 
cooperation within the WTO framework are related to public health issues, dispute 
settlements and investment policies and Trade Related Investment Protection Measures, 
as specified in the Doha Declaration. Identifying with this cooperative scheme, China 
announced for the first time a five hundred million dollar funds for investing primarily in 
the Indian infrastructure sector.231 The WTO enabled trade cooperation between the two 
countries also added a twist to the present international concerns that India and China 
would be getting caught in fierce economic competition.  
 
To further enhance this economic cooperation, a forum was set up in Shenzhen, in the 
Guangdong province of China, which was jointly sponsored by China Shenzhen 
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Comprehensive Development Research Institute, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, and the Indira Gandhi Research Institute to discuss not just bilateral relations 
but also potentials for increased cooperation under the WTO framework, also with regard 
to industrial, scientific and technological issues.232  Efforts are also being taken to 
accelerate economic and political engagement for launching negotiations for a free trade 
agreement (FTA). This comes in as two-way bilateral trade have registered a significant 
improvement and was recorded in 2004 at over US$13.6 billion233 as against projected 
target of US$10 billion. However, the relative share of India and China in each other’s 
global trade is still quite small. Moreover, even amidst impressive bilateral trade 
developments, India continues to bear unease over China’s all round rise, influenced 
partially by the bitter hangovers from the border war of 1962. Bearing this aspect of Sino-
Indian relationship in mind, an Indian official had suggested that only ‘a full and equal 
engagement is the best guarantee of national security’.234
 
In spite of the new cooperative fervour in Sino-Indian relations, scholars do regard that 
Chinese policy making whether with regard to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia or South 
Asia, is primarily determined by the realist philosophy of power maximisation and 
competition. One of the choices before China is to reassure its potential competitors 
about its intentions and pursue cooperative policies for mutual development.235 The 
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recent ‘strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity’ signed with India, 
once again clearly demonstrates the Chinese style of great power diplomacy, which 
emphasises common interests, benefits, equality, cooperation and peaceful coexistence. 
However, in this era of globalization one needs to realize that the critical aspect lies in 
economics, in the mutual development of trade and investment opportunities.   
 
The improvement in Sino-Indian relations since the 1990s, more specifically the 
economic relations, is not only out of an Indian imperative to enhance its political status, 
but also out of Chinese interests to compete with the US for trade and influence in this 
rapidly growing region and also in other multilateral institutions. Multilateralism has 
become a significant aspect in Chinese foreign policy strategy and trade liberalization as 
evident in the form of free trade areas is a key feature of China’s multilateral diplomacy. 
It must be noted that India does stand to benefit by cooperating with China at the 
multilateral level. Together with China and Brazil, India played a key role in developing 
a consensus at the WTO’s General Council Meeting in 2004.236 As a BRIC country and a 
member of the ARF, India gets an opportunity to interact with China fruitfully at a 
multilateral platform whether to discuss economic issues or to participate in Asian 
security discussions. Notes Sudhir Devare, that confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy does offer a useful opportunity in cooperative security.237 The ARF especially 
is an example of cooperative security. It is in India’s interests to try and engage 
peacefully with China at this multilateral level. In fact even in India, views about China is 
gradually undergoing a change, since increased economic interactions between the two 
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countries imply greater support for political and security cooperation in the region. 
 
ii) Information Technology 
Information technology or IT is a relatively new but vibrant area for cooperation between 
Asia’s two most rising powers, China and India. IT does provide a strong example of 
current world trends, characterised by the flow or mobility of personnel, production and 
research. It was the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, who for the first time 
introduced the prospects for greater Sino-Indian cooperation in the field of technology. 
Amidst much strategic thinking in both the country’s info-tech experience and its power 
enhancing potentials, it is to be noted that Indian and Chinese expertise lay in the 
software and hardware sectors respectively.238 Speaking at a forum titled “India and 
China: Challenges and Opportunities in IT Sector”, Prime Minister Vajpayee believed 
that while the two countries specialised in two different sectors, nevertheless he held that 
"IT cooperation will be a new momentum to develop bilateral ties between the two 
countries."239  Although China and India depict a study in contrasts, the global IT 
industry’s competitive dynamics now involve networked production, where the countries 
can maintain a competitive domestic industry only by acceding to WTO norms of a tariff 
free, open market trade.240 In spite of the fact that Indian and Chinese IT strategies have 
created two very different arenas of specialisation, still there has not been much of an in-
                                                 
238 However there are clear indications of future competition as the Chinese government has developed 
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also carving out markets to compete with the Chinese products, thereby hinting at potential competition in 
each other’s sphere of excellence. 
 
239 “Indian PM calls  for strengthening IT cooperation with China”, 27 June 2003. Text found in 
www.china.org.cn. 
240 James Clad, in Frankel and Harding, pp. 267-293. 
 
 139
depth interaction between the two countries so far. However, new synergies are being 
created between Indian software skills and Chinese internet expansion. In the keynote 
speech at an international conference held in Singapore, Singapore’s Minister Mentor, 
Lee Kuan Yew suggested that the two Asian giants, China and India were going to study 
each other’s experiences while simultaneously spurring each other to excel.241     
                                                                                                                                         
With growing economic ties, both have a stake in the other’s destiny and thereby a need 
arises to accommodate each other in important spheres of interests. Reflecting the present 
improvement in bilateral relations, Premier Wen Jiabao, in his visit to India asserted that 
China was not only vying for a free trade agreement with India, to make it the biggest 
free trade region in the world, but was also striving for closer relations in the                              
high tech sector, where the two countries had complementarities of interests. Calling for a 
closer Sino-Indian cooperation to launch the ‘Asian Century’ of IT, he held that 
“cooperation is just like two pagodas, one hardware and one software, combined we can 
take the leadership position in the world”.242       
                                                                     
Increased forays into China by Indian IT firms have been taking place where firms like 
Infosys, Wipro, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and Satyam Computer Services have 
established firm bases. NIIT, India’s top technology training company has been                            
in business in China since 1998. Even amidst cooperation, truth is that Indian firms are 
further outsourcing outsourced work from the US to China and perhaps it would still be a              
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while before local Chinese firms can hope to compete with India on a global scale.243
 
Why are these leading Indian companies making inroads into China? Apart from the fact        
that China offers a large domestic market, excellent infrastructure and a friendly business 
environment; in the long term however, Indian companies also do aim to use China as a 
base to enter other ASEAN markets.244  Moreover, in spite of the upbeat mood with 
regard to cooperative endeavours in the field of IT, analysis of the present labour 
intensive nature of their economies do suggest that eventually there is bound to be some 
competition with each other, as both are rising to capture global markets and resources. 
Innovative approaches would be required that would not only be sustainable but would 
also help in building further on the evolving bilateral relationship. 
 
iii) Cooperation against US unipolarity 
In the year 2005, a premier American think tank, the National Intelligence Council had 
warned against increased Sino-Indian cooperation for having the potential to significantly 
alter global geopolitics.245
 
One of the objectives of the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to India was not only to establish 
the fact that South Asia falls within its sphere of interests despite                              
Indian dominance in the region, but also to demonstrate and signal to the US that 
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irrespective of the pending resolution of their border dispute, China was keen to develop 
stronger strategic ties with India.246  For China it becomes even more urgent to resolve 
disputes and engage India, as the Bush administration is trying to lure India into a 
strategic alliance that would strive to contain the rise of China. It took note of the brief 
from the US State Department (regarding the US intentions to help India become a major 
world power) which further emphasised that Washington ‘understands fully the 
implications, including the military implications of that statement’.247              
                                                                                                                                                                               
In spite of the fact that both India and China have their own axes to grind with the US,  
another common platform for significant Sino-Indian cooperation is their common efforts 
against US unilateralism, which is perhaps the most prominent feature of post Cold War 
era. In fact it is argued that China’s multilateral diplomacy is perhaps closely related to its 
opposition to US hegemonism and is a step towards creating a multipolar world, with 
China playing a key role. Likewise India too has set the emergence of multipolar                              
world as one of its primary objectives, thereby sharing a common uneasiness with the 
US. This arises out of similar aspirations like that of China, to be full participants in this 
multipolar world that was being contained by American foreign policy. The improvement 
in Sino-Indian relations as well as the fact that India joined Brazil, China and other 
developing countries for negotiating world trade rules was also a result of the common 
Sino-Indian intentions to balance US dominance in the region.248
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 American ideological and economic goals pressed heavily on India and China, as it 
continued to relate issues like nuclear proliferation, human rights, trade and so on, which 
was perceived as US heavy handedness into the domestic politics and sovereignty of the 
two countries.249 With regard to broader arms control and disarmament agenda they share 
similar views in variance with those of the US, especially as both are most likely to 
expand their ballistic missiles and nuclear arsenals. However, in spite of their common 
endeavours against the discriminatory nature of the US non-proliferation regime, India 
and China continue to differ amongst themselves with regard to how this regime should 
be applied in relation to the other.250
                                                                                                                                                                              
Again, despite diplomatic proclamations enumerating areas of mutual interests, future 
Sino-Indian relations do remain firmly embedded within a triangle formed with the US, 
where both stand to gain from positive relations with the US, as skillful manoeuvring of 
great power alignments generally does add to country’s diplomatic capital. Since they pay 
special attention to the other’s great power diplomacy, there is an element of quiet 
competition between India and China, which is generated whenever the US appears to 
favour one over the other, resulting in each country to likewise formulate counter 
policies. Though in US-China calculations, India’s emergence is at best secondary, yet 
the nature and tenor of Indo-American relations does have a greater chance of influencing 
                                                 
249 Surjit Mansingh, “India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, Asian Survey, Vol.34, No.3 (March 
1994), pp. 285-300. 
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Sino-Indian relations.251 After the Indian nuclear tests of 1998, there was a brief setback 
in Indo-US relations. However, soon after there began a warming of Indo-US ties even as 
Sino-US relations entered into an uncertain phase. The bonhomie in Indo-US relations 
implied that for the first time the two democracies started to move away from 
estrangement to a new era of strategic partnership. Besides, many in the US consider a 
prosperous India to be serving Washington’s long term interests of ensuring that there 
will be countervailing powers in Asia that would prevent the domination of the region by                              
any one power.252  
 
The US is not comfortable with China’s attempts at increased power projections and the 
ever growing Chinese military expenditure. According to SIPRI 2004 Yearbook, military 
expenditure in 2003 for China was estimated at US$32.8billion and that of India was 
US$12.4billion.253 However it should be noted that realpolitics often justify increased 
military expenditure for nations which are also economically expanding.254   
 
The new goodwill in Indo-American relations is seen by some Chinese analysts as a US 
strategy to cordon off China with Japan and India on either side. It can be argued that 
China started to seek a new strategic and cooperative relationship with India out of its 
own concerns emanating from this growing Indo-US military cooperation. On its part, 
India is rediscovering its potential to develop a strategic profile by increasing                              
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cooperation with the US, which is in turn enhancing its status and influence in China’s 
backyard, Southeast Asia.  
 
ASEAN countries have always perceived India in the context of India’s relationship with 
major powers. On their part, the Southeast Asian states have mostly engaged major 
external powers on economic, political and strategic dimensions to enhance their own 
manouevrability.255  The ASEAN had its concerns that along with the US, India too 
might play a role in checkmating China in Southeast Asia. However, Indian strategic 
calculations necessitates it not to go overt with it but instead time and again reaffirm that 
it is not a party to American containment strategies but instead aims to improve relations 
with both. ASEAN states are just as aware as India, that it is in India’s interests to first 
compose their bilateral differences with China before venturing in any path that would 
necessitate it to play the role of a ‘containing factor’.256 As a clear demonstration of the 
fact that while striving to increase strategic ties with the US through the signing of the 
Framework for US-India Defence Relationship, India would not like to fall into the ploy 
to act as a containing force against China in the region; India decided to steer clear of the 
proposed US missile defence shield. This helped in allaying Chinese fears which had 
viewed it as a tactical US move to build India as a counterweight to China’s growing 
economic and military clout.257  
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However it cannot be denied that growing Indo-US partnership is definitely elevating 
Indian stature in global geopolitics, while simultaneously enhancing India’s desire for a 
great power status, where a permanent seat at the UNSC would be the first milestone. As 
for China, it has not supported India’s bid for the UNSC permanent seat. China continues 
to view with concern, that while the US cooperates with China on specific issues 
important to US calculations, yet at the same time the US uses all available leverage to 
pressurise China on wider range of political, strategic and economic issues, thereby 
preventing it from acquiring a dominant status in the region.258   Chinese leaders also 
added a new dimension to the bilateral threat perceptions and suggested that the two 
states felt threatened not by each other but by the US. According to Zhou Gang, China's 
ambassador to New Delhi, "the threat is not from China to India and not from India to 
China. It comes from other places.... There is only one force dominating the world and 
asserting its domination to create a unipolar world. It is quite realistic for [India and 
China] to improve [their] relations to a cooperative partnership."259                  
                                                                      
Realpolitiks necessitates that just like India would not openly antagonise China by 
teaming up with the US, for China too the success of its economic strategies lay in 
narrowing the economic and technological gap with the US. For this to happen, 
improvement of relations with the US is supreme. Hence time and again China adopts a 
conciliatory and flexible policy vis-à-vis the US. Moreover a strong impetus to continue 
to maintain close ties with the US arises out of the Chinese concern to expand its trade, 
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investments and technology. 
 
While cooperating with each other and simultaneously playing the game of realpolitik, 
neither India nor China openly express concern about the other’s growing politico-
military ties with the US, though both are equally aware of the fact that the elements of a 
zero-sum game are inevitable and implicit in this Sino-Indian-US triangular relationship.                              
India is well aware that it is still the US which is perceived as a dominant pole in the 
region. However, incorporating China into the global order is the key to Asian growth, as 
well as peace and security in the region.                                                                                                              
 
iv) Energy Security 
Energy security issues offer policy makers in China and India similar sets of challenges 
and choices. In the past decade or so, both India and China have experienced a 
tremendous rise in their respective domestic energy requirements, thereby resulting in the 
need to modify their existing energy security doctrines. The following table gives a 
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Table 9: Energy Production and Consumption
  Energy Production Nuclear Energy 
 (Million tonnes oil equiv.) 
(% of electricity 
production) 
 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
China  894 1072.9 1020.3 - 1.5 1.2 
India  335.3 387.8 413.1 2.1 1.5 2.3 
              
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001.  
       
 
 
Energy Use  
(kg of oil equivalent per capita) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
China  894 1072.9 1020.3 - 1.5 1.2 
India  335.3 387.8 413.1 2.1 1.5 2.3 
              
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006  
 
 
As two largest growing energy consumers with insufficient domestic energy production, 
both states have a common predicament and responses to the global market trends. Both 
share common cooperative outlook as net energy importers who need to adjust their 
dependence on foreign oil. They have similar set of centres of energy demands that lie far 
away from the indigenous sources. Moreover their problems are also alike, as for 
example, serious air pollution from coal generated electricity plants; besides, both India 
and China also have their concerns about the performance of their state owned enterprises 
in the energy sector.261 As for their common responses, they are primarily procuring their 
energy supplies from external long distance sources with capital intensive supply 
projects. They are also making efforts to have a market oriented approach in order to 
secure and safeguard supply and distribution. Besides, the two states also have a common 
stake in ensuring stability in the SLOCs for assured safe supply of oil not just from the 
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Middle East but also from Southeast Asia.  
 
Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, world oil prices increased sharply 
thereby intensifying competition for energy resources. In spite of a forward thinking 
Sino-Indian cooperative stance in pariah states like Sudan, Myanmar and Iran aimed at 
gaining access to their natural reserves, the procurement of raw materials for meeting the 
rising demands of iron ores, petroleum, coal and chemicals makes India and China 
destined for competition in global markets. Though hopes had been expressed by the 
former Indian Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyer, that India would cooperate with 
China ‘to force down prices’ yet India needs to realise that at the same point of time its 
biggest competitor is China, which too is exploring all possible options to line up new 
energy sources.262 Thus in spite of cooperation with China, India’s changing relationship 
with regard to energy is definitely inspiring a new set of diplomatic relations with other 
global players. According to political scientist Ashutosh Varshney, while this dependence 
on oil is rising, it clearly depicts that future Indian foreign policy would be having a lot to 
do with energy.263 Thus even amidst cooperative efforts to secure energy sources, still it 
can be said that a stepped up contest has begun between India and China with voracious 
energy demands back home. This is resulting in the bidding up of energy prices and 
racing against each other as well as other global players, in an urgent need to seize oil and 
natural gas contracts worldwide. 
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Again, it is the record increase in oil prices which is forcing Asian countries to explore 
the possibilities of creating a regional cooperation framework that might change the 
landscape of the global energy market. This would entail an integrated oil market and an 
energy mechanism for sharing strategic oil stockpiles among the countries. According to 
Zhao Hongtu, deputy director of World Economy Research Centre with the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations, energy cooperation could be a 
breakthrough to integrate the countries together, irrespective of their diverse political and 
economic systems.264  The first time roundtable talk held between Middle Eastern and 
Asian (China, India, Japan and South Korea) oil ministers to discuss Asian energy 
cooperation in January 2005 demonstrates that such cooperation between India and China 
specifically has been gathering momentum. However Sino-Indian equation in this area is 
still in flux. 
 
v) Cooperation against Terrorism 
Another relatively new and potential area for Sino-Indian cooperation is the issue of 
terrorism which again brings into play the struggle for security. The Asian giants do have 
major threat perceptions to their respective national security. While India has been a 
victim of terrorism and perceives Pakistan to be sponsoring terrorist acts in Indian states 
of Punjab and Kashmir265, China on the other hand also does have causes for insecurity 
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arising out of the threats from ethnic nationalism of the Uyghur Muslims, which have 
spurred in the Xinjiang province. Increasing number of Xinjiang fighters have taken 
refuge in parts of Pakistan, in areas loosely controlled by the Pakistani government, 
thereby adding to Chinese concerns.266 It is also argued in some quarters, that for China 
Pakistan serves as a counter balance to India, but more importantly Chinese influence in 
the country is to ensure stability of a moderate government that could stem Islamic 
fundamentalist support of separatist movements in Xinjiang. 267
 
China does have a clear policy of ‘no support’ for terrorist groups engaging in subversive 
activities in the neighbouring countries. This was demonstrated at the height of the 1999 
Kargil conflict, amidst intense lobbying for support by the former Pakistan Premier 
Nawaz Sharif, China asked both India and also Pakistan(with whom it has vital strategic 
ties) to respect the Line of Control (LOC), thereby indirectly hinting at Pakistan to retreat 
its fundamentalist military forces from the LOC. This was a significant symbolic gesture 
by China, and ever since India has tried to seek Chinese support in its fight against 
international terrorism. In spite of developing Pakistan as a major countervailing force 
against India in the subcontinent, still China does have its own reasons to support Indian 
fight against terrorism. Besides, other concerns for Chinese foreign policy had been the 
Taliban led Afghanistan, which had been a major source for funding the secessionists, 
besides promoting narcotics-terrorism. All these factors have opened a new area of 
cooperation between India and China. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
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in New York, bilateral efforts at cooperating against terrorism has been gathering greater 
momentum, as the two nations agreed to maintain closer cooperation and establish a 
bilateral dialogue against terrorism. 
 
To this effect, there had been the first dialogue meeting between China and India, just 
before Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003. Both Chinese and Indian 
officials emphasised the UN role as a catalyst for action against threat or terrorism, while 
at the same time expressing their willingness and operational preparedness to strengthen 
counter-terror cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.268 India and China have 
a regular annual counter terrorism dialogue mechanism which highlights the importance 
of cooperation on bilateral counter terrorism. Sino-Indian military-to-military exchange is 
reflective of China’s new military diplomacy, which is again an indication of the 
processes of reforms and opening up of China’s political, economic and military edifice.  
The fact that Chinese and Indian naval forces for the first time conducted a joint search 
and rescue exercise off the coast of Shanghai in 2004 indicates an important step towards 
the improvement of bilateral relations.  In June 2005, foreign ministers of China, India 
and Russia had met in Vladivostok and agreed to intensify joint work against 
international terrorism and other forms of organized crimes. However, in spite of the 
efforts to cooperate on the war against terrorism, basic Indian concerns vis-à-vis China’s 
relations with Pakistan do still remain firmly entrenched in Indian security calculations. 
This nexus makes China a perennial concern for Indian strategic thinkers out of the basic 
Indian political belief that Pakistan still remains the primary harbinger of terroristic 
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activities on the Indian soil. 
 
Sino-Indian cooperation and Southeast Asia  
Indian emphasis and coordinated efforts to cultivate economic and political ties with 
Southeast Asian nations resulted in India’s inclusion as a sectoral dialogue partner of the 
ASEAN and members of the ARF and the EAS. This not only necessitated India to 
refocus its overall relations with the region but also provided both India and China a 
common platform to interact and promote stable political and security relations amongst 
themselves as well as in neighbouring areas through constructive relations with the 
ASEAN. Besides holding naval exercises and discussions with Singapore on joint 
maritime patrols, India has also hosted defence cooperation discussions on 
counterterrorism, drugs and anti-piracy with Thailand and Malaysia.269 Moreover both 
India and China recognised that under changing international environment, where 
developing nations were being subject to new pressures, it was imperative for both the 
states to maintain substantive contacts. Only constructive engagements between the two 
could conform to their mutual interests, as well as be conducive to peace and 
development in Asia at large.270  Vying for increased attention from Southeast Asia, both 
India and China adopted a similar outlook and acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali.271  While China is an 
active influence as an ASEAN plus 3 player, India too seized on the opportunity to 
connect with both Southeast Asia as well as with China. Besides, signing of the TAC, 
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was also a move undertaken by the ASEAN to give due recognition to the two Asian 
giants.  
 
Under the changed nuclear equations in South Asia, following the nuclearisation of India 
and Pakistan, it becomes more of an imperative for the two states to engage each other in 
multilateral forums. The ARF offers an ideal opportunity for Sino-Indian cooperation and 
bilateral exchanges, while at the same time focusing on issues like CBMs, preventive 
diplomacy and a range of other strategic issues of common concern. Just like the 
strengthening of ties between China and Russia (another ARF member) has taken place to 
restrict US power in today’s world, similarly an approach towards a genuine multipolar 
world could potentially spur greater Sino-Indian cooperation for a diversified balance of 
international power. To this effect the Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen had once told 
the Indian Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath after a JWG meeting, that the two nations   
“can make important contributions to shaping a multi-polar system.” 272  Here too not all 
is pleasant. Although the ARF offers India a chance to participate in regional security 
issues together with China, still India needs to keep track of China’s rapidly expanding 
efforts at economic integration with the ASEAN. Unless India takes economic diplomacy 
as a primary tool, it would again stand to lose out against Chinese products, which would 
have greater tariff benefits and hence competitive edge over Indian goods in the ASEAN 
markets. 
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However, given India’s Look East policy and its relations with Southeast Asia, India does 
realise that strategically it stands to gain by adopting a cooperative posture vis-à-vis 
China and at the same time having its diplomatic tools ready. Then it does not have to 
constantly device means and expend energy to keep ahead of China in the strife for 
political and economic influence in the region. Besides, being an ARF member provides 
it with a somewhat similar status as China on Southeast Asian regional security issues, 
whereby it becomes difficult for China to play on the perceptions of the regional states in 
indirectly influencing its policies in South Asia and thereby affecting its relations with 
India. It needs to be noted here that given the geo-strategic realities of the present era, a 
potential arena for greater cooperation between China, India and the ASEAN is becoming 
that of combating terrorism. Against the backdrop of improved Sino-Indian relations, the 
strategic importance of the rise of India to Southeast Asia is getting increasingly clear. 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, summed up the ASEAN’s changing 
perceptions about India. In the 11th International Conference on ‘The Future of Asia”, he 
noted that ‘Within Asia, India is a key player which is opening up to the world, and 
which can potentially play as large a role as China…For ASEAN, India is an additional 
engine of growth…Indian companies are developing overseas markets in ASEAN. 
Negotiations for an FTA between India and ASEAN are progressing well’273. Moreover 
he did not fail to highlight the fact that India was also developing direct economic 
linkages with China and as they explore the possibilities of a FTA, it was bound to have a 
huge implication for the whole of Asia. 
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Conclusion  
China and India are beginning to embark on a new path of bilateral relationship, setting 
aside strategic political questions and instead focusing on development and trade. It could 
be kind of a positive-sum economic proposition, which in turn could have a positive spill 
over effect on other issues, thereby also helping to resolve the long standing bilateral 
disputes. Over the last five decades, there have been numerable instances of friendly 
cooperation and mutual support in international events. Both China and India do share a 
sense of common values in the sense of their pursuit of autonomous foreign policies and 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.  
 
 As two rising powers with booming economies, they do have different sets of strategic 
interests, but only if they can focus on common issues of convergence and development 
would they be able to promote Asian peace, security and progress. Both China and India 
have common interests in maintaining regional stability, enhancing regional cooperation, 
exploiting economic opportunities and energy sources, highlighting environmental issues 
and promoting military and cultural exchanges, while also cooperating to increase their 
negotiating capacities against US unilateralism.  
 
Sino-Indian military-to-military exchange is reflective of China’s new military 
diplomacy, which is again an indication of the processes of reforms and opening up of 
China’s political, economic and military edifice.  While both the states desire a truly 
multipolar world that would provide space for growth and action as befitting for a great 
power and support the reform of the UNSC, yet they have their own calculations and 
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thereby differences with regard to ways and means of achieving it. In spite of all the 
bonhomie in relations, from the realist perspective China does not want India to emerge 
as an equal, which is evident in its opposition or rather its refrain from supporting Indian 
membership to the P-5 of the UNSC, the N-5 nuclear club, the APEC and ASEM to name 
a few.  
 
The inherent attribute of competition between them become evident in their strategic 
thinking and the resultant policies. As for example India acceded to ASEAN –TAC and 
Prime Minister Vajpayee also signed the historic Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation with ASEAN at Bali, with the hope on either side 
to create an ASEAN-India regional trade and investment area. All these agreements come 
as a strategic Indian move to rival and compete with China and also Japan, the other two 
Asian giants, who have already embarked on the path to raise their economic profile and 
stakes in ASEAN countries.  
 
However, it can be said that with the grant of an observer status in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India is keen to make strategic forays into Central Asia, 
as well as enhance its relations with Russia and China. This organisation offers India a 
chance to build strategic linkages across oil rich countries in the Asian continent at large, 
thereby catering not just to its energy demands but also providing it with a scope for 
greater political and economic interactions and influence. 
 
Moreover it can be argued that the military cooperation deal that the two states have 
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signed in May 2006 can go a long way in upholding peace along the disputed border.274 
The strategic dialogue that has been initiated between India and China could also serve as 
a positive goodwill and diplomatic approach. It could lessen the inherent suspicion in 
bilateral relations by promoting bilateral growth and fostering trust by seeking to 
cooperate for a better future. The first ever memorandum of understanding (MoU), that 
has just been signed between India and China to regularize bilateral exchanges and also 
to consult and coordinate on regional and international affairs can be seen as a new 
endeavour to enhance mutual trusts while promoting friendly relations.275  
 
Economic growth coupled with strategic power could well position Indian foreign policy 
as increasingly assertive. Hence it might be possible that a rising economic and military 
power like China would start to assess India differently. It could come to terms with the 
fact that Asian and global security would depend on the positive future relations between 
the two countries as cooperation may become natural over a period of time. Only by 
constructing a constructive, engaging bilateral relationship based on common security 
could this Sino-Indian relationship be brought out of the vicious circle of security 
dilemma. Finally, if ASEAN, China and India are to address their mutual concerns, it 
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As two of the world’s oldest civilizations and once great powers, India and China are 
again back on an upward rise on their relative power trajectories, virtually 
simultaneously. Though this relationship is still mired in a web of inherent suspicion, yet 
there is a new dynamism about it. Over the years the degree of conflict has gradually got 
muted to a significant extent. New aspects of competition and cooperation are coming to 
the forefront of Sino-Indian interactions, which have the potential to not just significantly 
alter Sino-Indian relations but also restructure the geopolitics of Asia. 
 
However, this study shows that it would perhaps be too simplistic to conclude that this 
new dynamism would bring about all round rapprochement between the two countries. 
Cooperative security can only develop on the basis mutual benefit and trust. While a lot 
of issues call for common understanding and cooperative stance, yet at the same time it 
can be noted that often the issues that bind them together are also the issues that enhance 
their mutual competition and also fuel their bilateral conflict and rivalry. 
 
While studying Sino-Indian relations and India’s resultant policy options in Southeast 
Asia, what comes out is the element of the interplay of conflict, competition and 
cooperation, which determine the contours of the evolving Sino-Indian relations. All the 
three forms of interactions are pivotal to this relationship. Yet Indian foreign policy 
thinking vis-à-vis China is still characterized by the Realist mainstream Indian perceptual 
position which regards China to be a potential challenge or threat to Indian interests in the 
long run.  
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After the Cold War, as changes in alliances and relations took place across the Asian geo-
strategic space, it implied that the broad context that defined the parameters of Sino-
Indian relations was also changing. The China focus in Indian foreign policy making has 
hence undergone a significant shift ever since the bilateral relations started to improve 
from 1988. Following the initiation of India’s Look East policy in the 1990s, India’s 
erstwhile China focus of looking at it across the Himalayas gradually got muted and 
instead it started to address the relation from a new perspective of competition and 
cooperation. 
 
If the three forms of interactions are rank ordered in order of their significance in this 
relationship, what evolves from this thesis is that though conflict had been the base of 
such a relationship, it is now being geared increasingly towards cooperation. As far as 
competition is concerned, it is an inevitable factor and has always been inherent in Sino-
Indian relationship. 
 
Though the growing complexity of the evolving Sino-Indian relations is primarily rooted 
in security issues, yet it has now expanded to include economics and institutional 
instruments related to the recognition of status, as well as elements of competition for 
influence in varied arenas. Even for China, in the post Cold War era, its international 
status has become its key concern given its great power aspirations. The power factor 
plays a pivotal role in the Chinese conception of status. This in turn goes a long way in 
simultaneously contributing to the ever expanding bilateral rivalry between India and 
China. It can be said that Sino-Indian relationship has been unique in the sense that it is 
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characterized by high level political, military and recent economic exchanges, yet still 
marked by basic mistrust, misperceptions, unrealistic expectations and defeating 
attitudes. Issues like internal stability and an overlapping sphere of influence in the South 
and the Southeast Asia, further complicates genuine improvement in bilateral relations. 
This notion of bilateral conflict is further based on notions of encirclement and 
containment. The rather slow process of the normalization of the bilateral relations 
illustrates the above facts. 
 
There have been several areas of convergence of interests; however cooperation has been 
occasional as several issues continue to keep the two sides at odds.  Continuous Chinese 
nuclear assistance and military cooperation with two of India’s neighbours, Pakistan and 
Myanmar respectively, serve as a critical barrier to the normalization of Sino-Indian 
relations. It continues to be a perennial concern for India, as being specifically targeted to 
contain India within South Asia, thereby preventing it from playing a role of greater 
strategic significance over the vast spectrum of Asian geopolitics. Even amidst new 
bonhomie in bilateral relations marked by the strategic partnership agreement of 2005, 
India still remained skeptical about real Chinese intentions in the region. The fact that the 
Chinese Premier visited Pakistan just before reaching India remained a sore point among 
many Indian policy makers.276  
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As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, Myanmar as a Southeast Asian state has brought 
into the forefront, elements of competition and conflict for wealth, status and security 
between India and China. Burgeoning Sino-Myanmarese military relationship has forced 
India to bring about a change in its erstwhile Myanmar policy. What comes out from this 
study is that new realist pragmatism has evolved in Indian foreign policy thinking where 
its aim is to promote its national interests while enhancing its geopolitical clout amongst 
the countries of the region. It can be deduced from the fact that India deliberately 
embarked on an ambiguous foreign policy, where it constantly supports the democratic 
movement in Myanmar on the one hand and is striving to fulfill its strategic needs by 
cooperating with the Myanmarese junta on the other.  
 
The Look East policy serves as a helpful strategy in that context as it is in India’s 
strategic interest to engage Myanmar, which it regards to be a gateway to the ASEAN. 
Other Indian initiatives like the Ganga- Mekong cooperation and the BIMSTEC are also 
taken with similar strategic intent. The visit of Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam to 
Myanmar in March 2006, on the invitation of Myanmar’s Senior General Than Shwe, 
reinforces India’s commitment to the Look East policy as the visit was considered very 
significant because of the ‘considerable amount of substantive content.’277 It can be 
concluded that Myanmar would continue to remain the centre of Sino-Indian competition 
for the foreseeable future. In fact Sino-Myanmarese connections had been an area of 
common concern for both India and the ASEAN and India had attempted to capture on 
those Southeast Asian worries by advocating its Look East policy. 
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Sino-Indian relationship is likely to remain largely competitive in Southeast Asia in all 
likelihood.278 From this thesis we find India making strategic forays into Southeast Asia 
as part of its Look East policy. A study of Sino-Indian relations show that this rising role 
of India cannot really be seen in isolation, as it is closely linked to Chinese presence in 
the ASEAN region. India is making efforts to court those Southeast Asian states which 
have long term concerns about Chinese behaviour in the region. Indian defence pacts 
with Vietnam and Indonesia are aimed at Chinese weak spots.279  Southeast Asian states 
have on their part, time and again subtly expressed their interests in greater Indian role in 
the region to counter Chinese threats. Former Malaysian ambassador to India, Ben Haron 
observes unequivocally that  ‘India is the only country in Asia besides Vietnam, that can 
check China’s growing clout and role; but it’s bogged down with its problems with 
Pakistan and believes it can’t go beyond its borders.’ 280  
 
Other contentious issues in Sino-Indian relations have been Chinese nuclear diplomacy 
which is reluctant to accommodate India’s stature as a full fledged nuclear power (though 
US and other Western countries have accommodated India’s de-facto nuclear status) at 
the international level. As far as India is concerned, it would continue with its nuclear and 
ballistic missiles programmes since it is the adversarial relation with China that has in 
turn driven India’s nuclear programme to a great extent. Another cause of Indian concern 
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has been Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, which has become a favoured focus of 
ship visits and official exchanges by the Chinese Navy.281   
 
Several questions remain unanswered in the scope of this thesis. If China is really bent on 
engaging India as part of its ‘peaceful neighbourhood’ policy, what is the motive behind 
its assistance to Pakistan in building up the deep sea harbour at Gwadar? Is it purely 
strategic economics as advocated by the Chinese? Then what about the geo-strategic 
value of such a port? Questions can be raised as to if the motive is just and only trade and 
the need to tackle China’s own domestic problems of insurgent risings that is influencing 
Chinese decision to aid both Pakistan and Myanmar simultaneously? Is it not a 
bargaining chip vis-à-vis India and its aspirations for a greater Asian role?  
.  
A US-India and Sino-US relation is another important aspect that could significantly alter 
the regional balance of power and has in turn influenced the direction of India’s 
interactions with China. India has been cautious that its desire for growth, stability and 
regional leadership could not be sustained without the support of the US.282 China also 
observes with caution any form of US-India engagements, as such engagements could 
well be poised to counter a rising China in Asian geopolitics. For this reason, the role of 
the US becomes a major geopolitical factor when analyzing all the three forms of 
interaction in Sino-Indian relations. Washington’s move to send more diplomats to India 
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and China, demonstrates the rising importance of not just China but also India in US 
foreign policy. According to Mr. Richard Bush, director of the Brookings Institution’s 
Centre for North-east Asian Policy Studies, “The US has to pay attention to China and 
India not just in terms of rhetoric, but also in terms of resources”.283  
 
What has been significant in this context is the fact that President Bush had spoken of 
India’s role in securing a stable balance of power in Asia.284 Realist thinking would 
analyse the nuclear deal to be a part of the US grand strategy to contain China; which 
further has its roots in the Bush administration’s desire to build India’s stature as a 
counterbalance to a rising China. Joseph Cirincione, head of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sums it up by saying that “the 
crux of this announcement is what it tells us about the US grand strategy, and that behind 
whatever else is going on here the US is preparing for a grand conflict with China and 
constructing an anti-China coalition,” moreover, “…in that scenario, India is even more 
valuable as a nuclear power, rather than as a nonnuclear country.”285
 
Indian policy makers are cautious about Indian strategic needs and calculations and are 
aware of the vital stakes in China. Hence, time and again it has been reiterated that 
India’s developing relations with the US were not derivative of its relations with China. 
Closer Indo-US ties is a rising concern for China, especially since Southeast Asian 
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countries have traditionally been close to the US and the US on its part is demonstrating a 
containment like strategy vis-à-vis China. This move in turn has been carefully taken note 
of by the Southeast Asian economies. Growing Indo-US partnership is actually enhancing 
India’s status in regional as well as global geopolitics. In the absence of the American 
forces in the region, ASEAN states perceive India to be a potential counterweight to 
Chinese ambitions. However, their policies have been subtle in this regard for they cannot 
really afford to antagonize China and have made moves to bring somewhat of an Asian 
balance by simultaneously courting India, the other rising Asian giant. 
 
China attempts to down play India as a potential competitor in the region, nevertheless is 
cautious of the geopolitical importance that India could assume in this game for 
influence. How far Sino-Indian relations get affected by the recent US-India nuclear deal 
would depend to a large extent on the trajectories of future US-China relations as well. 
 
The key questions that this thesis tried to address were to find out the extent to which 
India’s Look East policy had been derivative of India’s interactions with China. Also to 
study how time and again India has looked upon the ASEAN countries while dealing 
with China  and to what extent Southeast Asia has played up to this role, in the struggle 
for influence between the two Asian giants. While the three forms of interactions have 
been studied in great details, there is still the potential for further research when each is 
studied solely in the context of the evolving Sino-Indian relations. 
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What has evolved in this thesis is the fact that India’s radically different policy 
framework vis-à-vis Southeast Asia and the resultant Look East policy, was not only the 
result of the structural changes in the international system, but it also emerged out of an 
Indian imperative to remain strategically engaged with the region. This move has been to 
ensure that China refrains from utilizing its clout on Southeast Asian states to challenge 
the Indian position in India’s own backyard, South Asia. Thus it clearly demonstrates that 
Indian policy options in Southeast Asia have also emerged out of Indian concerns for 
China and Chinese strategies aimed at utilizing its clout in the region to contain India in 
South Asia. 
 
Another aspect which came out in this thesis is the necessity to address the root causes 
between India and China if the basic conflictual elements of this relationship are to be 
settled. Despite the elevations of talks to the political level and increased economic 
exchanges, certain sections of Indian strategic thinkers still believe that India’s China 
policy continue to live on hope as basic Indian concerns with regard to Chinese forays 
into the so called Indian ‘sphere of influence’ still remain unsettled. Analysts regard these 
indirect challenges to Indian security- some real and some perceived, to be the cause 
behind the continuation of conflicts. 
 
As Asia stands in the hub of economic activities, Southeast Asia stands at a cross section, 
serving as an important platform for both India and China, where the two are in constant 
competition to acquire greater capabilities. Reports by various research organizations 
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around the world (in the likes of Goldman Sachs286) indicate that Asia would lead the 
economic growth, with India and China serving as engines of growth.  Indian pursuit of 
the Look East policy is especially significant here because of its coverage of issues which 
focus also on security, economics and strategic concerns and calls for a robust 
engagement with the region.  
 
In all these calculations China assumes a special significance. The new pragmatism in 
Indian foreign policy thinking brought about a public acknowledgement by the Indian 
premier Atal Behari Vajpayee of the so called ‘healthy competition’ that is currently 
present amidst the two Asian giants. In that context the ARF offers both a chance to spell 
out their strategic objectives in the region while engaging with each other on a common 
platform. As India and China gear up to play the role of economic giants, it is Asia that 
stands to play the destined role in not just economic growth and development but also in 
security matters.287   
 
In the context of Southeast Asia-India relations, what perhaps appeals to ASEAN’s 
imaginations is that India not only offers an attractive market but with its burgeoning 
naval activities in the region, it also has the potential to play the role of a possible 
strategic counterbalance to China in Asia.288 It can be expected that India would continue 
to expand the scope and reach of its naval capabilities not just in the Indian Ocean region 
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but also in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea, as reflected in several joint naval 
exercises that India has undertaken with Southeast Asian states and also with the US. 
 
However as far as Indian presence in Southeast Asian organizations is concerned, it has at 
best been marginal when compared to China. India’s recent participation at the East 
Asian Summit in December 2005 can be regarded as a significant progress made by 
India. Although eminent scholars like Mohan Malik, skeptical of the Summit, may regard 
it to be a mere ‘talk shop’ which perhaps had intensified old rivalries between India and 
China, nevertheless it should be noted that the Chairman’s statement made it clear that 
the EAS would mainly be a forum to discuss strategic issues.289 It can be said that the 
sheer participation in this top level consultative forum for building confidence and mutual 
understanding among countries of the region, reflects the growing significance of India in 
Asian geopolitics. The fact that the ASEAN states had invited India to join the EAS in the 
first place is also reflection of the inherent preference of most ASEAN states for a 
regional balance of power, through an outward looking security architecture. 
 
As far as economics is concerned, India cannot match China in Southeast Asia in the 
immediate future, nevertheless the rapid economic development and the rather impressive 
growth rate that India is experiencing of late (it has been experiencing a sustained annual 
average growth rate of over 6% since the economic reforms of 1991290) could well 
position it to engage China in a healthy competition in the region in future. 
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India has been rather prompt in signing free trade agreements with two ASEAN countries 
and in order to enhance its geopolitical clout in the evolving balance of power game, it 
has followed China (which already has entered into a FTA with ASEAN), by declaring 
Indian objectives of signing an FTA with the ASEAN. It can be speculated that India still 
has a long way to go before it can catch up with China. It is evident from the fact that the 
ASEAN-India FTA has already hit a snag of late. However they are trying to reach a 
compromise.  
 
Moreover in spite of the assurance to the ASEAN that the ASEAN-India FTA would 
come into effect from January 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government is 
under increasing pressure from key party politicians to go slow on import liberalization. 
This shift in New Delhi’s stance is very recent and it would take some time to gauge the 
direction of Indian policy motives. While competition with China is obvious with regard 
to Indian policies towards Southeast Asia, the government is under a pressure to undergo 
a shift in its policies. The strategic thinkers are well aware of the consequences. They are 
cautious that India could stand to lose out vis-à-vis China in the game of influence in 
Southeast Asia and therefore a government official has already been reported as 
justifying Indian position again with China in the picture. A senior foreign ministry 
official said that “we cannot benchmark ourselves with China in every respect…We 
accept that the profile India will come to acquire in Southeast Asia will obviously be 
different from China’s.”291
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Irrespective of the official Chinese standpoints of bonhomie in bilateral relations as 
depicted during the trip of Premier Wen Jiabao, yet there is a sheer contradiction amongst 
the Chinese analysts. They view that a fierce competition with China has just begun in 
the aftermath of the IT revolution and the rising energy demands have again locked the 
two states in severe competition. This clearly indicates that while both India and China 
are trying to cooperate with each other, they are also simultaneously engaging in a game 
of competition. In this context it should be noted that in January 2006, India and China 
signed a landmark agreement to collaborate in technology, as well as hydrocarbon 
exploration and production, a partnership that could significantly alter basic equations in 
the energy sector.292   Although Southeast Asia does not really come much in between the 
two Asian giants in their search for energy sources, yet the fact that Sino-Indian 
competition for energy is getting increasingly intensified in Myanmar, surely in turn 
bears consequences for the ASEAN.  
 
It has been the simultaneous desire for status and enhancement of political and economic 
prestige, coupled with a similar set of self perceived notions of being natural great powers 
destined to restore their respective status in the world stage, that have actually further 
aggravated this competitive interaction. What time would perhaps tell is that it is the on 
going competition between the two Asian giants that is perhaps being revisited in the 
cloak of cooperation. It is more of cooperation under duress as both countries realize the 
importance of developing their respective economic strengths as a primary determinant of 
a nation’s capacity in the present global set up. For China a positive international 
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environment is essential in its pursuit of material power, international status and a 
peaceful rise and this often shapes its policy of cooperative diplomacy in foreign affairs. 
Indian IT companies that are making a beeline for Chinese domestic markets also actually 
aim to use this available Chinese infrastructure as a base to eventually enter the attractive 
ASEAN markets to enhance their financial and political clout. 
 
Bilateral cooperation between India and China is an imperative given the current 
systemic setup that is characterized by globalization where both represent themselves as 
unique new players of the global economy. The display of the new readiness to resort to 
problem solving approaches in bilateral relations was evident during the visit of the 
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in 2003. It demonstrated Indian 
willingness to address Chinese concerns in Tibet, which were equally reciprocated by 
Chinese acceptance to resolve the Sikkim issue by not only recognizing the trade route 
through the region but also dropping Sikkim from the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website 
of independent countries. Though skeptics would argue that such a move was only 
symbolic nevertheless it can still be regarded as an important milestone towards the 
resolution of the bilateral boundary dispute. 
 
Increasingly, cooperation is being seen on issues of common concern, as well as on 
international forums like the WTO, where both are considered as important players. The 
series of CBMs that have been concluded over the last one and a half decade also 
indicates the new political commitment on either side to cooperate on new arenas, 
without resorting to the erstwhile position of resolving the boundary disputes as a primary 
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basis for future interactions. This new resolve of the two countries and especially India to 
adopt a forward momentum of bilateral relations has perhaps brought in the maximum 
benefits. It was reflected when both the states agreed to step up interactions between their 
armies, thereby signaling a thaw in defence ties, as well as bolstering the military CBMs 
that have been initiated in this millennium.293 The first ever MoU signed to regularize 
bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust can be regarded as a significant step 
towards strengthening of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. 
 
What comes out from this research is the usage of cooperation not just as a form of 
interaction but also as a strategy to increase India’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China in 
the international setting. As for example with regard to energy security, China’s 
economic muscle is edging out India in most places, as they overpay and thwart India’s 
bids. India has no option but to cooperate with China and work as strategic partners in 
their mutual quest for oil and energy resources, as else it would result in destructive 
competition.  India is geared towards achieving its objectives of becoming a major power 
in Asian geopolitics and also enhancing its status in the international arena. Cooperation 
employed as a process can in fact spill over to create good momentum in other arenas too.  
 
Positive yields of globalization imply interdependence in inter-state relations. Policy 
makers of both countries view economic engagements as having greater positive bearings 
as CBMs in terms of economic and social implications. Likewise economics had a special 
focus in the course of this thesis, as primarily it has been the growing economic 
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engagement between India and China that had been conducive in increasing the mutual 
stakes. It also helped to lay down the positive political atmosphere for the effective 
functioning of the cooperative security framework which has been employed in this 
research to study the strategy of cooperation in this relationship. What emerges from this 
study is that in the present context, it has basically turned out to be an economics-driven-
politics that is shaping this relationship. Thus it is this very economic engagement that 
makes the current ‘cooperation’ sounder and also bears the prospect for a strategic 
partnership between India and China as the likely outcome of this evolving relationship 
 
In the war against terrorism, the present Sino-Indian rapprochement implies strong 
countervailing and shared interests are taking root between the two states, in spite of the 
prevalent rivalry for influence in Southeast Asia. It has been demonstrated clearly by the 
series of Sino-Indian dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism to strengthen the bilateral 
cooperation aimed at combating terrorism. This also perhaps explains China’s foreign 
policy move to promote its ‘diplomacy of smiles’, in line with its foreign policy goal of a 
‘peaceful rise’ not just aimed at allaying fears of the growing Chinese powers but also to 
convey to its Asian neighbours that its rise is in no way detrimental to other states’ 
national interests. Besides, it also wants to moderate India’s drift towards the US, as well 
as Indian moves in Southeast Asia, which could decisively curtail Chinese power 
potentials in Asia.  
 
Though India has looked upon Southeast Asia for opportunities while dealing with China, 
the ASEAN states on their part have kept their options open. In spite of harbouring latent 
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fears for China, they are reluctant to play a pawn in the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry for 
influence. The fact that several ASEAN states have signed a number of agreements with 
India, including the Singapore-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, 
clearly indicates that Southeast Asian nations are desirous of the interaction of major 
countries in the region to prevent a rising China. While having their respective issues of 
concern with regard to China, both India and the ASEAN states do have a common area 
of convergence where they adopt a pragmatic and realistic policy of engaging with China 
through cooperation. 
 
Projections for the future 
It can be concluded that Sino-Indian relationship has definitely evolved over the years, 
from being purely conflictual to one which is multidimensional and characterized both by 
elements of cooperation and competition. However, cooperation has been sporadic at 
best. Having analysed Sino-Indian relations in the context of India’s Look East policy, 
with the help of the framework using three intersecting circles of security, wealth and 
status and also using the cooperative security framework, it appears that emerging powers 
India and China have sufficiently different strategic orientations in Asia and are destined 
less for cooperation and more for competition in days ahead.  
 
The Sino-Indian rivalry in Southeast Asia would actually transform into a game of 
influence where they would continue to vie against each other to influence the regional 
states. China would continue its policies aimed at recreating its sphere of privileged 
influence. India on the other hand would try using its influence to fulfill the basic 
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objectives of its Look East policy, to prevent China from monopolizing the region and 
influencing the regional states to support Chinese moves aimed at undercutting Indian 
security and domination in South Asia. To a great extent the strategic importance of 
Southeast Asia for Indian policy makers would be determined by the ASEAN’s ability to 
not just withstand pressure from major powers like China, but also in its capability to 
remain politically cohesive and economically strong.294
 
Chinese opposition to India’s membership of ASEM, the APEC and the UN Security 
Council reflects the on going inherent competition between the two giants. India has been 
lobbying hard to seek these memberships as it would reflect India’s emergence as a major 
player not just in Asian geopolitics but in the global arena as well. So the status dispute 
would actually continue for some to come.  
 
Looking at the issue from an optimistic angle, India stands a better chance to revive its 
relations not just with the ASEAN states but also with China, when it has greater scope 
for interaction at the multilateral level. What is perhaps required for regional peace and 
stability is a need for a change in the threat perceptions of both India and China with 
regard to competition and conflicts over regional issues. Amidst recent goodwill reflected 
in the decision of the two countries to mark year 2006, as the Year of India-China 
Friendship, it needs to be pointed out that ties are improving between the two Asian 
giants. In the context of the evolving Sino-Indian relations, Southeast Asia lies at a 
critical juncture in Asian geopolitics with the fear of becoming a strategic buffer zone, 
susceptible to geopolitical influences. The ASEAN-India Summit, the ARF and the EAS, 
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can be regarded as important platforms and opportunities for India to remain 
comprehensively engaged in the region. There is value in such forums as they play 
crucial roles as platforms for global leaders to discuss issues of common concern and 
interests. Given India’s success as a democracy and its impressive technological rise, it is 
also in the interest of the Southeast Asian states to try and engage both the Asian giants 
simultaneously. 
 
Though India has succeeded in making strategic forays in China’s traditional sphere of 
influence, Southeast Asia, the success of India’s Look East policy can at best be regarded 
as limited, yet it is a policy with a potential. India’s very aim had been to contain Chinese 
use of Southeast Asian region to impinge upon Indian interests in South Asia. However, 
the recent move by China, aided by India’s neighbours to seek observer status in the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has definitely startled India. 
Despite all the cooperative fervour in Sino-Indian interactions of late, the presence of 
China implies a ‘competing claimant’295 successful in gaining a strategic space in India’s 
exclusive sphere of influence.296
 
Thus to conclude, in this game of competition, India needs to initiate new approaches to 
improve its overall economics, which in turn would be a principle driver of regional/ 
global politics. As increasingly it has been economics and the size of the Indian market 
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(not to forget India’s nuclear assertion) that has perhaps been India’s greatest asset in the 
present context. Having said that, it would perhaps be imperative for the Indian policy 
makers to ensure that majority of the population reaps the benefit of the current economic 
growth. It is significant from the point of view of maintaining stability of the growth 
process.297  As major realignments in India’s favour is already taking place, economic 
growth together with strategic power projection could well position Indian foreign policy 
as being increasingly assertive. Hence it might be possible that in future a rising China 
would start to assess India as being in a different league. Under the ever increasing level 
of economic and technological interdependence, both the states could well come to terms 
with the need to lift Sino-Indian relations out of the vicious circle of security dilemma by 
engaging with each other in a constructive manner. 
 
At this juncture India’s Look East policy could once again come into play as India strives 
for greater dynamism in Asian politics. The multidimensionality of the evolving Sino-
Indian bilateral relations would continue to spill over to the Asian continent at large. As 
Southeast Asia would remain a platform for India, expanding ASEAN-India relations 
could unfold greater security cooperation and economic opportunities for India. In the 
final analysis, only if India embarked on policies to strengthen its economic, political and 
security linkages with its neighbours in South Asia, as well as with the countries in 
Southeast Asia, can India hope to play a dynamic and positive role beyond its own 
region. With the deepening of Sino-Indian bilateral relations, it would perhaps be 
imperative for India to manage its strategic relationships in a competent manner, which in 
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turn would enable it to keep up with China in the ultimate strife towards security, wealth 
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Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China  
11/04/2005    
I. H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, is 
currently paying a state visit to the Republic of India from 9 to 12 April 2005 at the invitation of 
H.E. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India. 
 
During the visit, Premier Wen Jiabao held talks with Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, called 
on President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Vice President Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, and met 
with Chairperson, United Progressive Alliance Smt. Sonia Gandhi. External Affairs Minister Shri 
K. Natwar Singh and Leader of Opposition, Lok Sabha Shri L.K. Advani will call on him. 
Premier Wen paid a visit to Bangalore and will deliver a speech at the Indian Institute of 
Technology in New Delhi.  
 
Leaders of the two countries had an in-depth exchange of views in a sincere, friendly and 
constructive atmosphere and reached broad consensus on bilateral relations and international and 
regional issues of common concern.  
 
II. The two sides reviewed the friendly contacts and progress in their bilateral relations in recent 
years and agreed that India-China relations have entered a new stage of comprehensive 
development. Both sides noted with satisfaction that with the frequent exchange of visits between 
leaders of the two countries, the process of building trust and understanding has gained 
momentum. Rapid growth of trade and economic cooperation has been coupled with the 
expansion of exchanges and cooperation in other fields. The two sides have made incremental 
progress in addressing outstanding issues. The two sides have also maintained good 
communication and collaboration in international and regional affairs. Both sides agreed that 
India and China have made satisfying progress in developing their long-term constructive and 
cooperative partnership.  
The two sides recalled the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive 
Cooperation between the two Prime Ministers on 23 June 2003 and reiterated that the Declaration 
provided a shared vision of bilateral relations and an agreed framework for cooperation.  
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 III. In the light of the development of their bilateral relations, in order to promote good 
neighbourliness, friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation and taking into account the 
profound changes in the regional and international situation, the two sides agreed that India-China 
relations have now acquired a global and strategic character. The leaders of the two countries 
have, therefore, agreed to establish an India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for 
Peace and Prosperity.  
 
Such a partnership is based on the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for 
each other’s concerns and aspirations, and equality; provides a sound framework for an all-round 
and comprehensive development of bilateral relations based on mutual and equal security, 
development and prosperity of the two peoples; and contributes to jointly addressing global 
challenges and threats. It reflects the readiness of the two sides to resolve outstanding differences 
in a proactive manner without letting them come in the way of the continued development of 
bilateral relations.  
 
IV. The two sides agreed that high-level exchanges between the governments, parliaments and 
political parties of the two countries play an important role in expanding overall bilateral 
cooperation. They conveyed their determination to maintain and strengthen the momentum of 
such exchanges in future and agreed to hold regular meetings between the leaders of the two 
countries. In this context, the two sides also reiterated their intention to promote regular 
ministerial-level exchanges and make full use of the India-China strategic dialogue and other 
bilateral dialogue mechanisms. 
V. The year of 2005 marks the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between India and China. To mark the occasion, the two countries will organize a series of 
commemorative activities. It was noted that “Cultural Festival of China” was currently underway 
in India and that a corresponding “Cultural Festival of India” would be organized in China later in 
the year. The two sides would also organize other cultural activities to further promote mutual 
awareness and deepen the friendship between the two peoples. The two sides declared 2006 as the 
“year of India-China friendship”.  
Both sides expressed satisfaction with strengthened exchanges in the area of culture, and affirmed 
that mutual understanding and cultural exchanges would facilitate development of cooperation in 
 193
other areas as well. In order to reinforce traditional cultural links, an agreement was concluded for 
the construction of an Indian-style Buddhist temple at Luoyang in Henan Province of China.  
VI. The two sides stressed that an all-round expansion of India-China economic cooperation, 
including trade and investment, constitutes an important dimension of a stronger India-China 
relationship. The two countries agreed to make joint efforts to increase the bilateral trade volume 
to US$ 20 billion or higher by 2008. The two sides welcomed the report of the Joint Study Group 
(JSG) that was set up to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in 
expanded trade and economic cooperation. The JSG in its Report has identified a series of 
measures related to trade in goods, trade in services, investments and other areas of economic 
cooperation, and recommended their expeditious implementation to remove impediments and 
facilitate enhanced economic engagement between India and China. The two Prime Ministers 
tasked the Ministerial-level India-China Joint Economic Group (JEG) to consider these 
recommendations and coordinate their implementation. For this purpose, the two sides will make 
their best endeavour to hold the next meeting of the JEG within the next six months. The JSG has 
also recommended an India-China Regional Trading Arrangement, comprising of trade in goods 
and services, investments, identified understandings for trade and investment promotion and 
facilitation, and measures for promotion of economic cooperation in identified sectors. The Prime 
Ministers agreed to appoint a Joint Task Force to study in detail the feasibility of, and the benefits 
that may derive from, the India-China Regional Trading Arrangement and give recommendations 
regarding its content. 
Both sides noted that the Agreement on the Establishment of a Financial Dialogue Mechanism 
would further facilitate the dynamic and diversifying economic cooperation between the two 
sides. They will continue consultations on concluding the Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement.  
 
The two sides noted with satisfaction that the two countries have signed the SPS Protocols for the 
export of grapes and bitter gourd from India to China. The two sides also agreed to constitute a 
Joint Working Group to implement expeditiously the MOU on Application of SPS between the 
Chinese General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the 
Indian Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
China positively evaluates market access for Indian rice to the Chinese market and will launch as 
early as possible the risk analysis procedure of the Indian rice in accordance with relevant 
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Chinese laws and regulations.  
 
VII. The two sides agreed to further promote the cooperation in the spheres of education, science 
and technology, healthcare, information, tourism, youth exchange, agriculture, dairy 
development, sports and other fields on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity. The two sides 
decided to establish an India-China Steering Committee on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation chaired by their Ministers for Science and Technology, and start consultations on an 
agreement on mutual recognition of academic certificates and degrees between India and China. 
The two sides announced the launching of regular youth exchange activities. China will invite 
100 Indian youth to China within the year of 2005 and hold an exhibition this year on advanced 
and applicable technologies in India.  
VIII. The two sides recognized the importance of strengthening mutual connectivity and agreed to 
jointly work towards further enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism and people-to-
people contacts. It was noted with satisfaction that an MOU on major liberalisation of civil 
aviation links between India and China was concluded during the visit.  
 
IX. The two sides will continue to cooperate in exchanging flood-season hydrological data of the 
trans-border rivers as agreed between them.  
 
In response to concerns expressed by the Indian side, the Chinese side agreed to take measures for 
controlled release of accumulated water of the landslide dam on the river Parechu, as soon as 
conditions permit. It was noted with satisfaction that an agreement concerning the provision of 
hydrological data on Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo was concluded during the visit and that the two sides 
had also agreed to continue bilateral discussions to finalize at an early date similar arrangements 
for the Parlung Zangbo and Lohit/Zayu Qu Rivers.  
 
The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of energy security and conservation, including, 
among others, encouraging relevant departments and units of the two countries to engage in the 
survey and exploration of petroleum and natural gas resources in third countries.  
X. The two sides noted the useful exchanges and interaction in the military field and decided to 
further promote such exchanges and interaction. They agreed that broadening and deepening of 
defense exchanges between the two countries was of vital importance in enhancing mutual trust 
and understanding between the two armed forces, and to ensuring a peaceful environment in 
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which they could pursue their respective national development objectives. The two sides decided 
to further strengthen effective contacts and exchanges in this field.  
 
XI. During the visit, the two sides exchanged views on the India-China boundary question and 
reiterated their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution, through 
equal and friendly consultations and proceeding from the overall interests of bilateral relations. 
They expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the discussions between the Special 
Representatives of the two countries and welcomed the conclusion of the Agreement on the 
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question. Both 
sides are convinced that an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic 
interests of the two countries and should therefore be pursued as a strategic objective. They 
expressed their commitment to the mechanism of Special Representatives for seeking a political 
settlement of the boundary question in the context of their long-term interests and the overall 
bilateral relationship.  
Pending a final resolution, the two sides will continue to make joint efforts to maintain peace and 
tranquility in the border areas in accordance with the Agreements of 1993 and 1996. Both sides 
agreed that while continuing the discussions between the Special Representatives, it is also 
important that the Joint Working Group (JWG) continues its work to seek an early clarification 
and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Progress made so far on the clarification 
of the LAC in the India-China border areas was noted. It was agreed to complete the process of 
exchanging maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC on 
the basis of already agreed parameters, with the objective of arriving at a common understanding 
of the alignment, as soon as possible.  
 
The two sides expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved in the implementation of the 
Agreements of 1993 and 1996 and agreed to fully implement them expeditiously. Towards that 
end, they concluded a Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building 
Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.  
 
XII. The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-
China political activities in India.  
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The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one 
China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to 
abide by its one China policy.  
 
The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions. 
XIII. Both sides reviewed with satisfaction the implementation of the memorandum on the border 
trade through the Nathula Pass between the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Sikkim State of the Republic of India.  
 
XIV. The two sides noted with satisfaction that through friendly consultations an agreement in 
principle had been reached between the two countries to solve the long-pending issue of property 
originally belonging to Indian Consulate General in Shanghai with the Chinese side agreeing to 
provide a plot of land in lieu of the premises of the original Consulate General of India.  
 
XV. As two large developing countries, both India and China were aware of each other’s 
important role in the process of promoting the establishment of a new international political and 
economic order. Both sides share common interests in the maintenance of peace, stability and 
prosperity in Asia and the world at large, and share the desire to develop closer and more 
extensive understanding and cooperation in regional and international affairs.  
 
The two sides are supportive of democratization of international relations and multilateralism, 
stand for the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair, 
rational, equal and mutually beneficial, and promote North-South Dialogue and South-South 
Cooperation. The two sides believe that the international community should eliminate poverty, 
narrow the gap between North and South, and achieve common prosperity through dialogue and 
cooperation.  
XVI. The two sides reiterated the importance of the United Nations in global peace, stability and 
common development and expressed their determination to continue their efforts, together with 
the international community, in strengthening the UN system to develop a sound multilateral 
basis to address global issues. Both India and China agree that reform of the United Nations 
should be comprehensive and multi-faceted and should put emphasis on an increase in the 
representation of developing countries. The Indian side reiterated its aspirations for permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council. The Chinese side also reiterated that India is an 
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important developing country and is having an increasingly important influence in the 
international arena. China attaches great importance to the status of India in international affairs. 
It understands and supports India’s aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international 
affairs. The two sides reaffirmed their readiness to conduct close consultations and cooperation in 
the process of UN reforms. 
XVII. The two sides, aware of the threats posed by terrorism to the peace and security of the two 
countries and the whole world, resolutely condemn terrorism in any form. The struggle between 
the international community and global terrorism is a comprehensive and sustained one, with the 
ultimate objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions. This requires strengthening the global 
legal framework against terrorism. Both sides noted the positive outcome of the meetings held so 
far of their bilateral dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism and agreed to further strengthen 
and consolidate their discussions and cooperation. It was agreed to hold the next meeting of the 
dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism later this year.  
 
XVIII. Both sides agreed to conduct regular exchange of views on major international and 
regional issues, strengthen cooperation in the WTO and other international multilateral 
organizations, and to continue the consultations on other issues of common concern. They agreed 
to work together to preserve stability and growth in the global economy and reduce disparities 
between developed and developing countries. They supported an open, fair, equitable and 
transparent rule-based multilateral trade system and resolved to safeguard the legitimate rights 
and interests of the developing countries. 
XIX. Aware of their linked destinies as neighbours and the two largest countries of Asia, both 
sides agreed that they would, together, contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding, trust and cooperation in Asia and the world at large, and facilitate efforts to 
strengthen multilateral coordination mechanisms on security and cooperation.  
 
XX. During the visit, the two sides signed and/or released the following documents.  
i. Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China 
Boundary Question 
ii. Report of India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation  
iii. Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field Along the Line 
of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas 
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iv. Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance and Cooperation in Customs Matters  
v. MOU on the Launch of the India-China Financial Dialogue  
vi. MOU on Civil Aviation 
vii. Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirement for Exporting Grapes from India to China  
viii. Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirement for Exporting Bitter Gourds from India to China 
ix. MOU on Provision of Hydrological Information of the Sutlej /Langqen Zangbo River in Flood 
Season by China to India.  
x. Protocol on India-China Film Cooperation Commission  
xi. MOU on Cooperation between the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Chinese People’s 
Institute of Foreign Affairs 
xii. Memorandum on the Construction of an Indian-style Buddhist Temple on the Western side of 
the White Horse Temple in Luoyang, China  
XXI. The two sides believed that Premier Wen Jiabao’s highly successful State visit to the 
Republic of India marked a new level of India-China relationship and opened a new chapter in the 
friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries.  
 
Premier Wen Jiabao, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, expressed his appreciation 
to the Government and the people of India for their warm hospitality, and invited Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh to visit China at a mutually convenient time. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
appreciated the invitation and accepted it with pleasure. The Indian side also reiterated the 
invitation to President Hu Jintao to visit India. The exact time of the visit will be decided through 
diplomatic channels.  
 
Prime Minister of the Republic of India 
Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China  
 
New Delhi  
April 11, 2005  





Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between 
the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China 
23/06/2003    
At the invitation of Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China H.E. Wen 
Jiabao, Prime Minister of the Republic of India H.E. Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to 
the People’s Republic of China from 22 to 27 June 2003.  
 
During this visit, Premier Wen Jiabao held talks with Prime Minister Vajpayee. Their 
Excellencies President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Jiang Zemin of the 
Central Military Commission, Chairman Wu Bangguo of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress and Vice President Zeng Qinghong of the People’s Republic of China held 
separate meetings with Prime Minister Vajpayee. The talks and meetings were held in a sincere 
and friendly atmosphere.  
Leaders from both countries noted with satisfaction the progress made over recent years in 
bilateral relations. This is conducive not only to their respective development, but also to regional 
stability and prosperity. The two sides recalled the historical depth of their friendly contacts. India 
and China are the two largest developing countries of the world with centuries-old civilization, 
unique history and similar objectives. Both noted that the sustained economic and social 
development in the two countries, representing one third of humanity is vital for ensuring peace, 
stability and prosperity not only in Asia but also in the whole world.  
 
The two sides agreed that India and China have a mutual desire for good neighborly relations and 
have broad common interests. They agreed to fully utilize the substantial potential and 
opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation.  
 
Friendship and cooperation between the two countries meets the need to: 
· promote the socio-economic development and prosperity of both India and China;  
· maintain peace and stability regionally and globally; 
· strengthen multipolarity at the international level; and 
· enhance the positive factors of globalization.  
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 Both sides affirmed that they would abide by the following principles, promote a long-term 
constructive and cooperative partnership and, on this basis, build a qualitatively new relationship:  
· Both sides are committed to developing their long-term constructive and cooperative partnership 
on the basis of the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s 
concerns and equality;  
· As two major developing countries, India and China have a broad mutual interest in the 
maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world, and a mutual desire in 
developing wider and closer cooperation and understanding in regional and international affairs;  
· The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a 
threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other; and  
· Both sides agree to qualitatively enhancing the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas 
while addressing differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually 
acceptable manner. The differences should not be allowed to affect the overall development of 
bilateral relations.  
Both sides agreed to hold regular high-level exchanges between the two countries. This will 
greatly enhance mutual understanding and expand bilateral relations. With a view to deepening 
their coordination and dialogues on bilateral, regional and international issues, both sides agreed 
on the need for annual meetings between Foreign Ministers of the two countries. They also 
agreed that personnel exchanges and friendly contacts between ministries, parliaments and 
political parties of the two countries should be further enhanced. 
The two sides welcomed the positive momentum of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in 
recent years and shared the belief that continued expansion and intensification of India-China 
economic cooperation is essential for strengthening bilateral relations.  
 
Both sides shared the view that existing complementarities between their two economies provide 
an important foundation and offer broad prospects for further enhancing their economic relations. 
In order to promote trade and economic cooperation, both sides will take necessary measures 
consistent with their national laws and rules and international obligations to remove impediments 
to bilateral trade and investment. They reaffirmed the importance of the ministerial meeting of the 
Joint Economic Group (JEG) and agreed to hold the next (seventh) JEG meeting within the year.  
 201
The two sides will set up a compact Joint Study Group (JSG) composed of officials and 
economists to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded 
trade and economic cooperation. The JSG would also draw up a programme for the development 
of India-China trade and economic cooperation for the next five years, aimed at encouraging 
greater cooperation between the business communities of both sides. The Group should present a 
study report and recommendations to the two Governments on measures for comprehensive trade 
and economic cooperation by the end of June 2004. 
 
The two countries will launch a financial dialogue and cooperation mechanism to strengthen their 
dialogue and coordination in this sector.  
 
The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation at the World Trade Organization, which is not only 
to mutual benefit but also in the broader interest of developing countries. The two sides will hold 
dialogues on a regular basis in this regard.  
 
Historical and cultural links between India and China will be strengthened, inter-alia, through the 
promotion of exchanges in culture, education, science and technology, media, youth and people-
to-people relations. They agreed to set up Cultural Centers in each other’s capitals and facilitate 
their establishment.  
Both sides will work towards the enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism, exchange 
hydrological data in flood season on common rivers as agreed, cooperation in agriculture, dairy, 
food processing, health and other sectors.  
 
They agreed on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, 
which will help enhance and deepen the mutual understanding and trust between the two armed 
forces. They confirmed that the exchange of visits by their Defence Ministers and of military 
officials at various levels should be strengthened.  
 
The two sides exchanged views on the India-China boundary question and expounded their 
respective positions. They reiterated their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually 
acceptable solution through consultations on an equal footing. The two sides agreed that pending 
an ultimate solution, they should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border 
areas, and reiterated their commitment to continue implementation of the agreements signed for 
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this purpose, including the clarification of the Line of Actual Control.  
 
The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the political 
perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.  
The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China 
political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and 
reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing 
about “independence of Tibet”.  
 
The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one 
China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation of 
the Indian position.  
 
India and China recognized the primacy of maintaining international peace. This is a prerequisite 
for the socio-economic development of all developing countries, including India and China. The 
world is marked by diversity. Every country has the right to choose its own political system and 
path to development. As two major developing countries, India and China acknowledged the 
importance of their respective roles in the shaping of a new international political and economic 
order. The international community must help the developing countries to eliminate poverty and 
narrow the gap between the North and the South through dialogue and cooperation so as to 
achieve common prosperity.  
 
The two sides acknowledged the vital importance of the role of the United Nations in world 
peace, stability and development. They are determined to continue their efforts in strengthening 
the UN system. They reaffirmed their readiness to work together to promote reform of the UN. In 
reform of the UN Security Council, priority should be given to enhancing representation of the 
developing countries.  
Both sides stood for continued multilateral arms control and disarmament process, undiminished 
and equal security for all at progressively lower levels of armament and for multilateral 
negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. They are firmly 
opposed to introduction of weapons in outer space, use or threat of force against space-based 
objects and support cooperation in development of space technology for peaceful purposes. 
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 The two sides recognised the threat posed by terrorism to them and to global peace and security. 
They resolutely condemned terrorism in any form. The struggle between the international 
community and global terrorism is a comprehensive and sustained one, with the ultimate 
objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions. This requires strengthening the global legal 
framework against terrorism. Both sides shall also promote cooperation on counter-terrorism 
through their bilateral dialogue mechanism.  
 
India and China face special and similar challenges in their efforts to protect the environment 
while simultaneously forging ahead with rapid social and economic development of their 
countries. In this context, the two sides agreed to work together in a practical manner to cooperate 
on preserving the environment and ensuring sustainable development and to coordinate positions 
on climate change, biodiversity and other issues in relevant multilateral fora.  
 
The two sides supported multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such cooperation 
promotes mutually beneficial exchanges, economic growth as well as greater cohesion among 
Asian countries. The two sides viewed positively each other’s participation in regional and sub-
regional multilateral cooperation processes in Asia.  
The two sides stated that the improvement and development of India-China relations is not 
targeted at any third country and does not affect either country’s existing friendly relations and 
cooperation with other countries. 
 
The two sides agreed that the official visit of the Prime Minister of India to the People’s Republic 
of China has been a success, has contributed to enhancing mutual understanding and trust 
between the Governments, leaders and peoples of the two countries, and marks a new step 
forward in strengthening the all-round cooperation between India and China in the new century.  
 
Prime Minister Vajpayee invited Premier Wen Jiabao to visit India at a mutually convenient time 
and conveyed to President Hu Jintao an invitation from President Abdul Kalam to visit India. The 
Chinese side accepted the invitations with appreciation. The dates of the visits will be settled 
through diplomatic channels. On behalf of the Government and the people of India, H.E Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee thanked the Government and the people of China for the warm 
welcome received by him and his delegation.  
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 Signed in Beijing on 23 June 2003 in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages. 
(Atal Bihari Vajpayee)    (Wen Jiabao) 
Prime Minister     Premier of the State Council 
The Republic of India    The People’s Republic of China  















Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique  
 
Beijing, 23 December 1988 
2000/11/15  
At the invitation of Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made and official goodwill visit to the People's 
Republic of China from 19 to 23 December 1988. Accompanying His Excellency Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to China were Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, Mr. Narasimha Rao, Minister of 
External Affairs of India, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of Commerce, Dr. B. Shankaranand, 
Minister of Law and Justice and Water Resources, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, Minister of State for 
External Affairs, and other Indian officials.  
 
Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in an atmosphere of friendship, 
candidness and mutual understanding. President Yang Shangkun of the People's Republic of 
China, General secretary Zhao Ziyang of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) and Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee 
had separate meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During his visit, the two Governments 
signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Science and Technology, the agreement 
Relating to Civil Air Transport, and the Executive Programme for the Years 1988, 1988 and 1990 
under the Agreement for Cultural Cooperation. Both the Premier and the Prime Minister were 
present at the signing ceremony. The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi and their party 
also toured historical sites and scenic spots in Beijing, Xi'an and Shanghai.  
 
During their talks and meetings, the leaders of the two countries had a wide exchange of views 
and ideas on bilateral relations and international issues of mutual interest. Both sides found such 
talks and meetings useful as they enhanced mutual understanding in the interest of further 
improvement and development of bilateral relations. The two sides made a positive appraisal of 
the cooperation and exchanges in recent years in trade, culture, science and technology, civil 
aviation and other fields, and expressed satisfaction with the relevant agreements reached 
between the two countries. They emphasized the vast scope that existed for learning from each 
other.  
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They emphasized that the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, which were jointly initiated by China and India and 
which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding 
principles for good relations between states. These principles also constitute the basic guidelines 
for the establishment of a new international political order and the new international economic 
order. Both sides agreed that their common desire was to restore, improve and develop Sino-
Indian good-neighborly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles. This not only 
conforms to the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but will actively contribute to peace and 
stability in Asia and the world as a whole. The two sides reaffirmed that they would make efforts 
to further their friendly relation.  
 
The leaders of the two countries held earnest, indepth discussions on the Sino-Indian boundary 
question and agreed to settle this question through peaceful and friendly consultations. They also 
agreed to develop their relations actively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable 
climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question while 
seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this question. In this context, concrete steps will be 
taken, such as establishing a joint working group on the boundary question and a joint group on 
economic relations and trade and science and technology.  
 
The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. 
The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the Government of India that 
Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan 
elements are not permitted on Indian soil.  
 
With regard to the international situation, the two sides held that in the present-day world, 
confrontation was giving way to dialogue and tension to relaxation. This is a trend resulting from 
long years of unswerving struggle by the peace-loving countries and people of the world against 
power politics. It is conducive to world peace and to the settlement of regional problems. It also 
facilitates the efforts of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to develop their 
national economies. China and India will make their own contributions to the maintenance of 
world peace, promotion of complete disarmament and attainment of common progress.  
His Excellency Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and their party expressed 
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heartfelt thanks to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China for the warm 
and friendly hospitality accorded them.  
 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited Premier Li Peng to visit the Republic of India at his 
convenience. Premier Li Peng has accepted the invitation with pleasure. And the date of the visit 
will be decided upon through diplomatic channels.  
 
Source: China Report, Vol.25, No.2 (April-June 1989), pp.199-200.  Text also found in 
www.fmprc.gov.cn. 
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